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Abstract
Monitoring the trustworthiness of social interaction partners is a cornerstone of social
cognition. However, the mechanics of learning about trust during online interactions as a
result of a person's behaviour can be difficult to explore. The current experiments use a
gaze cueing paradigm where faces provide either valid (always shift their gaze towards
the location of a subsequent target), or invalid cues (always shift their gaze to a different
location). Following gaze cueing, participants rate valid faces as more trustworthy than
invalid faces. We show that this incidental trust learning is sensitive to the emotional
expression of the face, is specific to assessments of trust, occurs outside of conscious
awareness, and is driven primarily by a decrease in trust for invalid faces (Chapter 2),
perhaps reflecting a cheater detection module. Memory for incidentally learned trust is
surprisingly durable, is affected by the familiarity of the cueing faces (Chapter 3), and
does not affect memory for the faces' physical features, nor does the trustworthiness of
the face generalise to other stimuli (Chapter 4). Furthermore, learning is modulated by
top-down knowledge of social group membership   when group identity is made
experimentally salient, participants default to a group-level representation as a heuristic
for social judgements (Chapter 5), while using naturally occurring group memberships
(i.e. race) results in better learning for in-group members than out-group (Chapter 6).
Finally, while there is evidence that trust learning is driven by learning about eye-gaze
behaviour, this cannot be explained purely by disruptions to visuomotor fluency
(Chapter 7), which suggests that this phenomenon is part of an active social monitoring
framework that relies on physical changes or behaviours in a face to affect subsequent
social judgements.
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Chapter 1. Introduction and literature review
Navigating the social world requires a huge amount of processing power. Every new
person with whom we interact is quickly evaluated according to a range of social
dimensions, such as how friendly they may be, how attractive, how trustworthy, how
interested they are in us, and how dangerous they may be if interactions sour. These are
important judgements because they can colour every subsequent social decision that we
make   whether or not to continue a conversation, or accept a drink, or invest whatever
time and resources may be necessary to build and maintain a relationship with that
person.
These early decisions are made quickly and automatically. Willis and Todorov
(2006) found that people can make decisions about the attractiveness, likeability,
trustworthiness, aggressiveness, and competence of a face image with as little as 100ms
exposure, and these judgements correlated strongly with judgements made in the
absence of time constraints. This indicates that 100ms exposure to a face image is
enough to make reliable social decisions about the person.
The underlying properties of these early social decision mechanisms have been well
explored. First impressions of faces can be explained using three dimensions:
trustworthiness, dominance, and youthful-attractiveness (Sutherland et al., 2013).
Decisions about trustworthiness also relate to cues to emotion, to the point where
trustworthy faces (faces displaying a physiognomic architecture identied as trustworthy
by Todorov, Baron & Oosterhof, 2008) that express smiles are rated as expressing more
intense happiness than smiling untrustworthy faces, while the reverse is true for angry
expressions (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009). This suggests that emotion and
trustworthiness have a shared perceptual basis, an interpretation supported by the
nding that they also share neural mechanisms (Engell, Todorov & Haxby, 2010).
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First impressions of faces that load on these dimensions are heavily
image-dependent: as images rated as more trustworthy are more likely to include certain
congurations of features that might be similar to emotional expressions, this means that
ambient (varying naturally in lighting, viewpoint, expression, hairstyle, age, etc.) images
of individuals can generate widely varied social decision ratings (Jenkins, White,
Van Montfort & Mike Burton, 2011; Todorov & Porter, 2014). In fact, computational
analysis of image properties can account for 58% of variance in human raters' impressions
of previously unseen ambient images (Vernon, Sutherland, Young & Hartley, 2014).
Given that much of this literature into rst impressions focuses on decisions that
appear to be highly motivated by image-level properties rather than in vivo social
decisions about people, this research is particularly applicable in a world of social media,
where selection of prole pictures and avatars to represent us online is a key way of
communicating with people who have not met us in person. It also has far reaching and
potentially catastrophic implications in the justice system   Wilson and Rule (2015)
found that nave participants' ratings of inmate photographs predicted the likelihood
that a convicted murderer would be sentenced to death (as opposed to life
imprisonment), and that this relationship was true even of wrongfully convicted people
who were later exonerated, indicating that physical appearance can increase the
likelihood of a wrongfully severe punishment.
However, there are some important caveats about generalising from this research to
other real-world social decisions. When interacting with people in the real world our
experiences are much more varied and dynamic than the use of static images allow, and
research on social judgements comparing dynamic with static stimuli is scarce,
inconclusive, and focuses primarily on judgements of attractiveness over any other social
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dimensions (Rubenstein, 2005; Roberts et al., 2009; Koscinski, 2013). There is also
inconsistent evidence on the validity and accuracy of these judgements (Porter, England,
Juodis, Ten Brinke & Wilson, 2008; Kramer & Ward, 2010; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010;
Carre & McCormick, 2008; Eerson & Vogt, 2013; Gomez-Valdes et al., 2013).
Research into rst impressions has yielded some important insights, but there are
other techniques to study social judgements. One way is to use third-party information
through short descriptions of a character's behaviour (what one might consider a
laboratory analogue of gossip). These behavioural vignettes are typically crafted to elicit
particular trait judgements (e.g. ``Bob gives a lot of money to charity" could indicate
that Bob is generous, while, ``Adam likes to make jokes at other people's expense" would
indicate that Adam is unlikeable).
The advantage of measuring attitudes elicited by these behavioural vignettes rather
than physical facial features is that the same identities can be compared when they
embody dierent traits. This is particularly useful in neuroimaging, where third-party
behavioural descriptions can be used to dissociate higher order social information from
low-level visual properties, and have helped to show representations of social information
in visuotemporal (Verosky, Todorov & Turk-Browne, 2013) and posterior cingulate
cortex (Kuzmanovic et al., 2012).
Behavioural descriptions have also been used to examine some behavioural
properties of social learning. Falvello, Vinson, Ferrari and Todorov (2015) investigated
the set capacity of learning from positive, negative, or neutral behavioural descriptions
by showing participants 500 image-description pairs, a subset of which (either 100, 200,
300, or 400 images) were faces and the rest places. Participants were instructed to read
the behavioural descriptions and form impressions about the face presented with it, and
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after learning they rated each face on a scale of trustworthiness from 1 (untrustworthy)
to 9 (trustworthy). They found that people rated faces paired with socially positive
behaviours as more trustworthy than those paired with negative behaviours, and this
eect was equally strong for a face set of 400 faces as for a set of 100 faces, which
suggests that the set capacity for this social learning is impressively large.
Rule, Slepian and Ambady (2012) found that information about trustworthiness and
deception can have a knock-on eect to downstream cognitive processes such as memory:
untrustworthy faces are remembered better than trustworthy faces, and this eect
emerges whether faces physically appear as trustworthy or untrustworthy, or if they are
described as such using third-party information. This is also something that can be seen
to a degree in the results of Falvello et al. (2015)   ratings for faces associated with
positive behaviours were rated on average about 0.2 points higher on the 9-point
trustworthiness scale than were faces associated with neutral behaviours, while faces
associated with negative behaviours were rated about 0.75 points lower than neutral
faces, which suggests that that eect was primarily driven by better memory for
untrustworthy identities.
It is important to recognise some limitations when generalising from research that
uses behavioural vignettes, and to acknowledge that these types of third-party
information cannot tell us everything about how we form social judgements and learn
about the trustworthiness of others. For example, Kuzmanovic et al. (2012), who found
posterior cingulate activation in response to trait-diagnostic vignettes, found no such
activity if trait evaluations were made on the basis of nonverbal expressive behaviours,
and these were instead associated with amygdala activation. The fact that separate
brain regions are recruited for these dierent tasks suggests that they arrive at the same
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end goal (a social evaluation) through dierent means, and therefore that this posterior
cingulate activity relates more to whether learned information is verbal rather than
whether it is social.
Rather than a specically social mechanism for evaluating other people, research
using behavioural vignettes seems to recruit modality-independent aective mechanisms
that are not specically tailored for social information. This is shown by the fact that
Falvello et al. (2015) found similar learning capacity for place-description associations as
for face-description associations. This points to an interpretation of results from studies
that use third-party information as showing fundamentally more general learning
mechanisms than we might employ naturally within a given social context.
Imagine the social world as a geographical place, and navigating through it as a
literal navigational task. In this case, rst impressions from physical appearance and
physiognomy are like a compass. They provide useful information that, for short journeys
(i.e. short interactions with little chance of future consequences) may well suce. You
may also sample this information multiple times in the early stages to calibrate and get
your bearings with the journey. Conversely, third-party information is like street signs  
information from the external world that structures and guides your expectations and
more often than not will serve as useful sources of information that guide your behaviour.
However, there is a crucial third source of information that has been less explored in
the literature, and that is one's own experiences. To use the geography analogy, this
may be noticing information (e.g. the terrain, the visibility, potential shortcuts) not
oered by signs and compasses. In a social sense, this kind of information is direct
experience of a person's behaviour, a source that should arguably be privileged over
third-party information and lead to stronger representations as it pertains to the self
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(Ham & van den Bos, 2006, as cited in Uleman, Adil Saribay & Gonzalez, 2008) as it has
a fundamental basis in episodic memory. This information can also be used to calibrate
rst impressions   if a person looks particularly aggressive but consistently behaves in
an agreeable and friendly manner, then the initial impression should be updated in line
with new information.
Learning directly from experience can be a powerful cue to a person's character and,
through the use of social dilemma and economic games, trustworthiness in particular can
be both manipulated and measured. An example of an economic trust game might be a
situation where a participant and a confederate are taking turns investing in a central
pot. If both players cooperate, the participant will invest their money (and so take a
risk), the confederate will reciprocate, and the total sum of money will be split between
them, which is a fair arrangement. Alternatively, if the participant cooperates and the
confederate betrays their trust, the confederate gets all of the money and the participant
gets nothing. If both players attempt to cheat their partner then both players get
nothing. You can therefore manipulate trust by manipulating the behaviour of the
confederate, and measure it by monitoring how much the participant is willing to invest.
Other variations of the task might use dierent sequences, risks, or strategies to
interrogate specic features of participants' trust.
These types of games have been used to good eect to investigate realistic
in-the-moment negotiations of trust. For example, research has shown that women are
more forgiving of trust transgressions than are men (Haselhuhn, Kennedy, Kray,
Van Zant & Schweitzer, 2015). There is also evidence that enhanced memory for
untrustworthy individuals may be driven by expectations. Buchner, Bell, Mehl and
Musch (2009) found that participants who engaged in an economic game with
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cooperative and cheating faces showed better source memory for cheaters in a surprise
memory test, but Bell, Buchner and Musch (2010) found better old-new recognition and
source memory for both cooperators and cheaters over neutral control faces, and what
better predicted source memory of faces was the comparative rarity of the face's
behaviour. Later studies (Bell, Buchner, Erdfelder et al., 2012; Bell, Buchner, Kroneisen
& Giang, 2012) conrm that this enhanced memory for cheaters appears to be driven
more by expectancy violations   that is, people remember surprising or unexpected
events (in a style of learning similar to a Rescorla & Wagner, 1972, model, where
learning is better for unexpected than expected events) rather than using memory
specically tailored for deceivers.
Economic games are a powerful tool for measuring and manipulating trust as they
rely on direct experience of trustworthy or untrustworthy behaviour that participants
use to make decisions. Compared with trust judgements elicited by faces' physical
appearance, these techniques have the advantage of being able to make the same
identities as both trustworthy and untrustworthy within an experimental design. On the
other hand, these techniques also have the advantage over third-party information as the
deceptive behaviour participants are using to judge the faces is personally relevant and
has a foundation within episodic memory, which allows researchers to examine deception
and betrayal in a more ecologically valid context. Using combinations of these dierent
methods dimensions can be manipulated orthogonally to investigate what happens when
dierent signals about a person's trustworthiness compete (e.g. Suzuki & Suga, 2010;
Rezlescu, Duchaine, Olivola & Chater, 2012).
However, a disadvantage of economic trust games is that they are an overt, explicit
manipulation that is exogenously driven. Participants know that the behaviour of their
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partners is a crucial manipulation in a lot of these games, and the mere context of a
competitive game may change how they behave towards cooperators and cheaters. On
the other hand, in the real world we do not typically operate in such a competitive
context, and deceptive or cooperative behaviour may therefore be treated dierently
than it is in game situations. Indeed, in real social interactions our decisions may be
driven by behavioural cues outside of our conscious awareness   resulting in so-called
`gut' decisions.
There is some evidence that unconscious processing is a powerful and useful tool,
and in some cases it may be necessary for processing of information to be implicit. In a
recent review ten Brinke, Vohs and Carney (2016) describe research into lie detection,
and describe a trend where participants perform poorly when asked to explicitly judge
whether a partner has told a lie or the truth. However, in more implicit scenarios, such
as when participants do not know that lying is a part of the experimental manipulation,
participants often demonstrate behaviours that suggest suspicion (for example, some
report feeling less comfortable with their partner and are less likely to engage in
economic games with that person, despite reporting no explicit awareness). This
counter-intuitive trend, that people are better at detecting or learning deception when
distracted by another task, points to an unconscious social monitoring system. This
could be advantageous in that an unconscious system would be less susceptible to
interference from other factors, such as the potential social repercussions of falsely
accusing somebody of lying (which may make explicit judgements more conservative).
Kaunitz, Rowe and Tsuchiya (2016) have also found that incidental learning can
impact conscious memory for faces. In a visual search task, participants were asked to
search arrays of between 20 and 55 faces for a particular target. Using eye-tracking, the
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authors monitored which non-target faces they had xated during their search, and then
judge whether those faces had been xated and rejected during the search. Despite these
faces being incidental to the task (meaning there is no strategic value in remembering
them), participants could remember up to seven irrelevant non-target faces. This eect
was specic to faces in a natural conguration, as when the same images were inverted
participants' memory capacity was reduced to only three identities. As such, incidental
learning can occur outside of awareness, but it can also intrude on explicit and conscious
memory processes.
The majority of studies looking at social learning use explicit manipulations to
change individuals' social judgements of another person. One outstanding question that
this thesis looks to address is how social learning (in particular social learning of trust,
as this is a powerful and fundamental tenet of social cognition) can occur via incidental
learning processes. That is, the experiments presented here use a technique where the
faces and their behaviour are irrelevant and ignored while participants focus on a
dierent task. The proposal is that such information is nonetheless monitored and used
to make social decisions, and that this may take place without explicit awareness of the
social cues. The paradigm that we use to examine this manipulates trust using gaze
cueing.
1.1 Gaze Cueing
Eye gaze in humans is a uniquely powerful social cue, and can be used to alert others to
potentially interesting, relevant or dangerous stimuli in the environment, as well as
encouraging interpersonal engagement in social interactions. It has been proposed that
the eye itself has evolved to subserve these interactive features; the strong contrast
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between the iris and sclera that is unique to humans enables easier decoding of eye gaze
direction, and humans are more sensitive to the subtle information provided by these
physical features than non-human primates (the Cooperative-Eye Hypothesis;
Tomasello, Hare, Lehmann & Call, 2007).
When we see a person's gaze change direction, we automatically reorient our own
attention to where they are looking (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). This is similar to basic
directional cueing that can be generated with arrow stimuli (Tipples, 2002), in that any
object that cues the spatial location of a target improves subsequent processing of the
target when it appears. Despite similar levels of cueing to arrows in laboratory settings,
however, eyes are a unique cueing stimulus and research with eye-tracking has shown
that people will orient their eyes towards the heads and particularly eyes of another
person over and above any other type of stimulus, including arrows, in natural scenes
(Birmingham, Bischof & Kingstone, 2009).
Gaze cues cannot be ignored completely (Driver et al., 1999), and susceptibility to
them develops early in life (Hood, Willen & Driver, 1998; Reid, Striano, Kaufman &
Johnson, 2004). Gaze cueing has been demonstrated in a variety of dierent paradigms,
and has been shown during face-to-face interactions (Lachat, Conty, Hugueville &
George, 2012), using subliminally presented stimuli (Xu, Zhang & Geng, 2011; Chen &
Yeh, 2012), and even using illusory faces (Takahashi & Watanabe, 2013). Kuhn, Tatler
and Cole (2009) have found that the direction of eye gaze is the most powerful biological
tool to misdirect participants' attention during a magic trick. Gaze cueing eects are
reliable, robust, and dicult to change, and evidence that cueing eects are susceptible
to features such as the trustworthiness or identity of the face is inconsistent (Suenbach
& Schonbrodt, 2014; Hungr & Hunt, 2012; Strachan, Kirkham & Tipper, n.d.; Frischen
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& Tipper, 2004).
We know that gaze cues can be used to deceive or cooperate with partners, and so if
a partner directs or misdirects us to a target we can extrapolate information about that
person's personality and intentions. We also learn early in life to monitor the behaviour
of those around us to measure their reliability   infants have been shown to prefer to
follow the gaze of adults who reliably look towards the location of a reward at 14 (Chow,
Poulin-Dubois & Lewis, 2008) and 8 months old (Tummeltshammer, Mareschal &
Kirkham, 2014). Extracting such information becomes more sophisticated as we grow
older.
1.1.1 Incidental social learning from gaze cues
Bayliss and Tipper (2006) used a gaze-cueing paradigm where participants had to
perform an object categorisation task on images that appeared on either side of the
screen while an unrelated face appeared in the centre and either always cued the correct
location (valid) or always cued the incorrect location (invalid). See Figure 1.1 for an
outline of the trial sequence. When subsequently asked to judge which faces appeared
more trustworthy in a 2-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) paradigm, participants chose
faces that consistently looked towards the targets (valid-cueing) over those that always
looked away from targets (invalid cueing).
Interestingly, when asked which of the face pairs appeared more frequently during
the experiment, participants chose the invalid face over the valid. This could reect
better learning of invalid or untrustworthy identities, as they are associated with the
unexpected feeling of being deceived in a non-competitive context, in line with previous
research (Rule et al., 2012; Buchner et al., 2009; Bell et al., 2010; Bell, Buchner,
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Figure 1.1: Example of valid-cueing face trials used in Bayliss and Tipper (2006). A face
would appear in the centre of the screen and cue either left or right, then the object would
appear. Participants had to categorise the object as either a kitchen or garage item. Faces would
consistently cue either validly or invalidly throughout the experiment. Faces were matched in pairs
and the pair member that was valid was counterbalanced across participants.
Erdfelder et al., 2012; Bell, Buchner, Kroneisen & Giang, 2012).
It is important to note that participants were instructed to focus on quickly and
accurately classifying the peripheral targets during the gaze-cueing procedure and to
ignore the central face as irrelevant, which means that this learning via gaze cueing
behaviour was incidental. When interviewed after the fact, participants also expressed
little suspicion of the critical manipulation of gaze behaviour. Overall, this nding
reects a form of incidental learning about the identities involved in this experiment.
Although participants did not report consciously remembering the gaze behaviour of the
faces, their choices as to which of a pair was more trustworthy consistently reected that
person's cueing validity.
Since this initial study there have been several replications of this nding. Bayliss,
Griths and Tipper (2009) replicated the study using faces that varied in their emotional
expression. They found that this learning (i.e. the likelihood of selecting the valid face as
the trustworthier of the pair) was strongest when faces expressed a smile, was only
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marginal for neutral faces, and was absent when faces were posing angry expressions.
The fact that this eect is aected by higher order social information such as emotion,
which conveys a person's internal state and motivations, suggests that this learning of
trust from gaze contingencies reects a uniquely social learning mechanism. This is
further supported by the fact that similar cueing from individual but non-social arrow
stimuli does not result in acquired attitude changes to these stimuli (i.e. people do not
like valid arrows more than invalid arrows; Manssuer, Pawling, Hayes & Tipper, 2015).
The results of Bayliss and Tipper (2006) raise several questions. While there is a
hint that there may be dierences between how valid and invalid faces are remembered,
and this would be in line with previous research, it is impossible to tell whether such
asymmetries are present when using 2AFC as a measure, as the responses to valid and
invalid faces are inherently co-dependent (that is, one cannot select the valid face as
being trustworthier than the invalid face without also selecting the invalid faces as being
untrustworthier). Rogers et al. (2014) replicated the original experiment but introduced
an economic game to measure how gaze cueing behaviour might impact participants'
real-world decisions about the face identities. They found that participants invested
more money with valid than invalid faces, even at their own expense (that is, even when
there was no chance of reciprocity), which suggests that their learned knowledge of faces'
cueing behaviour can have real-world social consequences.
Manssuer, Roberts and Tipper (2015) and Manssuer, Pawling et al. (2015) have
updated the original paradigm by asking participants to rate each face on trustworthiness
using scalar ratings at the beginning and end of the experiment. This way, they can
measure not only how individual faces relate to each other, but also how the crucial
manipulation of gaze behaviour changes the apparent trustworthiness of a face over the
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course of the experiment. This technique also has the advantage of being much easier to
apply than conventional economic games such as those used in Rogers et al. (2014).
1.1.2 A model of incidental social learning from gaze cues
The aim of the current body of work is to explore the mechanisms behind how people
can incidentally learn social information from task-irrelevant behaviours such as gaze
direction. Imagine a model of face processing similar to that posed by Bruce and Young
(1986) or Haxby, Homan and Gobbini (2000), where there are two streams of
information processing about faces. One stream is thought to process invariant aspects
of faces such as their identity, gender, age, and race, and is subserved by ventral brain
areas in the fusiform gyrus. The other stream processes more transient information that
can change from moment to moment, such as eye gaze, and are subserved by more dorsal
temporal areas such as superior temporal sulcus. Incidental social learning from gaze
cues points to some communication between these streams of information, where gaze
behaviour feeds into stored identity representations (which also receive input from the
invariant stream) to inform later trustworthiness judgements.
There are many potential ways in which these streams could communicate.
Consider the simple model shown in Figure 1.2. This shows a two-stream model for
information from faces, leading from the earliest stages of face processing (where the
structural conguration is recognised as a face, likely subserved by face-selective regions
in occipital cortex) through to a unit that stores information about a particular identity
(likely subserved by anterior temporal areas that relate to semantic and representational
memory; Haxby et al., 2000), which can then be used for higher order social tasks such
as mindreading. Labelled are examples of how processing of information can be distorted
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Figure 1.2: A model of incidental social learning from gaze cues. Visual information enters the
model from the left, through early face processing systems that identify the face-like conguration
and structure. Information is then processed by separate streams: an invariant stream, in red,
which processes information that is unlikely to change over the course of an interaction (e.g.
identity), and a variant stream, in blue, which processes information that is likely to change
(e.g. gaze direction). These streams then feed into a stored representation of the individual's
identity, which can be used later to process incoming information. Some examples of feedback
communications are shown: A. and B. processing of variant (A.) and invariant (B.) information
is not aected by person knowledge, but the integration of this information is aected by what is
already known about that identity; C. person knowledge aects processing of variant information
such as eye gaze or emotion; D. person knowledge aects processing of invariant information such
as gender or race; E. either variant or invariant information is aected by the content of the other.
or aected by other modules in the system. In this model, processes A. and B. would
serve as lters for incoming information   evaluating information from both streams
about an individual so that it can be integrated with the representation for that identity.
These processes likely depend on the nature of the stored identity representation, or
person knowledge, as well as the surrounding context. For example, if the identity
representation is sparse (i.e. the person is unfamiliar) certain types of information may
be privileged over others   for example, if the person is unfamiliar then negative
information may be privileged over positive (a `stranger danger' monitoring system).
On the other hand, processes C. and D. show what might happen when stored
person knowledge is clear enough that it can interfere with earlier processing of incoming
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information. For example, Suenbach and Schonbrodt (2014) used famously trustworthy
or untrustworthy characters from popular lms (e.g. Viggo Mortensen's Aragorn from
Lord of the Rings as a trustworthy example; Anthony Hopkins' Hannibal Lecter from
Silence of the Lambs as an untrustworthy example) as gaze cueing stimuli. The authors
found that gaze cueing from untrustworthy individuals was inhibited, and this was
potentially moderated by participants' levels of trait anxiety. On the other hand,
Manssuer (2015) found no eect of trustworthiness on gaze cueing when trustworthiness
was based on the physical appearance of individuals. This suggests that stored person
knowledge can interfere with gaze following, but physical cues to trustworthiness (which
are closely related to emotion and therefore likely processed along the variant stream
also) appear to be processed in parallel, with little interference. With this in mind, we
might therefore expect to see the magnitude of cueing costs reduce as participants learn
more about the cueing validity of particular faces.
The nal communication channel displayed in Figure 1.2 is a channel between the
variant and invariant processing pathways, process E. Information in one processing
stream may be able to inuence information in the other. An example of such an eect
might be the Own-Race bias in emotion processing, where information about a face's
race (processed in the invariant stream) aects the eciency of recognising emotional
expressions (processed in the variant stream). Evidence for this eect in emotion has
been shown repeatedly (e.g. Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002b, 2002a; Hu, Wang, Han, Weare
& Fu, 2015; Beaupre & Hess, 2006), but there is comparatively little research examining
the processing of information such as eye gaze. Some evidence suggests that eye gaze can
have an eect in the other direction   memory decits for other-race faces appear to be
related to direct eye gaze, for example (Adams, Pauker & Weisbuch, 2010). However,
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further exploration of this pathway, and how it might aect the assimilation of variant
information into the stored identity representation, remain relatively unexplored.
This model is dramatically oversimplied   none of the modules presented here are
straightforward enough to be encompassed in a single box, as the two streams likely
include subordinate, parallel streams for dierent types of information, and the stored
identity representation covers a range of processes including mentalising, long-term
memory, and other top-down processes such as information from third-party gossip.
However, even this simplied model paints a complex picture of social learning. The aim
of this thesis is to explore how this model might behave in a particular set of
circumstances: that is, how do we build an identity representation on the basis of
information from the variant stream   eye gaze   while controlling for information from
other sources. By controlling the invariant information (identity) and top-down
knowledge, we can explore some of the key features and limitations of learning about
trustworthiness from observing a person's gaze behaviour.
For example, we can explore whether, as participants are exposed to more and more
information and use that to build a representation of an identity, acquired knowledge of
cue validity aects earlier processing of gaze cues later in the experiment (i.e. by the end
of the experiment are people less susceptible to gaze cues because they have learned
which faces are trustworthy; pathway C.). We can explore how information such as
emotion, which is represented in the same pathway, can change the assimilation of eye
gaze behaviour into a stored identity representation (pathway A.). Or we can examine
whether gaze behaviour can change how information from alternative sources, such as
top-down knowledge of the social group membership or race of the face, is incorporated
or represented (i.e. can knowledge of out-group members' helpful behaviour change how
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we make judgements based on that information; pathway D.). We can even ask whether
eye gaze behaviour can inform trustworthiness judgements in the absence of conscious
awareness. The gaze cueing paradigm used here is a powerful tool for investigating the
intricacies of social learning from behaviour.
1.2 Scope of this thesis
The current thesis aims to explore key questions and features associated with this
incidental learning of trust. A key underlying theme of all experiments is to monitor the
incidental learning of gaze contingencies associated with each face stimulus, and to
explore how these contingencies then manifest as social decisions about trust. Over six
experimental chapters and eighteen separate experiments, we aim to describe the
mechanisms subserving this incidental social learning.
Chapter 2 explores certain key features of this incidental learning, including some
important replications of previous results. As well as exploring the role of emotional
expression in trust learning, this chapter also addresses whether this eect is specic to
trust as a social judgement, and whether or not this learning is a result of conscious
awareness of gaze contingencies. In Chapter 3, we look at how durable the eect is and
how initial levels of familiarity with the faces may lead to more stable representations of
individual identities over time. This chapter also addresses whether the eect is strong
enough to survive reversing learned individual gaze behaviours unexpectedly.
Chapter 4 looks at whether there are other ways of capturing these learned
representations of trustworthiness without directly asking participants to explicitly rate
the faces, while chapters 5 and 6 examine how the identity of the cueing face   as a
member of either the participant's own social group or an out-group, using both minimal
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and real-world (racial) social groups   inuences learning of trust. These latter chapters
also address some dierences between using implicitly salient real-world groups and
using explicitly instructed laboratory-based groups in social research.
Finally, Chapter 7 examines the role of visuomotor uency in this learning, and
questions whether the same learning of trust can be seen in the absence of gaze cueing  
without any apparent behaviour from the faces, this chapter explore whether simply
associating some faces with disruptions to uent visuomotor processing is enough to lead
to changes in trustworthiness.
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learning
This chapter explores some of the key features of incidental learning of trust from gaze
cues. This eect has been shown previously using a 2-alternative forced choice (2AFC)
rating procedure, where participants are shown pairs of faces (one that has provided
valid cues throughout gaze cueing and the other invalid cues) and asked to select which
they feel is the more trustworthy of the two. However, this does not explain how these
changes come about: whether this eect is driven by an increase in trustworthiness for
valid faces, a decrease for invalid faces, or a bidirectional mix of the two. To further
investigate the specic nature of changes in trust ratings two scalar ratings of
trustworthiness are used in the current studies, one at the beginning and one at the end
of the experiment, to track changes in trustworthiness for both valid and invalid
faces (c.f., Manssuer, Pawling et al., 2015). This more sensitive measure provides the
ideal approach to further investigate key boundary conditions for the understanding of
the processes mediating incidental learning of trust.
Based on ndings by Manssuer, Roberts and Tipper (2015) that event-related
potentials (ERPs) to valid and invalid cueing identities are characterised by a late
positive potential (LPP) component that is associated with stimulus valence and that
rises only in response to invalid faces, we expect that this learning of trust may be
specialised to detect identities that are likely to deceive. As such, we predict that the
behavioural pattern of results in this experiment would be primarily characterised by a
decrease in trust for invalid faces.
One outstanding issue where this new measure may be beneal concerns the role of
facial emotion. Bayliss et al. (2009) found that gaze-contingent trust eects appear to
rely on a positive social context, as they found no trust eects when the faces expressed
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anger and a reliable eect only when the faces smiled. However, the neutral expression
condition was somewhat ambiguous, as participants were only slightly more likely to
select the valid face as the more trustworthy of a matched pair in a 2AFC paradigm.
This previous work using forced choice between valid and invalid cueing individuals
creates a somewhat blunt measure; we can see that valid faces are preferred over invalid,
but as each judgement made about a face is also inseparable from the judgement made
about its pair (i.e. in a 2AFC, you cannot judge one face as trustworthy without judging
the other to be untrustworthy), we cannot tell what the underlying mechanisms might
be. We also do not know how exactly the emotional expression of a face might change
the pattern of results using forced-choice measures of trustworthiness. It still could be
the case that neutral faces are not sucient to elicit learning of trust  there is a wealth
of evidence that smiling faces are treated dierently from neutral faces in various social
interactions, both when measured by trustworthiness judgements (Hehman, Flake &
Freeman, 2015) and by more implicit measures (Wang, Ranganath & Yonelinas, 2014)  
or it may be that we can detect trust learning with neutral faces using this new, more
sensitive measure.
Therefore we examined the role of emotion in the incidental learning of trust in
conditions where faces expressed neutral emotions (Experiment 2.1) and when they
smiled (Experiment 2.2). We aim to unequivocally identify whether incidental learning
of trust from gaze cueing can be detected when faces express neutral emotions.
Additionally, and more importantly, we can assess whether the pattern of learning
(whether valid faces increase in trust and invalid faces decrease in trustworthiness, or
whether the eects are unidirectional) is the same for both neutral and positive emotions.
The further issue this chapter investigates is whether incidental learning of eye-gaze
48
Chapter 2: Key boundaries of trust learning
patterns is specic to judgements of trust, or generalises to other emotional assessments,
such as liking of a person. One might assume that trust and liking will be closely
related: if we trust someone, we are more likely to like them. Indeed, the two are often
conated as aspects of warmth in dual-dimension theories of social cognition (e.g. Fiske,
Cuddy & Glick, 2007). However, subtle behaviours that can be used to deceive others,
such as gaze shifts, could have quite specic eects on trust. For example, whether to
invest money with another person is inuenced by incidental learning of patterns of gaze
shifts, as is the decision to be altruistic while computing the likelihood that such an act
will be reciprocated in the future (Rogers et al., 2014). Such decisions might not be
aected by general feelings of liking, for example we may trust a lawyer to do their
utmost to preserve our freedom, but we may not like them on a personal level; the two
feelings are distinct, and can be separated. To our knowledge, there is little previous
work directly addressing the question of whether trust and liking are functionally similar
in this way, so in Experiment 2.3 we replace the trustworthiness ratings of Experiment
2.1 with likeability ratings, to see if this incidental learning is specic to trust or if there
is a broader aective spillover into other social judgements.
The nal issue that this chapter addresses is that of awareness. Bayliss and Tipper
(2006) found that most participants did not report that they were aware of the
experimental manipulation, suggesting that they demonstrated trust learning in the
absence of conscious awareness. However, the current set of experiments uses an updated
paradigm where participants rate the faces for trustworthiness at the beginning of the
experiment as well as the end. It is possible that this pre-experiment rating could cue
participants to the nature of the experiment early on and so encourage demand
characteristics that may be driving any eects. Experiment 2.4 tests this explanation by
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asking participants to make explicit recollections of which faces were valid and which
were invalid, with the aim of seeing whether explicit memory for the face's behaviour can
explain this incidental learning of trust.
2.1 Experiment 2.1
We re-examine whether incidental learning of trust can be detected with faces expressing
neutral emotion, and if such an eect is detected, what pattern of changes in trust are
revealed. In Experiment 2.1 we compare the reaction times (RTs) to valid and invalid
gaze cues, and the trustworthiness changes between the beginning and end of the
experiment.
2.1.1 Methods
Participants
A total of 24 participants (18 female, M age = 19.96, s.d. = 1.49) volunteered for the
study in return for payment or course credit. All were students of the University of York.
All participants provided written consent and the study was given ethical approval by
the Departmental Ethics Committee of the University of York Psychology Department.
Stimuli
Target stimuli for the object classication task were the kitchen and garage object
images used in Bayliss, Paul, Cannon and Tipper (2006). There were 13 unique objects
in each group (kitchen/garage) that appeared in both left and right orientations. All of
the stimuli were coloured in blue. In total, there were 52 individual images used in the
experiment. Face stimuli were taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces
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(KDEF) stimulus set (Lundqvist, Flykt & Ohman, 1998), and included sixteen images;
eight male and eight female. These faces were initially selected by eye from a gure in
the Supplementary Material of Oosterhof and Todorov (2008), in which the faces from
this set are plotted along six judgement dimensions. The faces used were all taken from
the centre (within 1SD from the intercection of all six dimensions) of this plot, so the
faces used in our experiments were, compared with the rest of the KDEF set, as close to
neutral trait judgements as possible.1 These faces were split into two groups, which
would appear as either valid or invalid cues in the experiment (counterbalanced across
participant). The eyes of each face were manipulated using Adobe Photoshop CS6 to
generate faces where the eye gaze was either straight ahead, left or right. Unaltered
images were used for the trustworthiness rating sections.
The study was run on an Intel Core i5 PC with a 21.5" monitor. The experiment
was presented using E-Prime 2.0 software with a white background throughout and the
resolution set to 1024x768 pixels. Participants were sat approximately 60cm from the
display, and during trustworthiness ratings the face stimuli had a visual angle of 19.29
horizontally and 20.97 vertically, while during gaze-cueing the face stimuli had a visual
angle of 13.36 horizontally and 14.93 vertically.
Design and Procedure
Participants were told that they would be asked to perform an object categorisation task
on images of objects that appeared on the left or right side of the screen, and to respond
1Although means and standard deviations were not retrieved from Oosterhof & Todorov's (2008)
material, we can validate our assumption that these groups of faces were close to neutral by examining the
pre-ratings assigned to them in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, as well as Experiments 7.1 and 7.2 (experiments
included in Strachan, Kirkham, Manssuer & Tipper, 2016). As the pre-ratings occurred before any
participants had a chance to experience the faces within an experimental context, any dierences could
only be explained by physical cues to trustworthiness, and the combined power of these four experiments
would be sucient to detect this. We explored this and found that the pre-ratings for faces in one group
(M=-2.71, s.d.=13.04) did not signicantly dier from the other (M = 0.85, s.d. = 6.82; t(14) = -0.68, p
= 0.506).
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Figure 2.1: Outline of gaze-cueing procedure used in Experiment 2.1. (a) Examples of a single
face on a valid (left) and invalid (right) trial. A participant would see this face in only one of the
two conditions; that is, it would only ever be valid or invalid whenever it appeared throughout the
experiment. (b) The trial sequence of the whole experiment. Participants made trustworthiness
ratings of the faces at the beginning (top) and end (bottom) of the experiment, and in the
main body participants categorised the kitchen and garage objects with key-press responses while
ignoring the faces.
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with whether these were garage or kitchen objects. They were also told that the central
face images were irrelevant and to be ignored. Before the experiment participants were
allowed to study printed versions of the kitchen/garage images, in order to familiarise
themselves. This was done rstly to ensure that participants had the knowledge of what
each object was, and secondly to make sure that early responses from the rst trial block
were not confounded by uncertainty as to the object categories of the targets.
Each trial began with a 600ms xation cross in the centre of the screen, which was
then replaced by a face showing a direct gaze for 1,500ms. The face then shifted gaze
either to the left or right for 500ms before the target stimulus appeared on either the
same (valid) or opposite (invalid; see Figure 2.1a) side of the gaze direction. The target
stimulus remained until 2,500ms had passed, following which an error tone would sound
if an incorrect response was logged and the face shifted back to direct gaze for a further
1,000ms. A blank screen followed for 500ms before the next trial began. The trial
structure is shown in Figure 2.1b.
The object categorisation responses were the H key and the Space bar of a
keyboard, chosen because the H key appears directly above the Space bar on QWERTY
keyboards and this direction was orthogonal to the possible location of the target.
Participants were instructed to respond with their index nger on the H key and thumb
on the Space bar. For half of the participants, H represented kitchen objects, while for
the other half it represented garage objects.
In total there were ve blocks of 32 trials each, and each face appeared twice in each
block, once gazing left and once right. The order of faces was randomised, as was the
order of target objects, the side that the target appeared, and the order of valid and
invalid trials.
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At the beginning and the end of the experiment, participants rated the original
unmanipulated face images used to generate the gaze cueing stimuli. Participants were
shown a calibration slide where they clicked in the centre to start, and then the face
images were presented for 1,000ms. Participants were then instructed to click along an
uninterrupted scale that appeared on the screen at a point that conformed to how
trustworthy they felt the person was. The scale recorded responses between -100 and
+100, calculated by the distance from the centre of the line of the participants' mouse
click   responses to the left of the centre were coded as negative, while those to the right
were coded as positive (these were indicated on the screen with a   and + sign at either
end of the scale). Identities were presented in a randomised order.
To ensure that participants were nave to the primary manipulations of the
experiment, and as such that their trust ratings were due to implicit factors rather than
demand characteristics, participants were interviewed after the experiment to see what
suspicions they held of the experimental manipulations. Some participants did report
suspicion of the primary research question when asked, but this issue is addressed
directly in Experiment 2.4 and so we do not discuss it further here.
Data analysis
Before data were analysed, participants' responses were ltered to remove all error trials
(where participants reported the incorrect answer in the object categorisation task) and
RT outliers   RTs below 250ms (too short to process the stimuli) and above 2,500ms
(indicating that participants had not given a response in the allotted time). The number
of remaining trials was then compared with the original number of trials to check that all
participants retained at least 70% of their total trials and had not scored below 70%
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total correct on any one condition during the gaze cueing task.
Linear mixed eects models Data were analysed using a linear mixed eects
modelling approach. RTs, accuracy rates and trustworthiness scores could have been
analysed using conventional parametric techniques such as factorial ANOVAs or t-tests.
However, we felt that in this paradigm it is particularly important to control for more
than just subject-level variance. That is, there is also the issue of materials- or
stimulus-level variance (dierences in how specic faces might be treated). While the
stimuli used throughout this thesis were pre-selected to be as controlled as possible, it is
nonetheless possible that particular individual identities could aect results   for
example, while all faces were selected as being similar in trustworthiness, there is still a
distribution in trustworthiness that may have made certain faces appear more or less
trustworthy when compared with their companions.
With this in mind, we elected to use linear mixed eects models that could control
for variance at both the subject and stimulus level. To do this we used the lme4 package
in R. To give a conceptual introduction to how we used these models, below is an
example of a maximum random structure or null model for modelling trustworthiness
ratings:
> model.null <- lmer(Rating ˜
+ (1|Subject) + (1|Identity) + (0 + Time|Identity) +
+ (0 + Time|Subject) + (0 + Validity|Subject),
+ data = dataframe)
In this example, Rating is the outcome variable (trustworthiness rating) that we are
measuring. 1jSubject and 1jIdentity are the random intercept terms for the subject- and
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stimulus-level random eects. The other terms refer to the slopes of those factors that
are repeated within one of the random factors (e.g. each identity is shown at both times
- pre- and post-experiment - and each subject experiences both times, so these are both
included as random slope terms). When exploring the role of xed factors in this eect,
we include additional xed parameters in the model:
> model.time <- lmer(Rating ˜ Time +
+ (1|Subject) + (1|Identity) + (0 + Time|Identity) +
+ (0 + Time|Subject) + (0 + Validity|Subject),
+ data = dataframe)
> model.valid <- lmer(Rating ˜ Validity +
+ (1|Subject) + (1|Identity) + (0 + Time|Identity) +
+ (0 + Time|Subject) + (0 + Validity|Subject),
+ data = dataframe)
These models give beta estimates and standard error values that we report here. In
order to get a test of signicance   that is, to see whether either of these models
explains a signicantly greater proportion of the variance in the data than does the null
model, we compare each of these in turn with the null model using the anova function
in R (c.f. Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008). This is conceptually similar to testing for a
main eect in a factorial ANOVA. To test for interactions, we generate models with both
factors dened: one that includes an interaction and one that does not, and these can
then be compared in the same way:
> model.2factor <- lmer(Rating ˜ Time + Validity +
+ (1|Subject) + (1|Identity) + (0 + Time|Identity) +
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+ (0 + Time|Subject) + (0 + Validity|Subject),
+ data = dataframe)
> model.interact <- lmer(Rating ˜ Time * Validity +
+ (1|Subject) + (1|Identity) + (0 + Time|Identity) +
+ (0 + Time|Subject) + (0 + Validity|Subject),
+ data = dataframe)
When analysing RTs in Experiment 2.1, we then generated models for each xed
factor individually (block-only and validity-only models), which were compared with the
maximum random structure using the anova function. To measure the interaction of
these factors, we modelled a block x validity interaction and compared this with a block
+ validity model, where both factors were xed but there was no interaction. For RTs
the maximum random structure would not converge with all random slopes dened,
which indicates that the model is overtting the data. In this case it is customary to
remove random slopes until it ts, which in this case only happened once the block j
identity and validity j subject terms were removed. We removed these terms from the
null, block-only and validity-only models to allow for direct comparison. The two-factor
and interaction models both converged with the block j subject and block j identity slope
terms removed.
For accuracy rates, responses were averaged across subject, validity and block and
calculated as percentage correct. For accuracy rates, stimulus eects were not modelled
as this would mean each value could only be an average of two trials, which would be too
much constraint on the variance. As such, each model was calculated with a 1 j Subject
intercept term. Validity-only and block-only models were generated, as well as block +
validity and block * validity, and these were all compared using the same anova
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function as were RTs. The null and single-factor models would not all converge with the
same random terms, and so all terms were removed from these models to allow for direct
comparison. The two-factor and interaction models would not converge until the block j
subject term was removed.
For trustworthiness ratings, the process was largely similar. We again generated a
maximum random structure then generated models for each xed factor individually
(time-only and validity-only). These were compared with the maximum random
structure using the anova function. A time x validity interaction model was then
compared with a time + validity model with no interaction but both factors included.
No trustworthiness models would converge until both the time j subject and time j
identity error terms were removed.
For comparison, we also report more standard analyses in the form of factorial
ANOVAs for each experiment (where appropriate) throughout this thesis. The results of
these analyses are collated in Appendix A.
2.1.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 2.1 are shown in Figure 2.2. RTs were
aggregated across subject, identity, block, and validity, and these were analysed using
linear mixed-eects modelling. Adding block as a xed factor signicantly improved the
t of the maximum random structure model ( = -89.13, SE = 22.82, 2(4) = 20.84, p
<.001), as did including validity as a xed factor ( = 43.50, SE = 7.39, 2(1) = 34.35,
p <.001). Comparison of the two-xed-factor models (block + validity and block *
validity) found no evidence of an interaction ( = -136.64, SE = 17.47, 2(4) = 5.27, p
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Figure 2.2: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds (left plot) and accuracy rates (percent
correct; right plot) across all ve blocks in Experiment 2.1 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid
(solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
= 0.260).
The analysis of accuracy rates found that adding block to the null model
signicantly improved the t ( = 1.56, SE = 1.35, 2(4) = 24.08, p <.001), but
including validity did not ( = 0.07, SE = 0.85, 2(1) = 0.01, p = 0.933). Comparison
of the two-xed-factor models (block + validity and block * validity) found no evidence
of an interaction ( = 4.50, SE = 1.89, 2(4) = 3.56, p = 0.468).
There was no evidence of an interaction of block and validity over the course of the
experiment, indicating that participants did not seem to adapt to and predict invalid
gaze cues to anticipate the true location of a subsequent target. Although this is just one
experiment, there is evidence from the wider literature that supports the idea that
participants do not show diminished cueing costs over time (Manssuer, Roberts &
Tipper, 2015; Manssuer, Pawling et al., 2015). Throughout the experiments in this thesis
we nd no evidence that cueing costs reduce over time as evidenced by an interaction of
block and validity (this is reected in the 2x5 ANOVAs of RTs and accuracy rates listed
in Appendix A, along with gures similar to those presented here, with RTs and accuracy
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broken down across blocks. In these analyses, only one experiment shows an interaction
of block and validity in RTs (Experiment 3.1: p = 0.045), and one more is marginal
(Experiment 2.4: p = 0.097), but no other analyses approach signicance, indicating
that these are likely spurious). Therefore, to be as concise as possible in the main text
we collapse across blocks and look only at whether validity improves the model t (that
is, look for evidence of a gaze-cueing cost) throughout the main body of the thesis.
Trustworthiness ratings
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Figure 2.3: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 2.1 for valid (dotted) and
invalid (solid line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
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The results of the trustworthiness ratings for Experiment 2.1 are shown in
Figure 2.3. Adding time to the null model signicantly improved the model t ( =
-6.59, SE = 1.70, 2(1) = 14.91, p <.001), as did including validity ( = -8.60, SE =
2.40, 2(1) = 11.20, p <.001). Finally, the interaction model (time x validity) t the data
signicantly better than did the full model (time + validity), where both factors were
modelled but without an interaction ( = -13.85, SE = 3.37, 2(1) = 16.74, p <.001).
The results of Experiment 2.1 conform to the pattern one would expect based on
previous studies. Observing somebody's gaze movements automatically triggers a shift in
attention to the same location and resulting in faster processing at that location than
somewhere uncued. This association of face identity and cueing behaviour appears to be
incidentally encoded; even though the face was irrelevant to the task, individuals who
looked away from the target object (invalid cues) were trusted less. This was supported
by subsequent analyses, where we generated separate models of the valid (models
converged once the time j subject term was removed) and invalid rating data separately
(models would not converge with any error terms) and compared a null model with a
model with time as a xed factor (that is, to see if ratings changed signicantly over
time) and found that time improved the model t for invalid faces ( = -13.52, SE =
2.42, 2(1) = 30.01, p <.001) but not for valid faces ( = 0.33, SE = 2.32, 2(1) = 0.02,
p = 0.885), indicating that this eect was primarily driven by a decrease in trust to
invalid faces.
A signicant gaze-cueing eect was found in the RT data and was reected in the
form of decreased trust over the course of the experiment in response to misleading or
invalid faces.
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2.2 Experiment 2.2
This experiment aimed to explore how emotion aects this incidental learning of trust.
This replicates all details of Experiment 2.1, but used smiling rather than neutral face
images as the cueing and rating stimuli. Note that Bayliss et al. (2009) demonstrated
signicant learning of trust when the faces expressed positive emotions with a smile.
However, when the faces expressed a neutral emotion the same pattern of trust was
observed, but it was of marginal signicance. Experiment 2.1 has shown that it is
possible to detect signicant learning of trust when faces are neutral, however the eect
was asymmetrical, as invalid faces declined in trust and valid faces did not change.
Whether faces expressing positive emotions produce this same pattern is the key
question for Experiment 2.2.
2.2.1 Methods
Participants
24 participants (24 female, M age = 20.46, s.d. = 4.05). volunteered for this study in
return for a mixture of course credit and payment.
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 2.1 in every way except that the KDEF
faces used were frontal-view smiling faces in place of neutral (see Figure 2.4). All other
details were identical.
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Experiment 2.1:
Neutral
Experiment 2.2:
Smiling
Figure 2.4: Examples of the neutral (left) and smiling (right) stimuli used in Experiments 2.1 and
2.2, respectively.
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 2.1, and in this experiment no
participants had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials. Data
were analysed in the same way as outlined in Experiment 2.1 Data Analysis section, with
the exception that when analysing RTs and accuracy rates we dropped block (blocks 1-5,
but see Appendix A) as a xed factor in our models and instead compared a null with a
validity-only model with validity j subject as the only random slope term. Models of
accuracy would not converge with any random terms dened.
No models of trustworthiness would converge until both the time j identity and time
j subject terms were removed.
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Figure 2.5: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 2.2 in response to valid (light grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
2.2.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 2.2 are shown in Figure 2.5. Fitting validity
to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when explaining RTs
( = -41.28, SE = 10.08, 2(1) = 15.19, p <.001). This improvement was not seen for
accuracy scores ( = -0.01, SE = 0.02, 2(1) = 0.16, p = 0.687).
Trustworthiness ratings
The changes in trustworthiness ratings for the faces in Experiment 2.2 are shown in
Figure 2.6. In this experiment, participants found invalid faces less trustworthy after the
experiment than before, but this time there was a noticeable increase in trust for valid
faces. Adding time to the null model did not signicantly improve the model t ( =
-0.56, SE = 2.06, 2(1) = 0.07, p = 0.785), but including validity did ( = -8.36, SE =
2.63, 2(1) = 9.42, p = 0.002). Finally, the interaction model (time x validity) t the
data signicantly better than did the full model (time + validity), where both factors
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Figure 2.6: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 2.2 for valid (dotted) and
invalid (solid line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
were modelled but without an interaction ( = -21.17, SE = 4.05, 2(1) = 26.86, p
<.001).
Smiling faces elicited a clearer trust eect than neutral faces, and the pattern of
data is quite telling; when neutral faces were used, valid cueing faces did not change
their trustworthiness over the course of the experiment, while invalid cueing faces showed
a clear devaluation of trustworthiness. Further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness
as a function of time for valid and invalid faces (for which no models would converge
with any random terms) separately found that time improved the model t for invalid
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faces as in Experiment 2.1, and this was again signicant ( = -11.15, SE = 2.89, 2(1)
= 14.57, p <.001) but this time we also saw a signicant improvement for valid faces (
= 10.02, SE = 2.72, 2(1) = 13.34, p <.001).
While it has been shown before that smiling faces elicit stronger trust eects than
neutral faces (Bayliss et al., 2009), this is the rst direct manipulation that can show
dierences in how valid and invalid faces are processed dierently.
2.2.3 Cross-Experiment Analysis
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Figure 2.7: Changes in face ratings in Experiments 2.1 (left; neutral faces) and 2.2 (right; smiling
faces) for valid (light grey) and invalid faces (solid line). Error bars show standard error.
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The combined results of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 are shown in Figure 2.7. As the
only dierence between the two experiments was expression of the face stimuli, the two
changes in trustworthiness across both experiments were combined into a single dataset.
In this analysis, the rst trustworthiness ratings were subtracted from the second ratings
to give a trustworthiness change score   that is, a value for the magnitude and direction
of change over the experiment   and these change scores were compared using linear
mixed eects models that included expression and validity as xed factors. No models
would converge with any slope terms included.
Adding validity to the null model signicantly improved the model t ( = 17.51,
SE = 2.45, 2(1) = 49.43, p <.001), which is not particularly surprising given that both
experiments showed clear incidental trust learning. Including expression also signicantly
improved the t ( = 6.03, SE = 2.52, 2(1) = 5.69, p = 0.017), as smiling faces
generally changed slightly more positively over the course of the experiment than did
neutral faces. However, the interaction model (validity x expression) did not t the data
signicantly better than the full model (validity + expression), where both factors were
modelled but without an interaction ( = 7.32, SE = 4.88, 2(1) = 2.26, p = 0.133).
Closer examination of the dierences between valid and invalid faces (for valid faces
all error terms had to be removed, while for models of invalid faces only the validity j
subject term had to be removed) found that including expression in the model
signicantly improved the t for valid faces ( = 9.69, SE = 3.04, 2(1) = 10.04, p =
0.002), apparently driven by the fact that smiling valid faces were more likely to show an
increase in trustworthiness over the experiment than their neutral counterparts.
However, while this was not seen for invalid faces ( = 2.37, SE = 4.42, 2(1) = 0.30, p
= 0.586), there was no evidence that this eect resulted in a two-way interaction.
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It is important to err on the side of caution when interpreting these
between-experiment analyses, as these dier not only in terms of posed expression of the
faces but also in terms of when the experiment was carried out, therefore the condition
(or experiment) to which participants were assigned was not truly random. It could be
that uncontrolled factors related to the timing of the data collection (e.g. time of year,
amount of sunlight, ambient temperature, or proximity of university deadlines) might
have aected participants' social learning in ways that we cannot determine. As such,
results are presented but are meant to be indicative of interesting results.
2.3 Experiment 2.3
This experiment explores the possibility that incidental learning from gaze cues is not
specic to trustworthiness per se but rather reects a broader valence judgement
associated with the faces. If this is true, then the eect should generalise to other
judgements that have a moral or aective component. As such, Experiment 2.3 changes
the question that participants are asked from one of trustworthiness to one of likeability.
2.3.1 Methods
Participants
27 participants volunteered for this study in return for a mixture of course credit and
payment. Two participants' data were not collected due to runtime errors and a further
one participant had to be removed following RT lters, so the nal number available for
analysis was 24 (24 female, M age = 18.96, s.d. = 1.06).
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Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 2.1 in every way except that at the
beginning and the end of the experiment, participants were asked, ``How LIKEABLE is
this face?'' rather than ``How TRUSTWORTHY is this face?'' and all mentions of
trustworthiness on consent forms and instructions were replaced with the words likeable
or likeability (dependent on context).
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 2.1, and in this Experiment
one participant had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials.
Data were analysed in the same way as outlined in Experiment 2.2. In this experiment,
neither the RT or accuracy models would converge with any random terms dened, and
so these were removed.
In this experiment, no models of likeability ratings would converge until the time j
subject random term was removed.
2.3.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 2.3 are shown in Figure 2.8. Fitting validity
to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when explaining RTs
( = -32.04, SE = 8.85, 2(1) = 13.08, p <.001). This improvement was not seen for
accuracy scores ( = 0.86, SE = 0.77, 2(1) = 1.23, p = 0.267).
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Figure 2.8: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 2.3 in response to valid (light grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
Likeability ratings
The changes in likeability ratings for the faces in Experiment 2.3 are shown in Figure 2.9.
In this experiment, participants found invalid faces less likeable after the experiment
than before and their valid counterparts slightly more, but this dierence was quite
small. Adding time to the null model did not signicantly improve the model t ( =
-0.85, SE = 1.59, 2(1) = 0.29, p = 0.591), nor did including validity ( = -0.46, SE =
1.60, 2(1) = 0.08, p = 0.771), and the interaction model (time x validity) did not t the
data signicantly better than the full model (time + validity), where both factors were
modelled but without an interaction ( = -4.77, SE = 3.11, 2(1) = 2.36, p = 0.124).
We compared the results of Experiment 2.3 with Experiment 2.1 by calculating
trust change scores (the dierence between the second and rst ratings to determine how
participants changed their decisions about trust across the experiment) and compared
these with linear mixed eects models with validity and question (trustworthiness vs.
likeability) as factors. Adding validity to the model signicantly improved the t ( =
-9.31, SE = 2.06, 2(1) = 19.96, p < .001), and including experiment marginally
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Figure 2.9: Time course of likeability ratings over Experiment 2.3 for valid (dotted) and invalid
(solid line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
improved the t ( = -4.77, SE = 42.80, 2(1) = 2.77, p = 0.096), but the key nding
was that an interaction model of validity x question t signicantly better than did a
model with both factors without an interaction ( = -9.08, SE = 4.08, 2(1) = 4.94, p =
0.026), which indicated that trust learning was signicantly dierent from likeability
learning. This is likely driven by the absence of any decrease in likeability for invalid
faces, where this is seen when asking about trustworthiness.
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2.4 Experiment 2.4
This experiment explores whether incidentally learned trustworthiness can be explained
by demand characteristics, as participants could feasibly pick up on the nature of the
experiment without actually experiencing changes in social attitudes. That is, they
become explicitly aware of which faces did and did not repeatedly look towards targets,
and used this explicit knowledge to make judgements on the trust scale. To explore this,
Experiment 2.4 replaced the nal trustworthiness rating with an explicit recollection
check where participants were asked to categorise whether faces had previously looked
towards (valid) or looked away from targets (invalid).
2.4.1 Methods
Participants
31 participants volunteered for this study in return for a mixture of course credit and
payment. One participant's data were not collected due to a runtime error, so the total
number available for analysis was 30 (M age = 21.79, s.d. = 3.90).
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 2.1 in every way up until the end of the
gaze cueing. The nal trustworthiness rating procedure was replaced with a 2AFC
procedure where participants were asked to explicitly recall whether each face was valid
or invalid. That is, after the gaze cueing task, an instruction screen appeared explaining
that each face during the experiment had either always looked towards or away from
where the object was about to appear. They were then told that the next procedure
involved them having to recall whether each face had looked towards or away from the
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object.
In a trial in the awareness check procedure, a face appeared in the centre of the
screen with the question, ``Did this face look TOWARDS or AWAY from the object?''
and response key reminders on either side of the screen. Participants were instructed to
press Z if they felt the face had looked towards where the object had been about to
appear, M if they felt the face had looked away, and the SPACE bar if they could not
remember. Each face was shown once in a randomised order, then the experiment ended.
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 2.1, and in this experiment one
participant had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials. Mean
RTs and percentage accuracy scores were calculated for each participant for both valid
and invalid trials. RT and accuracy data were analysed in the same way as outlined in
Experiment 2.2. In this experiment, RT models would not converge with any random
terms dened and so these were removed.
For awareness results, participants' data was marked as incorrect if the participant
chose the wrong cueing behaviour or if they pressed the SPACE bar to indicate that they
did not know. As there were 16 faces, each participant could score a total number
correct out of 16. Chance level (50% correct) was 8 out of 16, and binomial tests
indicated that 12 was the threshold at which recall could be considered signicantly
above chance. As such, participants scoring 12/16 correct or above were considered
aware of the manipulation and face cueing behaviour, while those scoring below this were
considered nave to the manipulation.
We categorised participants on this individual basis, but we also calculated the total
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number of successes across all participants and tested whether these diered signicantly
from chance accuracy using a binomial test, to see if evidence of awareness emerged at
the population level where it might not at the individual level.
2.4.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 2.10: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 2.4 in response to valid (light grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 2.4 are shown in Figure 2.10. Fitting
validity to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when
explaining RTs ( = -43.06, SE = 8.26, 2(1) = 27.03, p <.001). This improvement was
not seen for accuracy scores ( = 0.20, SE = 0.73, 2(1) = 0.07, p = 0.789).
Awareness check
The results of the awareness check are shown in Figure 2.11. Out of 30 participants, only
4 scored signicantly above chance accuracy when asked to explicitly recall which faces
were valid and which were invalid.
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Figure 2.11: Total number of faces correctly identied for each participant out of 16 in Experiment
2.4. The solid horizontal line denotes the chance level of 50%. The dashed horizontal line designates
the threshold above which performance was considered signicantly above chance level.
Across all participants, average recall was close to 50% levels (M = 8.17, s.d. =
3.69), and the proportion of accurate recall was not signicantly above chance (p =
0.681).
2.5 Chapter Discussion
There were several aims to this chapter. The rst was to replicate previous research
showing incidental trust learning from gaze cueing using a separate stimulus set from
previous experiments and using a pre- and post-rating design that allowed for tracking
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changes in trust over the experiment. Experiment 2.1 shows that with neutral faces,
changes in trustworthiness ratings primarily manifest as a unidirectional decrease for
invalid faces, while valid faces mostly remain unchanged.
Experiment 2.1 demonstrated that learning of trust is possible even when faces
express neutral emotions. Previous work highlighted the role of emotion in these
gaze-trust eects. Bayliss et al. (2009) demonstrated signicant trust learning eects
when faces smiled, no eects when they frowned, and marginal eects when the faces
were neutral. Experiment 2.1 has revealed that signicant trust eects can be obtained
with neutral faces. It is unclear whether the failure to detect eects in the Bayliss et al.,
2009 study was a Type II error, or whether the changes to the procedure were of critical
importance. In the previous work a 2AFC task was employed where pairs of faces that
had consistently looked towards targets (valid) or had looked away from targets (invalid),
were presented and participants selected the one who they felt was more trustworthy. In
contrast, the current study requires assessment of trust for each individual face and it
measures changes in trust ratings from the start to the end of the experiment.
This new approach is a more sensitive and robust means of measuring trust.
Furthermore it provides important information concerning where the eect may lie.
That is, 2AFC can only reveal that faces that previously looked towards targets tend to
be selected as more trustworthy, not whether valid faces are trusted more, invalid faces
trusted less, or both. The results of Experiment 2.1 suggest an asymmetry, where the
eect is only observed in the decline in trust of invalid faces that looked away from
targets, whereas there is no change in trust rating for the valid faces that always looked
towards targets.
Experiment 2.2 demonstrates that there appears to be a change in the pattern of
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trust learning when the faces smile; that is, in contrast to Experiment 2.1 where eects
were only detected in a decline in trust for invalid faces. When the faces smile a
bi-directional eect is observed, where invalid faces again show a decrease in trust, while
valid faces now produce a signicant increase in trust. This latter bi-directional eect
with smiling faces has also been demonstrated by Manssuer, Roberts and Tipper (2015),
Manssuer, Pawling et al. (2015).
There are multiple potential explanations for the dierence in the pattern of results
between Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 that future research should investigate. For example,
the default learning mechanism might be to detect deception. Certainly in terms of
memory for faces, this is better for faces that deceive (Bayliss et al., 2009; Bayliss &
Tipper, 2006; Bell, Buchner, Erdfelder et al., 2012; Buchner et al., 2009), hence learning
of trust is only evident in invalid faces that deceive and look away from targets. In
contrast, when the faces all express positive emotion, this combines with the positive
signal of joint attention evoked by valid cueing faces, hence increasing trust of these
faces. Alternatively, the positive social context elicited by a smiling expression motivates
participants to try to remember the faces better   since invalid faces are already
remembered well regardless of emotion (c.f. Experiment 2.1), this advantage would
primarily aect valid faces. However, it is important to be cautious with this
interpretation, as later results (particularly those of Experiment 3.1 in Chapter 3) may
call this stance into question.
Experiment 2.3 replaced the question of trustworthiness that participants were
asked with a question of likeability; simply by changing a single word in the design the
eect was abolished. This lack of eect with liking judgements suggests that this
incidental learning is highly specic to trust   a fact that makes sense if one considers
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that trust as a trait judgement serves much more heavily as a predictive model of
behaviour than does liking: we decide how much to trust someone based on how we
expect them to behave, whereas liking is a more subjective and aective judgement, and
one less based in statistical contingencies. For example, incidental learning of gaze
contingencies will inuence economic decisions to invest in another person (e.g. Rogers
et al., 2014). It is possible that eects of liking might emerge if participants assimilated
these deceptive cues in a more personal way   perhaps if we manipulated beliefs about
intentions (as the knowledge that someone intentionally deceived you carries important
implications for social behaviour) or a sense of competition with the face (such that the
face is deceiving you to maximise their own chances at a reward) we would see a change
in how participants like the faces, but at its basic level this eect appears to be specic
to monitoring the trustworthiness of interactants.
The nal aim of this chapter was to explore whether the inclusion of trust ratings at
the beginning might inuence the explicit awareness of gaze behaviour. Note that in
previous work that showed no awareness of gaze cueing behaviour (Bayliss et al., 2006;
Rogers et al., 2014) participants were not asked about trust until the end of the
experiment. Hence up to that trust measure at the end of the experiment the faces had
been irrelevant and to-be-ignored. However, in the current task the faces are rated for
trustworthiness at the start of the experiment. It is possible that this trust rating could
cue the participants to the relevance of the faces, and facilitate learning of gaze
behaviour, resulting in explicit/conscious knowledge of which faces consistently looked
towards and away from targets.
It should be noted that such an explanation based on demand characteristics was
unlikely given that Experiment 2.3 yielded null results despite that experiment arguably
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being as easy to interpret and predict as Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. For peace of mind,
however, Experiment 2.4 explored this question and found that explicit memory for the
faces' cueing behaviour could not explain this eect, as only 4 participants out of 30
scored signicantly above chance when asked to explicitly categorise the faces as valid or
invalid.
This distinction between explicit memory for cueing behaviour in Experiment 2.4
and more implicit memory in the form of trustworthiness ratings in Experiments 2.1 and
2.2 oers an intriguing insight into the nature of these learned representations. Indeed, it
suggests that these eects occur outside of conscious awareness, and in theory it is
possible that incidental trust learning might only occur outside of conscious awareness.
While it is not possible to examine this using the current data, it is somewhat telling
that the proportion of participants who demonstrated explicit awareness (4/30) is
approximately similar to the proportion of participants in Experiment 2.1 who did not
show the typical trust learning eect (changes to valid faces more positive than changes
to invalid: 7 out of 24). This is not conclusive, but it is suggestive and may be an avenue
for future research to investigate whether these two populations are similar.
The aim of this chapter was to explore some of the key features and boundaries of
incidental trust learning from gaze cues. We demonstrated that using dual
trustworthiness rating scales at either end of the experiment was a more sensitive
measure of trust than 2AFC used in previous experiments, as we found a clear pattern of
trust learning with neutral faces (Experiment 2.1), and that this pattern changed when
faces smiled (Experiment 2.2), a nding that would be impossible with more blunt
methods. We also found that this eect is specic to trustworthiness and does not reect
a general valence impression of the face (Experiment 2.3) and occurs outside of explicit,
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conscious awareness (Experiment 2.4).
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incidentally learned trust
Incidental learning of trust from gaze cues has been replicated in several dierent
experiments, including now those in Chapter 2. However despite these replications of the
original eect, one question that has never been explored directly concerns the stability
of this learned representation. That is, no studies to date have examined how long
incidentally learned trustworthiness lasts, despite the fact that this question carries
important implications for interpreting this eect. If this incidental trust learning is
short-lived and easily disrupted by an intervening task, then this suggests that it reects
an active, online monitoring of in-the-moment statistical contingencies, concerned only
with short-term interactions. If, on the other hand, this eect can survive interference, it
suggests a mechanism that is actively feeding such short-term monitoring into durable,
long-term representations of interaction partners.
Consider the Haxby et al. (2000) model of face processing, and the tentative model
of incidental trust learning posited in Chapter 1, which proposes two separate streams of
information when viewing faces; one through the fusiform gyrus and anterior temporal
lobe that appears to encode invariant stable features of the faces such as identity and
physical appearance, and a second that projects more dorsally through the superior
temporal sulcus (STS) and processes more variant aspects of the face such as expression
and gaze direction. That there is some communication between these two streams is
evident from our previous research. That is, the specic property of face identity is
associated with particular patterns of gaze behaviour, resulting in changes of face
trustworthiness.
Trustworthiness can be considered a stable property of person identity, and hence
one might predict it will be stable over time. That is, once a person is encoded as less
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trustworthy, such information should be available for future encounters with that person.
However, note that the learning of the association between face identity and patterns of
gaze takes place while the face is irrelevant and ignored while participants undertake a
dierent task. Previous work has shown little awareness of this learning (Bayliss et al.,
2006; Rogers et al., 2014), and in Experiment 2.4 participants could not explicitly recall
whether particular face identities had always looked towards or away from targets.
Hence the lack of explicit awareness of the face-gaze relationship might reect weak and
transient memories.
With the aim of exploring these questions, Experiment 3.1 oers a direct replication
of Experiment 2.1 and replicates the original eect. Then, in Experiment 3.2, we
recreate the baseline experiment but add in a short interference task where participants
watched videos of reaching motions in an attempt to distract them from their memories
of the faces in the experiment.
To further test the possibility for stable representations of trust, we can also
manipulate participants' initial experience with the faces. As noted, incidental learning
during gaze cueing relies not only on attention orienting evoked by eye gaze but also on
trial-invariant aspects of the face such as identity recognition. When learning about the
face identities from their gaze cueing behaviour, these distributed systems must share
information such that untrustworthy behaviour can be linked to the individual
expressing it. In previous studies, the faces used have been unfamiliar, and so the
identity representations that serve as the anchors for these trust representations are less
stable, which may compromise the strength of these associations. More familiar faces
have been shown to have more stable neural representations (Eger, Schweinberger, Dolan
& Henson, 2005) and that these neural representations are related to better behavioural
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performance in face identication tasks (Weibert & Andrews, 2015). As such, we
propose that the association between the face identity and patterns of gaze behaviour
incidentally learned while ignoring the face will be facilitated if the face representation is
more familiar. Experiment 3.3 explores whether using more familiar faces will have an
eect on memory for incidentally learned trust by replicating Experiment 3.2 and
including a short face-matching familiarisation task at the beginning. We predict that
increased familiarity of the face stimuli will produce more durable memories.
The motivation of Experiment 3.4 is to extend the interference to see if the learning
of trust can endure in the longer term. In this experiment we replace the ller task in
Experiment 3.3 and introduce an hour-long gap where participants are sent away from
the lab between the gaze cueing and the nal trustworthiness rating portions of the
experiment. We explore whether this eect can last over the course of an hour of
real-world interference (i.e. real faces and interactions, changes in context and
environment, etc.)
The nal aim of this chapter is to see if learning can survive exposure to
counter-typical behaviours. That is, as these representations are driven by participants
learning that certain faces provide valid cues and others invalid cues, are these
representations strong enough to withstand instances where the faces demonstrate the
opposite behaviour (i.e. valid becomes invalid; invalid becomes valid). In Experiment 3.5
we replace the interference tasks used before with a sixth block of gaze cueing where
faces switch their gaze behaviour. As such, participants experience two instances where
the face's behaviour does not match the stored representation of that identity. We
examine whether trust learning can survive this interference.
This also oers an opportunity to examine the eect in a dierent way. The crux of
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this incidental learning is that participants pick up on the underlying patterns of gaze
behaviour and use these to inform subsequent trustworthiness judgements. While there
is little evidence that participants can adapt to these invalid cues and learn to inhibit
gaze following for invalid faces (c.f. Manssuer, Roberts & Tipper, 2015; Manssuer,
Pawling et al., 2015, and Appendix A), it is nonetheless possible that if this pattern were
disrupted that participants would experience an error signal and show a cost in RTs,
accuracy, or both. A popular measure of implicit learning of statistical patterns in
presented stimuli is to change the pattern after a certain training block. Although
participants do not necessarily report explicit knowledge of the pattern, (and may not
show a reduction in associated RT costs; Heuer, Schmidtke & Kleinsorge, 2001), they
nonetheless show a broad increase in RTs when the underlying pattern changes
(Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001). As such, changing the gaze cueing behaviour of faces
could yield an alternative measure of this incidental learning of gaze contingencies.
However, the key issue of this chapter is the stability of these learned
representations. A related issue that could inuence the stability of memory is how the
learning may be aected by the nature of the information to be remembered. In Chapter
2 we showed that a decrease in trust for invalid faces was a more robust result than was
an increase in trust for valid faces, and this supports previous research demonstrating
memory advantages for cheaters over co-operators (Bell, Buchner, Erdfelder et al., 2012;
Buchner et al., 2009). As an example, Bayliss and Tipper (2006) showed that after
incidental learning of trust via patterns of eye-gaze, participants subsequently reported
that the invalidly cueing low-trust faces had been presented more often. Hence we might
expect to observe more stable memory for invalid faces in the current studies.
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3.1 Experiment 3.1
This experiment is a direct replication of the baseline experiment detailed in Experiment
2.1.
3.1.1 Methods
Participants
32 participants volunteered for this study. One participant made entirely inaccurate
responses in the rst block of trials, suggesting that they had misunderstood the
instructions, and another participant was removed after RT lters were applied for
retaining <70% of their original trials, and so the nal number of participants included
in analysis was 30 (21 female; M age = 20.09, s.d. = 1.81).
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 2.1. However, as this chapter deals with
pushing the limits of the incidental trust learning eect, we wanted to ensure that any
null results could not be attributed to lack of power and would actually reect a
disruption of memory. For this reason, we increased power by raising the n of all
experiments in this chapter to 30 instead of 24.
Data analysis
As in Experiment 2.1, before data were analysed participants' responses were ltered to
remove all error trials (where participants reported the incorrect answer) and RT outliers
  RTs below 250ms (too short to process the stimuli) and above 2,500ms (indicating
that participants had not given a response in the allotted time). The number of
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remaining trials was then compared with the original number of trials to check that all
participants retained at least 70% of their total trials and had not scored below 70%
total correct on any one condition.
Data were analysed in the same way as described in Experiment 2.1 Data Analysis
section, but collapsed across block to look only for a cost associated with gaze cueing. As
such, each analysis (both RTs and accuracy rates) compared a null model with a
validity-only model. Neither RT nor accuracy models would converge with validity j
subject as a dened term.
When modelling trustworthiness ratings for this and all subsequent experiments,
this maximum random structure (which we hereafter term the null model), would not
converge when all repeated-measures factors were included, and so we removed the time j
identity term from all models.
As in Chapter 2, Appendix A provides the results of more traditional factorial
ANOVAs for the purposes of comparison.
3.1.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 3.2 are shown in Figure 3.1. Fitting validity
to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when explaining RTs,
which indicates a gaze cueing eect ( = 46.41, SE = 7.28, 2(1) = 20.89, p <.001). This
eect was not seen for accuracy scores ( = -0.03, SE = 0.09, 2(1) = 0.13, p = 0.721).
86
Chapter 3: Examining durability of learned trust
RT
 (m
s)
60
0
70
0
80
0
90
0
10
00
11
00
Valid
Invalid
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
 co
rre
ct)
80
85
90
95
10
0
Valid
Invalid
Figure 3.1: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 3.1 in response to valid (light grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
Trustworthiness ratings
The trustworthiness ratings from Experiment 3.1 are shown in Figure 3.2. Adding time
to the null model did not signicantly improve the model t ( = -2.06, SE = 1.95,
2(1) = 1.13, p = 0.288), but including validity did ( = -6.77, SE = 1.78, 2(1) =
12.96, p <.001). Finally, the interaction model (time x validity) t the data signicantly
better than did the full model (time + validity), where both factors were modelled but
without an interaction ( = -11.34, SE = 3.27, 2(1) = 11.99, p <.001).
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
valid and invalid faces separately. These models would not converge with the time j
identity term included, so we removed this and found that time signicantly improved
the model t for invalid faces ( = -7.99, SE = 2.35, 2(1) = 11.47, p <.001) but this
improvement was only marginal for valid faces ( = 4.06, SE = 2.32, 2(1) = 3.06, p =
0.080), similar to Experiment 2.1.
The results of Experiment 3.1 replicate those of previous studies (Bayliss et al., 2006;
Bayliss et al., 2009; Manssuer, Roberts & Tipper, 2015; Manssuer, Pawling et al., 2015).
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Figure 3.2: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 3.1 for valid (dotted) and
invalid (solid line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
Observing somebody's gaze movements automatically triggers a shift in attention to the
same location and results in faster identication of objects at that location as compared
to objects not gazed at. The association between direction of gaze (valid or invalid) and
face identity appears to be encoded: even though the face was irrelevant to the task,
individuals who looked away from the target object (invalid cues) were trusted less.
Having shown evidence of incidental trust learning in Experiment 3.1, we now move
on to explore the key question of this chapter, which is how long this eect can survive a
period of interference. In Experiment 3.2, we introduce a brief distraction task between
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Figure 3.3: Schematic of the paradigm of Experiment 3.2, with the addition of the interference
paradigm between the gaze-cueing and nal trustworthiness ratings. This same interference task
was used in Experiment 3.3.
the nal block of gaze cueing and the nal trustworthiness ratings.
3.2 Experiment 3.2
This experiment replicates the baseline experiment (Experiment 3.1) with an intervening
ller task to see if the eect survives interference.
3.2.1 Methods
Participants
30 participants (21 female, M age = 20.63, s.d. = 1.08) volunteered for this study.
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Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3.1 in every way except that participants
performed a ller task between the gaze-cueing procedure ending and the nal
trustworthiness ratings (see Figure 3.3). All other details were identical. See Appendices
B and C for methods and results of the main ller task. The ller task included no faces
and lasted approximately 05:45 (minutes:seconds).
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 3.1, and in this experiment no
participants had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials. All
accuracy models converged when the validity j subject error term was removed. RT
models converged with the maximum random structure.
In this experiment, the validity-only model would not converge with the dened
random structure, and so we removed the time j subject slope from all of the models to
help direct comparison.
3.2.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 3.2 are shown in Figure 3.4. RTs were faster
to valid trials (M = 837.49, s.d. = 159.39) than to invalid trials (M = 863.72, s.d. =
155.01), and tting validity to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved
the t when explaining RTs ( = 25.49, SE = 9.36, 2(1) = 7.41, p = 0.006). This
improvement was not seen for accuracy scores ( = -0.12, SE = 0.70, 2(1) = 0.03, p =
0.864).
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Figure 3.4: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 3.2 in response to valid (light grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
Trustworthiness ratings
The changes in trustworthiness ratings for the faces in Experiment 3.2 are shown in
Figure 3.5. Adding time to the null model signicantly improved the t ( = -3.66, SE
= 1.68, 2(1) = 4.74, p = 0.029), as did including validity ( = -5.88, SE = 1.69, 2(1)
= 10.29, p = 0.001). Finally, the interaction model (time x validity) t the data better
than did the full model (time + validity) and this approached signicance ( = -6.12, SE
= 3.35, 2(1) = 3.35, p = 0.067).
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
valid and invalid faces separately. These models would not converge with the time j
identity term included, so we removed this and found that time signicantly improved
the model t for invalid faces ( = -6.72, SE = 2.39, 2(1) = 7.77, p = 0.005) but this
improvement was not seen for valid faces ( = -0.60, SE = 3.06, 2(1) = 0.04, p =
0.839).
Experiment 3.2 aimed to explore whether a brief period of interference could disrupt
the pattern of trust learning observed in Experiment 3.1. While the eect was not as
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Figure 3.5: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 3.2 for valid (dotted) and
invalid (solid line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
clear as seen in previous experiments, the a priori predicted pattern of trust changes was
observed.
There are trends for susceptibility to decay when an interference task is introduced.
One question, then, is what is the cause of this susceptibility to decay. We propose that
familiarity with the faces used as stimuli may be the deciding factor   in Experiment
3.2, the only exposure participants have to the faces is the initial pre-experiment ratings,
which provides only a supercial opportunity to encode these identities. This means that
when participants experience helpful or misleading gaze cues, they have to build
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representations of these identities from the bottom up. It may be that this eect is more
durable when cueing validity information is added to a pre-existing representation of
these identities   that is, when the faces are more familiar.
In Experiment 3.3, we explore this question by including an additional task at the
beginning of the experiment designed to increase participants' familiarity with the faces
  we use the same faces as in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 to avoid any confounds of
dierent stimuli, and to avoid any pre-existing expectations of trustworthiness that
might arise with using naturally familiar stimuli such as famous faces.
3.3 Experiment 3.3
Experiment 3.3 replicates Experiment 3.2 but adds an additional familiarisation task to
the beginning of the procedure to trigger greater familiarity with the face stimuli used.
That is, it employs procedures developed by Andrews, Jenkins, Cursiter and Burton
(2015) where faces are viewed from dierent angles and express dierent emotions in a
same-dierent face matching task. Such encoding has been shown to signicantly
improve face recognition performance.
3.3.1 Methods
Participants
32 participants volunteered for this study, but due to runtime errors data from two
participants were not collected. This left 30 participants (21 female, M age = 20.17, s.d.
= 2.10) who received a mixture of course credit and payment.
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Figure 3.6: Schematic of the familiarisation task participants completed at the very beginning of
Experiments 3.3   they were shown two images of faces and asked to judge if they were the same or
dierent identities. The paradigm was the same for Experiment 3.4 except that the 2AFC object
preference interference task introduced in Experiment 3.2 was replaced with an hour away from
the lab. Feedback was provided for incorrect responses.
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3.2 in every way except that participants
also performed a face-matching task at the beginning of the experiment in order to allow
for greater familiarity with the KDEF faces. Participants were shown images of all
sixteen identities that varied in their head orientation (full-left, half-left, half-right or
full-right) and emotion (happy, angry, disgusted, surprise, afraid or sad)   these were
unaltered images from the KDEF stimulus set (Lundqvist et al., 1998) and so were
presented with an o-white/brown background, rather than the plain white background
that was used for the images in the gaze-cueing and trust-rating portions. Participants
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made same/dierent judgements of the identities of face pairs, responding with a button
press of S if the two images showed the same person, and D if they showed dierent
people. Image pairs showed the same identity on 25% of trials, and a written feedback
screen appeared after each trial reporting either ``Correct", ``Incorrect" or ``No response
detected", depending on what response was logged. During the course of a trial a
xation cross was presented for 500ms, followed by the two images either side of a
xation for 1,500ms, followed by the feedback screen for 1,000ms (see Figure 3.6).
It was expected that the variability in these images and the nature of the identity
judgement task would prompt participants to encode viewpoint- and
emotion-independent identity representations of the individuals. Such a task has been
used before to good eect (Andrews et al., 2015), as participants reconcile
within-identity variability in face photographs to develop a richer, more abstract
representation of the individual.
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 3.1, and in this experiment no
participants had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials. In this
experiment, the null model for RTs would not converge with the validity j subject
random slope term dened, so this was removed, but all other models converged with
this included.
For trustworthiness ratings, the validity-only, time + validity, and time x validity
models would not converge until the time j subject and time j identity error slope terms
were removed, and so we removed these from all models to allow for direct comparison.
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3.3.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 3.7: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 3.3 in response to valid (light grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 3.3 are shown in Figure 3.7. Fitting
validity to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when
explaining RTs ( = 45.26, SE = 8.44, 2(1) = 28.61, p <.001). This improvement was
not seen for accuracy scores ( = 0.45, SE = 0.72, 2(1) = 0.40, p = 0.530).
Trustworthiness ratings
The changes in trustworthiness ratings for the faces in Experiment 3.3 are shown in
Figure 3.8. Adding time to the null model did not make it t the data signicantly
better ( = 1.85, SE = 1.72, 2(1) = 1.17, p = 0.280), but it did t signicantly better
when validity was included ( = -6.97, SE = 1.70, 2(1) = 16.42, p <.001). Finally, the
interaction model t the data signicantly better than did the full model, where both
factors were modelled but without an interaction ( = -13.88, SE = 3.38, 2(1) = 16.78,
p <.001).
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Figure 3.8: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 3.3 for valid (dotted) and
invalid (solid line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
Experiment 3.3 explored whether initial familiarity with the face identities used in
the gaze cueing aected how well participants learned and retained information about
individuals' trustworthiness, and it appears that familiar identities lead to durable
trustworthiness representations given the clear pattern of changes in ratings that we
found. Further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for valid
and invalid faces found that time only marginally improved the t when applied to
ratings of invalid faces ( = -5.09, SE = 2.67, 2(1) = 3.47, p = 0.063), but there was
now a signicant improvement for valid faces ( = 8.80, SE = 2.39, 2(1) = 11.43, p
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<.001). This is an interesting point to note in light of the results of Experiments 2.1 and
3.1, which found a signicant decrease in trust for invalid faces but no signicant change
for valid faces. It is possible that this increase for valid faces is a result of the increased
familiarity   perhaps with more familiar identities where there is a pre-existing
representation upon which to build, the focus shifts from detecting deception to
monitoring prosocial, cooperative behaviour. However, the current experiment can only
hazard this tentatively and so this could be an avenue for future research.
These results suggest that, while with unfamiliar faces this eect appears to be
somewhat susceptible to interference, increased familiarity with the faces can make this
incidental learning more resilient to decay over a short period of interference. This of
course raises the logical question: if this eect can now survive a brief (around 5 minute)
period of interference, could it survive longer periods? To explore this, in Experiment 3.4
we replace the 5-minute ller interference task with an hour-long break during which
participants were sent away from the laboratory.
3.4 Experiment 3.4
In Experiment 3.4 we replaced the 5-minute ller interference task with an hour-long
break during which participants were sent away from the laboratory. This provided a
naturalistic interference, as participants were given no instructions about what to do
during that time, and so means that if we still see evidence of the eect after this time
that this gaze cueing manipulation can lead to particularly durable changes in
trustworthiness.
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3.4.1 Methods
Participants
30 participants (24 female, M age = 19.93, s.d. = 2.93) volunteered for this study.
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3.3 in every way except that participants
performed no ller task. Instead, participants left the testing room for one hour between
the gaze-cueing and the nal trustworthiness rating sections.
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 3.1, and in this experiment no
participants had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials. In this
experiment, all RT models converged. The accuracy null model would not converge until
validity j subject term was removed, and so this was removed from both models.
For trustworthiness ratings, the validity-only, time + validity, and time x validity
models would not converge with the dened random structure, and so we removed the
time j identity slope from all models to allow for direct comparison.
3.4.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 3.4 are shown in Figure 3.9. Fitting validity
to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when explaining RTs
( = 27.74, SE = 8.63, 2(1) = 8.63, p = 0.003). This improvement was not seen for
accuracy scores ( = 0.32, SE = 0.74, 2(1) = 0.19, p = 0.665).
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Figure 3.9: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 3.4 in response to valid (light grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
Trustworthiness ratings
The changes in trustworthiness ratings for the faces in Experiment 3.4 are shown in
Figure 3.10. Adding time to the null model did not make it t the data signicantly
better ( = -1.59, SE = 1.63, 2(1) = 0.95, p = 0.329), nor did it predict the data
signicantly better when validity was included ( = -2.86, SE = 1.87, 2(1) = 2.34, p =
0.126). However, the interaction model t the data signicantly better than did the full
model, where both factors were modelled but without an interaction ( = -6.77, SE =
3.23, 2(1) = 4.40, p = 0.036).
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
valid and invalid faces separately, but in this experiment including time as a xed factor
did not signicantly improve the model t for valid faces ( = 1.79, SE = 2.29, 2(1) =
0.61, p = 0.433) but it did for invalid faces ( = -4.97, SE = 2.21, 2(1) = 4.63, p =
0.031).
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Figure 3.10: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 3.4 for valid (dotted) and
invalid (solid line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
3.5 Experiment 3.5
In Experiment 3.5 we replace the interference used in previous experiments with a sixth
block of gaze cueing. In this additional block, we reversed the cueing behaviours of the
faces such that previously valid faces became invalid and vice versa. The aim here was
twofold: rstly, to see whether learned representations of trust can survive exposure to
counter-typical gaze behaviours (i.e. whether trust learning was extinguished as the
learned information, "Person A is always valid, Person B is always invalid", is no longer
true).
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The second aim was to investigate whether trust learning could be explored using
RTs. Given that participants completed the typical ve blocks of gaze cueing before they
reached the reversed sixth block, they would have learned the same information that
they gathered throughout previous experiments by the time they reached the nal block.
If participants are implicitly learning the patterns of gaze cueing they might then show a
cost in RTs as the underlying pattern of gaze behaviour changes. The logic of this design
is based on the sequence learning paradigm used by Knopman and Nissen (1991) and
Reed and Johnson (1994), where changes from an implicitly learned sequence impairs
response times.
3.5.1 Methods
Participants
34 participants volunteered for this study, but one participant's data were not collected
due to a runtime error and three were removed following RT lters, which left 30 for
analysis (M age = 19.93, s.d. = 2.93).
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3.1 with the addition of an extra block of
gaze cueing. As such, this experiment did not include the familiarisation task in
Experiments 3.3 and 3.4. During this additional block, the cueing behaviour of the faces
was reversed, such that previously valid faces now provided invalid cues, while previously
invalid faces now provided valid cues.
Trustworthiness ratings were collected at the beginning and the end of the
experiment to explore whether learning could survive exposure to inconsistent
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information (i.e. if the fact that faces changed their cueing behaviour for the last two
appearances could override the learned trustworthiness impressions from earlier in the
experiment).
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 3.1, and in this experiment no
participants had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials.
Given that there was a possibility that the change in the nal additional block
would lead to an increase in reaction time, we analysed cueing data in the same way as
in Experiment 2.1   that is, broken down by block as well as validity. Neither RT nor
accuracy models would not converge until the validity j subject term was removed. We
also investigated the eect of changing the gaze behaviour on cueing eects further by
examining only the last two blocks   block 5, where the pattern has been learned fully,
and block 6 where it changes. We also had to remove the validity j subject term from
these models before they would converge.
No models of trustworthiness ratings would converge with the maximum random
structure, and so we removed the time j subject and validity j subject slopes from all
models.
3.5.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 3.5 are shown in Figure 3.11. RTs were
aggregated across subject, identity, block, and validity, and these were analysed using
linear mixed-eects modelling. Adding block as a xed factor signicantly improved the
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Figure 3.11: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds (left plot) and accuracy rates (percent
correct; right plot) across all six blocks in Experiment 3.5 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid
(solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
t of the maximum random structure model ( = -33.78, SE = 5.71, 2(1) = 23.83, p
<.001), as did including validity as a xed factor ( = -38.80, SE = 7.46, 2(1) = 26.94,
p <.001). Comparison of the two-xed-factor models (block + validity and block *
validity) did nd evidence for an interaction of the two ( = 13.03, SE = 4.37, 2(1) =
8.88, p = 0.003). However, our primary point of interest was the last two blocks, where
the change in gaze behaviour could cause participants to experience an error signal.
Closer examination of the last two blocks found a marginal eect of block ( = -20.21,
SE = 10.98, 2(1) = 3.38, p = 0.066), but no evidence for an eect of validity ( =
-12.81, SE = 10.92, 2(1) = 1.38, p = 0.241).1 The eect of block appears to be because
RTs in block 6 were generally faster than in block 5, which is not consistent with an
error signal. There was also no interaction between these two blocks ( = -10.82, SE =
21.82, 2(1) = 0.25, p = 0.619).
The analysis of accuracy rates found that adding block to the null model
1Note that including block as a xed factor reduces the power in each cell in the analysis   there were,
for example, only eight valid and eight invalid trials in each block, and controlling for identity reduces
this to only two presentations per block. As such, it is likely that this eect of validity in the nal blocks
is underpowered to detect a dierence rather than participants learning to overcome invalid cues (see
Appendix A).
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signicantly improved the t ( = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 2(1) = 9.14, p = 0.002), but
including validity did not ( = -0.02, SE = 0.01, 2(1) = 1.63, p = 0.202). Comparison
of the two-xed-factor models (block + validity and block * validity) found no evidence
of an interaction ( = 0.01, SE = 0.01, 2(1) = 2.40, p = 0.121). Closer examination of
the last two blocks found a marginal eect of block ( = -0.03, SE = 0.02, 2(1) = 2.89,
p = 0.089), but none of validity ( = -0.01, SE = 0.02, 2(1) = 0.36, p = 0.547), and no
interaction ( = 0.05, SE = 0.04, 2(1) = 2.04, p = 0.153).
Trustworthiness ratings
The changes in trustworthiness ratings for the faces in Experiment 3.5 are shown in
Figure 3.12. Adding time to the null model did not make it t the data signicantly
better ( = 0.28, SE = 1.63, 2(1) = 0.03, p = 0.864), and including validity only
marginally improved the t ( = -2.96, SE = 1.58, 2(1) = 3.49, p = 0.062). However,
the interaction model t the data signicantly better than did the full model, where both
factors were modelled but without an interaction ( = -11.79, SE = 3.15, 2(1) = 13.96,
p <.001).
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
valid (with time j identity removed) and invalid faces (with no random slope terms)
separately, and in this experiment including time as a xed factor signicantly improved
the model t for both valid ( = 6.17, SE = 2.21, 2(1) = 7.57, p = 0.006) and invalid
faces ( = -5.62, SE = 2.18, 2(1) = 6.59, p = 0.010).
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Figure 3.12: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 3.5 for valid (dotted) and
invalid (solid line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
Cross-experiment analysis
In order to see how an interference task and familiarity level impacted the overall eect,
the results of Experiments 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 were combined (see Figure 3.13). In
this analysis, the null model included the maximum random structure and no features
had to be removed to allow for convergence. The outcome variable was now change in
trustworthiness over the course of the experiments (as such, time was no longer a factor
and was now a property of the measured variable). Fixed factors were validity
(valid/invalid) and experiment (1-4). The null model was compared to validity-only and
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Figure 3.13: Changes in trustworthiness in Experiment 3.1 (where there was no ller and no
familiarisation task), Experiment 3.2 (ller task but no familiarisation task), Experiment 3.3 (both
a ller and familiarisation task), Experiment 3.4 (a familiarisation task and an hour's gap before
second rating), Experiment 3.5 (no familiarisation task, but where the faces changed their cueing
behaviour for the last block). The graph shows the change in trustworthiness ratings over the
course of the experiment for valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) faces. Error bars show standard
error.
an experiment-only models separately, and then an interaction model (validity x
experiment) was compared with a non-interaction model (validity + experiment). No
models would converge with the validity j subject term included.
Adding validity to the null model signicantly improved the t ( = 10.12, SE =
1.23, 2(1) = 66.80, p <.001), but including experiment did not ( = 0.66, SE = 0.69,
2(1) = 0.90, p = 0.343). The interaction model of validity x experiment did not t the
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data better than did the model where both factors were modelled but without an
interaction ( = 0.01, SE = 0.87, 2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.988), indicating that incidental
learning of trust was largely similar across experiments.
3.6 Chapter Discussion
Even when ignoring a face its pattern of eye-gaze behaviour can be learned, subsequently
inuencing ratings of the faces' trustworthiness: the key question explored here
concerned the stability of this incidental associative learning process. After replicating
the basic eect in Experiment 3.1, we showed in Experiment 3.2 that with minimal
interference the evidence of trust learning was weaker, although we did not completely
eradicate the pattern.
We go on to show in Experiment 3.3 that by including a face familiarisation task at
the beginning of the experiment, the eect can now convincingly survive the same
interference that weakens it in Experiment 3.2, and in Experiment 3.4 we show that
traces of this trust learning can persist an hour after gaze cueing has ended. Finally,
Experiment 3.5 demonstrates that even when the same faces are presented and the gaze
behaviour is reversed, trust can survive. The change scores of initial to nal trust ratings
from each experiment are shown together in Figure 3.13.
This is the rst study that investigates how long this incidental learning can last,
and we show that it can be durable and somewhat resilient to interference. While
Experiments 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 tend to show weaker learning eects than we see in
Experiments 3.1 and 3.3, the overall prole of results persists, and we are condent that
although these interference tasks do appear to weaken the eect, it nonetheless survives.
This is supported by the fact that a cross-experiment analysis found that modelling an
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interaction of validity and experiment when predicting changes in trustworthiness to
faces did not t the data signicantly better than modelling no interaction.
Of course there could be other interfering tasks that are more disruptive of
incidentally learned trustworthiness. For example, re-presenting the faces used in the
experiment in a task where no gaze cueing was observed is likely to cause extinction of
prior learning (c.f. Rogers et al., 2014). However, Experiment 3.5 shows that when there
is still gaze cueing, these representations are maintained, even when the stored
information is at odds with incoming experience. Experiment 4.3 in Chapter 4 provides
further converging evidence for this point. This maintenance may be due to context   if
the faces appear in a context outside of gaze cueing we may abandon maintaining the
memory of their helpful or deceptive cueing behaviour. However, if they continue to
provide cues (even if these cues now change) participants appear to maintain memories
for task-relevant information even if it does not necessarily t with what the face is
currently doing. In contrast, it is likely that exposure to faces not presented in the
experiment might not disrupt prior learning. For example, during the one-hour
interference task where participants left the laboratory (Experiment 3.4) they were
exposed to other faces as they moved around the campus, and the eect survived. Clearly
more formal studies of the stability of incidentally learned trust will be worthwhile.
The stability of trust learning even after faces demonstrate the opposite cueing
behaviour raises the question of how much information is necessary to learn about
trustworthiness, as well as to override these stored representations. Manssuer, Roberts
and Tipper (2015) investigated this with EEG and found a late positive potential that
dierentiated between valid and invalid faces that arose around the fth presentation of
the face. As such, it may be that two presentations of each face experienced in the sixth
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block of Experiment 3.5 were not enough to override the learned information from the
ten exposures in the preceding ve blocks.
We initially considered two possibilities: that this incidental trust learning might be
short-lived, and reect in-the-moment monitoring of statistical contingencies, or that
these traces might be integrated into a longer and more durable representation. We nd
evidence supporting the latter interpretation, and taken with previous research using a
similar paradigm we begin to see a complex underlying mechanism for social learning
emerge. This suggests that at some point during gaze cueing (likely around the fth
presentation of the face identity, c.f. Manssuer, Roberts & Tipper, 2015) information
about the cueing behaviour of faces is transferred to a longer term and more durable
representation that feeds into a network that focuses on invariant aspects of identity
recognition.
Interestingly, in Experiment 3.1 we replicate the result of Experiment 2.1 that the
change in trustworthiness over the course of the experiment is primarily driven by a
decrease in trust towards invalid faces. This pattern persists into Experiment 3.2, where
despite the weaker learning we nonetheless see that the decrease in trust to invalid faces
is greater than the increase to valid. However, this does not emerge in Experiment 3.3
(or in Experiment 3.4, although this could be due to the much weaker learning that we
see after an hour's interference). In Experiment 3.3, trust learning appears to be driven
instead by an increase in trust to valid faces. The internal representation of faces dier
when the faces become familiar. Although not reported in previous work, it is possible
that the prioritising of deception detection when interacting with unknown individuals
shifts to greater sensitivity to encoding trustworthy actions when people are more
familiar. This shift to remembering helpful behaviour rather than cataloguing deceivers
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could be a point for future research to investigate further.
However, when the results of these ve experiments are seen together, as in Figure
3.13, it seems striking that the decrease for invalid faces (while it may change slightly
across experiments) is rather more stable than the change for valid faces. This lends
support to our hypothesis that there may be dierences in how traces of learning survive
between valid and invalid faces, as it appears that memory for invalid faces is more
stable and appears to survive the interference that reduces the signal in Experiments 3.2
and 3.4. This nding supports previous literature that shows memory advantages for
cheaters or deceivers over co-operators (Bell, Buchner, Erdfelder et al., 2012; Buchner
et al., 2009; Suzuki & Suga, 2010). As people's default expectation of others is for them
to co-operate rather than deceive, invalid gaze cues provide a clear error signal that
results in a stronger and lasting memory for the interaction partners involved.
A nal aim of this chapter was to explore whether an additional block where the
gaze cueing patterns reversed would lead to a cost in RTs or accuracy. Previous research
has shown that implicit learning of underlying patterns can be seen in RT costs when the
underlying pattern changes (Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001). However, Experiment 3.5
explored this and found no evidence that such costs emerged. A possible explanation for
this is that while the underlying pattern for individual faces changed (valid became
invalid and vice versa), the global attentional cueing pattern remained the same (half of
the trials provided valid cues and half provided invalid cues). Similarly, Driver et al.
(1999) showed that gaze cueing is automatic and not easily aected by other factors such
as informing participants that gaze direction was counter-predictive. What our nding
shows is that although participants are learning about the faces, as evidenced by intact
trust learning, this does not impact their attentional cueing performance. It is possible
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that the active processes that lead to impression formation are happening later in the
trials, following on from gaze cues but not able to impact participants' preparedness or
strategies.
This question of whether trust learning could be measured using a technique other
than asking directly about the face raises an interesting point. Although measuring it
through RTs in this way is not possible, it is potentially advantageous to be able to
measure trustworthiness without having to ask about the face. More implicit measures
could, for example, allow multiple tests of the same subjects without the fear of demand
characteristics. This is the question that the experiments in the next chapter attempt to
address.
In conclusion, we have reported the results of ve experiments that examine for the
rst time the question of how durable cueing-induced changes in trustworthiness are, and
we show that although the eect tends to deteriorate over time, it is still surprisingly
resilient and traces of it do survive, particularly in the form of decreased trust towards
invalid faces. It can even survive instances where the faces change their behaviour. With
more familiar faces these eects can be seen up to an hour after cueing exposure has
ended. Taken together these results point to a mechanism for building robust, lasting
representations of the identities of deceptive or unhelpful interaction partners, even when
not explicitly attending to them while focused on a dierent task.
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incidentally learned trust
In Chapters 2 and 3, incidental learning of trust has been replicated several times using
a dual scalar rating system to measure changes in social attitudes. While this paradigm
has been shown to be eective at not cueing participants in to the nature of the
experiment during gaze cueing (c.f. Experiment 2.4), it nonetheless does ask directly
about the faces at the beginning and end of the experiment.
It is likely that the repeated request for ratings of face trustworthiness would alert
participants to the nature of the study, and change their strategies. Hence such explicit
ratings would prevent multiple measures of the eect   for example, tracking how the
eect endures over time within-subjects, or investigating test-retest reliability. The aim
of this chapter is to explore possible alternative measures of participants' incidental
learning, ones that access trustworthiness impressions in an implicit way without directly
mentioning the face's trustworthiness, to make it possible to ask such questions in the
future.
The rst part of this chapter aims to investigate whether gaze cueing behaviour can
systematically aect participants' memory for the physiognomic architecture of the faces.
Physical cues to trustworthiness are so ubiquitously and automatically associated with
reliable social judgements of trust that it seems plausible that these could be
systematically incorporated into memory for faces   a potentially ecient way of
remembering that a certain individual is untrustworthy could be to adapt the memory of
their face's physical features to express the architectural features typically associated
with untrustworthiness (e.g. lowered brow ridge, square jaw, etc.) to facilitate access to
this learned trustworthiness information. While top-down inuences do not aect
perception (and those studies that nd such eects are vulnerable to certain pitfalls, see
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Firestone & Scholl, 2015), it could nonetheless be that memory for perceptual features
may be more susceptible to top-down interference, as it is not directly beholden to
incoming sensory input and relies on integration with other aspects of social memory.
Experiment 4.1 replaces the scalar ratings used in Experiment 2.1 with a
post-experiment memory task. In this task participants were required to adjust a morph
of the faces to match exactly what they recalled viewing earlier. The morphs ranged
from low to high trustworthiness. We predicted that if prior incidental learning of trust
from eye-gaze could aect perceptual memory of the physical quality of the faces,
previously invalid cueing faces would be morphed to appear less trustworthy.
Experiment 4.2 is a simplied version of Experiment 4.1 using just two images (one
morphed to appear trustworthy, one morphed to appear untrustworthy) presented
side-by-side. The pretence of the experiment was that the image the participants had
seen during the experiment was one of a pair of twins, and they were asked to select the
twin they believed they had seen during the experiment. Not only are Experiments 4.1
and 4.2 subtler measures of the eect, as they do not ask about trust at all, but they can
also give us insight into how the participants' perceptual representations of the faces may
be altered by the faces' prior gaze behaviour.
The second part of this chapter investigates whether the learned trustworthiness
associated with faces can generalise to aect judgements of unrelated stimuli. There is
some evidence that information about faces can inuence judgements of non-face objects:
for example, Strick, Holland and van Knippenberg (2008) showed that facial
attractiveness could increase desire for associated objects. In Experiment 4.3 we explore
whether the same can be said for incidentally learned trustworthiness: we investigate
whether the previous cueing validity of an associated face can be detected in the
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aesthetic judgements of artistic images (decorative letter Hs, Mandelbrot fractals and
Kandinsky-style artwork). The driving hypothesis is that images presented alongside
valid faces will be rated more positively than those presented alongside invalid faces, as
the attitudes associated with the face bleed over onto associated stimuli.
During the image rating procedure, a face would appear in the centre of the screen
maintaining direct gaze, then shift its gaze to provide a valid cue to the location of the
subsequent image. Previous research suggests that properties of faces (such as emotion)
can transfer over to object, but only when the face is gazing at the object (Bayliss,
Frischen, Fenske & Tipper, 2007).
However, this also gives us the opportunity to further investigate previous ndings
by Manssuer, Roberts and Tipper (2015), who ran a similar gaze-cueing paradigm in
EEG and found that neural signals associated with cueing validity emerged around
1,000ms after the image had appeared in the form of a late positive potential. This
suggests that, when seeing a face, retrieving the stored representation of its
trustworthiness takes approximately a second. A gaze shift, however, can dislodge a
person's attention to the face and redirect it elsewhere in space. As such, it may be that
a short (less than 1,000ms) initial presentation of direct gaze may be insucient for trust
to be retrieved. To explore this, we included two between-subjects conditions in the
image ratings in Experiment 4.3   one where the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA)
between face onset and gaze shift was too short (500ms) to access this stored memory,
and one where it was sucient (1,000ms) to see if this inuenced either the image or
trustworthiness ratings. Our hypothesis was that trust learning would be disrupted in
the 500ms SOA condition as participants were exposed to the face without the
opportunity to consolidate their learned representations of trust, while trust learning
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would survive the interference with 1,000ms SOA.
4.1 Experiment 4.1
This experiment attempts to see if the incidentally learned trustworthiness observed in
Chapters 2 and 3 can be measured in terms of distortions in the memory for physical
features of the faces. Instead of scalar ratings, participants could physically alter the face
until it matched their memory of what they had seen in the experiment, to see if these
memories had been distorted by gaze cueing behaviour.
4.1.1 Methods
Participants
A mixture of undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of York
volunteered for this study in return for payment or course credit. There were 25
participants in total, but one participant's data were not collected due to a runtime
error, so there were 24 available for analysis (22 female, M age = 21.43, s.d. = 4.21
years). Participants were all Caucasian to control for other-race eects impacting how
participants evaluated subtle changes in the stimuli during the morphing procedure. All
participants provided written consent and the study was given ethical approval by the
Departmental Ethics Committee of the University of York Psychology Department.
Stimuli
The sixteen face stimuli (eight male, eight female) that were used in the gaze-cueing
experiment were identical to those used in previous chapters. Stimuli used in the nal
task were morphed images of the faces. Morphed faces were made using the KDEF face
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-100% Trustworthy 0% Neutral +100% Trustworthy
Figure 4.1: Examples of the morphed stimuli, with the original face in the centre and morphed
prototypes for untrustworthy (left) and trustworthy (right).
stimuli, which were warped between trustworthy and untrustworthy prototypes (the
prototype templates were based on work by Todorov et al., 2008) using
JPsychomorph (Tiddeman, Burt & Perrett, 2001) to generate 20 images of each face
identity morphing towards `trustworthy' in 5% increments, and 20 morphing towards
`untrustworthy'. An example of the extremes compared with the original image are
shown in Figure 4.1.
The presentation of the morphed stimuli was coded in Matlab R2012a and presented
as a compiled application using the same hardware used in Experiment 2.1. The
gaze-cueing section was coded in E-Studio 2.0 and presented using E-Run 2.0 on a white
background.
Design and Procedure
The procedure of the gaze cueing part of the experiment used the same parameters as
Experiment 2.1, the only dierence being the lack of explicit trustworthiness ratings at
the beginning and end. Importantly, the participants were told at the beginning of the
experiment to ignore the faces as distractors and focus only on the objects that appeared
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on the screen when they classied them. While this was the same in Experiment 2.1, it
is highlighted here because it illustrates that participants were not informed that they
would be tested on the faces later, or that they should even attend to any aspect of the
face identity, meaning any eects in the subsequent procedure would be entirely
incidental.
For the morphing procedure, participants were told after they had completed the
gaze-cueing that they would be tested on how well they remembered the faces in the
trials. They were told that morphed versions of the faces had been generated along a
continuum, and their task was to use button presses on the keyboard (the comma and
full stop keys, or < and >) to try to nd the image that had been used in the
experiment. They were told that as the changes were quite subtle, there was no time
limit and they could make as many adjustments to the face as they felt necessary.
In every trial, the original image would appear on the screen (that is, the rst image
they saw was the `correct' answer, although participants were not informed of this).
When they were happy that the image was the same as the one they had been exposed
to in the gaze-cueing section of the experiment, participants pressed the space bar to
advance to the next trial. After each trial, a screen appeared asking them to rate their
condence in their decision on a scale from 1 (not very condent) to 9 (very condent).
These condence ratings were taken because previous research has indicated that people
demonstrate memory advantages for cheaters or deceivers (Buchner et al., 2009; Bell,
Buchner, Erdfelder et al., 2012), and Bayliss and Tipper (2006) found that participants
were more likely to judge invalid cueing faces as having appeared more frequently in the
experiment than valid. Although this eect only trended towards signicance, we were
interested in seeing whether a related but separate measure   self-reported condence in
118
Chapter 4: Alternative measures of learned attitudes
their responses to the supposed memory test   would yield clearer results. As such it
was expected that condence ratings would be greater in response to faces from invalid
trials than from valid trials.
There were four identities used as practice trials to familiarise participants with the
procedure. Participants had not seen these faces before, and so they were shown the two
extremes of the scale (see Figure 4.1) and asked to morph the face to the midpoint
between the two (once again, the initial face served as the correct answer).
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 2.1, and in this experiment no
participants had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials. RT
and accuracy models would not converge with the validity j subject error term included.
In the morphing procedure, participants' nal image for each identity was recorded,
as was their condence in their decision on a scale of 1 (not at all condent) to 9
(extremely condent). Participants' responses were coded as the degree of separation
between the chosen image and the original image (negative numbers indicate
untrustworthiness), that were then multiplied by 5 to give a percentage to which
participants morphed the face (since each image represented a 5% step along the
continuum). A linear mixed eects model approach comparing a null model with a
validity-only model was used to investigate whether the degree to which faces were
morphed diered for valid or invalid faces, and all models converged with the maximum
random structure.
For condence ratings, participants' ratings of how condent they felt were
compared in a similar way (comparing a null model with a validity-only model to see if
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participants were more condent to one condition over the other), and again all models
converged.
As with previous chapters, see Appendix A for more conventional ANOVAs and RT
and accuracy rates broken down by experimental block.
4.1.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 4.2: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 4.1 in response to valid (light grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 4.1 are shown in Figure 4.2. Fitting
validity to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when
explaining RTs ( = -36.40, SE = 8.51, 2(1) = 18.22, p <.001). This improvement was
not seen for accuracy scores ( = -0.02, SE = 0.01, 2(1) = 1.82, p = 0.177).
Morphing results
On the whole, participants were more likely to morph images that had been invalid to
appear less trustworthy (percentage distortion: M = -4.63, s.d. = 39.34), and the same
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Valid
0% Trustworthy
Invalid
-5% Trustworthy
Figure 4.3: Examples of the average nal image chosen as the original face during cueing, when
the face was valid (left) and invalid (right).
was true for valid faces (percentage distortion: M = -1.76, s.d. = 43.67). Fitting validity
to the null model did not help to explain signicantly more of these data ( = -2.88, SE
= 4.16, 2(1) = 0.48, p = 0.488). It is notable that the standard deviations of the
responses were extremely high, and so this lack of dierence cannot be explained by
participants being accurate in their responses and answering that the initial image (or
one close to it) was the correct answer   rather it appears that participants
demonstrated little bias or consistency in how they morphed the faces.
The two face images in Figure 4.3 show the images with maximum probability of
being the nal image for invalid and valid images. As can be seen, the most probable
image is further towards the untrustworthy or negative end of the scale for invalid faces
(-1 images from neutral) than for valid (0 images from neutral). There was no evidence
that validity biased participants' judgements in either direction from neutral.
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Condence ratings
Data were also collected that measured participants' condence in their decisions that
the image they had chosen was the original, as we felt this might give some insight into
the participants' decisions. For example, even if participants were inaccurate or
inconsistent in the image they chose as the original, if they diered in their condence
ratings for valid and invalid faces that could indicate that at least they felt they had a
stronger representation of the features of some faces than others.
However, mean condence ratings were largely similar for valid (M = 4.88, s.d. =
1.99) and invalid faces (M = 4.73, s.d. = 2.07), and tting validity to the null model did
not signicantly improve the t ( = -0.14, SE = 0.15, 2(1) = 0.85, p = 0.357),
indicating that participants reported feeling similarly condent about decisions for both
kinds of faces.
The results of Experiment 4.1 showed no evidence of any eects of gaze-cueing
behaviour on participants' memory of the physical features of the faces in any of the
measures examined. That is, the incidental learning of trust from gaze does not change
the memory for the previously viewed face, and invalid cueing faces do not appear
physically less trustworthy.
However, it is possible that this may simply have been too complicated a measure
for participants to report their impressions of the faces. Due to the nature of the task, it
may have simply been that this null result is due to participants not being able to
remember the physical details of the faces. Certainly, our memory for faces is not always
perfect   particularly for unfamiliar faces during a cognitively demanding task (Jenkins,
Lavie & Driver, 2005)   and asking them to recall such ne-detailed features of faces as
this task nominally did (although of course the hope was to capture a broader valenced
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impression of the faces, this was not what the participants were asked to do) may have
swamped any eects if there were any.
This might also explain why no apparent dierence was found between condence
ratings for valid and invalid faces. When interviewed afterwards most participants
admitted that the nal morphing task was particularly dicult, and one or two admitted
that they had mostly felt like they were guessing which face it should be, which may
have meant that there were no trials where participants felt particularly more condent
than others. It might be that a simpler paradigm would avoid swamping any dierences
in participants' condence judgements with the overall level of diculty.
In order to address this and see if a simpler paradigm could yield a better
signal-to-noise ratio, we repeated this experiment but replaced the morphing procedure
at the end with a 2AFC task. We took the 50% trustworthy and untrustworthy morphs
from Experiment 4.1 and told participants that the images were those of identical twins
and they were to select the twin that they felt they had seen in the experiment. Broadly
speaking, this is the same task as Experiment 4.1, but with more structure to the
participants' response.
4.2 Experiment 4.2
This experiment simplies the morphing response of Experiment 4.1 by getting
participants to make a 2AFC of a pair of faces (one morphed to look trustworthy, one
morphed to look untrustworthy) that they believe they had seen during the experiment.
By simplifying the response that the participants made and limiting the decision to a
categorical distinction (one face or the other), it was hoped that this would limit
confounds identied in Experiment 4.1.
123
Chapter 4: Alternative measures of learned attitudes
4.2.1 Methods
Participants
A mixture of undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of York
volunteered for this study in return for payment or course credit. There were 24
participants in total, but one had to be removed after RT lters were applied and so the
total number available for analysis was 23 (18 female, M age = 21.52, s.d. = 4.26 years).
Participants were all Caucasian to control for other-race eects impacting how
participants evaluated subtle changes in the stimuli during the morphing procedure.
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
Untrustworthy Twin Trustworthy Twin
Figure 4.4: Examples of the `twin' stimuli. Images such as these were presented side by side and
participants were asked to judge which they had seen during the gaze-cueing experiment.
Stimuli were the same as in Experiment 4.1 for the gaze-cueing procedure. For the
subsequent judgements, participants were shown a screen immediately after the cueing
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procedure and told that the images they had seen in the experiment had been taken
from a database of identical twins, and that we were interested in seeing how well they
could implicitly learn the details of a face. The twin images were actually the 50%
morphed images from Experiment 4.1   these were chosen to avoid any distortions
present in the 100% prototypes while still ensuring that they were an equal distance
from neutral and were recognisably dierent1. See Figure 4.4 for examples.
Each `twin' pair was presented side-by-side for a maximum of 3,000ms   this was
done to give participants enough exposure to the face to make their decision, but not
enough to examine the faces too closely such that they still had to rely on a gut decision.
After 3,000ms the faces would disappear from the screen, but there was no upper time
limit on how long the participants took to make their response.
Once their response was registered, participants were asked to rate their condence
in their decision on a 9-point Likert scale (1-not very, 9-very condent) and had to press
the space bar to advance onto the next trial. The response was classed as which side of
the screen they believed the correct image was on, with the response keys Z for the left
hand side and M for the right. Each face pair appeared twice, and the order was xed
but counterbalanced across participants such that each face was always the same number
of trials away from its repeat as every other one (i.e. the rst pair would be the rst to
repeat, the second would be second, and therefore each pair would be separated from its
repeat by 15 other pairs of faces). The current analysis looks only at the judgements
made on the rst presentation of the faces.
One consideration about Experiment 4.1 that may have contributed to a null result
1A pilot study with ve participants was run to ensure that the images were dissociably dierent, and
that the trustworthy or positive images did actually appear more trustworthy. Independent judges went
through each face pair twice and selected either the trustworthier or the less trustworthy of each pair. No
judge scored more than one error on the 32 trials.
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was that we removed the initial trustworthiness ratings that were present in
Experiment 2.1. Although in the initial experiment these were used to calculate
trustworthiness changes over the course of the experiment, they also serve the
unintended purpose of making participants study the faces and evaluate them in terms
of their physical characteristics, a deeper level of encoding than one gets from simply
following gaze direction alone, and one that could lead to more stable memory for the
identities (see Experiment 3.3). As such, in this experiment we included an initial
trustworthiness rating to allow for deeper initial encoding of the faces.
Data analysis
The same RT lters were applied to these data as in Experiment 4.1, and all but one
participant retained enough trials and achieved high enough accuracy to be included in
the nal analysis. No RT or accuracy models would converge until the validity j subject
term was removed.
When participant chose the image they believed they had seen in the experiment,
they were coded either as congruent (valid face, trustworthy morph; invalid face,
untrustworthy morph) or incongruent (valid face, untrustworthy morph; invalid face,
trustworthy morph), and these counts were analysed to see if more congruent responses
were made than incongruent. As this is a binary response, we analysed the number of
congruent responses using a binomial test.
For condence ratings, we compared these using linear mixed eects models and t
a validity-only model to compare with a null model to see if validity explained any of the
variance in participants' condence ratings. Both models converged with the maximum
random structure. We also generated a model with congruency (whether the selected
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image matched to the validity in line with our predictions) as a xed factor, which we
compared with the null model, to see if participants were more condent when the image
they chose matched with the face's previous behaviour, and with the validity-only model,
to see whether condence was better predicted by face validity or choice congruency.
The congruency model would not converge with any random slope terms dened, and so
these were removed from all models to allow for direct comparison.
Initial trustworthiness ratings were not analysed as they did not inform our
hypotheses.
4.2.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 4.5: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds (left plot) and accuracy rates (percent
correct; right plot) across all ve blocks in Experiment 4.2 in response to valid (light grey) and
invalid (dark grey) trials. Error bars show standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 4.2 are shown in Figure 4.5. Fitting
validity to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when
explaining RTs ( = -28.23, SE = 9.84, 2(1) = 8.22, p = 0.004). This improvement was
not seen for accuracy scores ( = 1.00, SE = 0.74, 2(1) = 1.82, p = 0.177).
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Figure 4.6: Graph to show the proportion of the four dierent choice outcomes   selecting the
more trustworthy (bottom row, light grey) or untrustworthy image (top row, dark grey) of a
valid-cueing (left) or invalid-cueing (right) face. The congruent choices are denoted by thick black
borders. Entirely congruent choices would show the left bar as entirely blue (all 8 valid faces chosen
as trustworthy image) and the right as entirely red (all 8 invalid as untrustworthy image).
The results of Experiment 4.2 are shown in Figure 4.6. The graph shows the
proportion of the 8 valid and 8 invalid images that were selected as positive or negative.
For each participant, the number of faces that were chosen in line with our hypotheses
(Congruent; positive valid faces, negative invalid faces, 8.37) and the number that were
not (Incongruent; negative valid faces, positive invalid, 7.63) were calculated. The results
of the binomial test found that participants did not select the congruent image
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signicantly more often than could be explained by chance (p = 0.224).
Condence ratings
Although they did not reach signicance, there were dierences in condence ratings
that participants made for the dierent faces. Participants reported feeling more
condent in their decisions about invalid faces (M = 5.44, s.d. = 2.10) than valid (M =
5.09, s.d. = 2.02). Fitting validity to the null model signicantly improved the t ( =
-0.35, SE = 0.12, 2(1) = 8.24, p = 0.004).
Condence ratings for incongruent trials (positive image, invalid face or negative
image, valid face: M = 5.16, s.d. = 1.99) were lower than those for congruent trials
(positive image, valid face or negative image, invalid face: M = 5.37, s.d. = 2.13), but
tting congruency to the model did not signicantly improve the t ( = -0.11, SE =
0.13, 2(1) = 0.76, p = 0.385). In fact, comparing the validity and congruency models
showed that the validity model t the data signicantly better than did a congruency
model (2(1) = 7.48, p <.001), which indicates that validity was a better predictor of
condence ratings (in that participants felt more condent about decisions regarding
invalid faces than valid) than was congruency (the decision that would reect the true
cueing validity of the face).
Given that the task participants were asked to perform was to choose the image
they remembered from the experiment, a possible explanation of this eect is that
participants placed more condence in their stored representations of invalid faces (that
is, they felt they remembered them better) than valid faces, but this did not necessarily
bias them towards selecting the untrustworthy exemplar over the trustworthy one. This
result is reminiscent of that observed by Bayliss and Tipper (2006), where participants
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reported that they had viewed invalid faces more often.
4.3 Experiment 4.3
This experiment aimed to investigate whether incidentally learned trustworthiness
representations of face identities could be accessed without asking anything directly
about the faces in question. Such a measure would allow for the investigation of aspects
of the eect such as its test-retest reliability that have not been possible to address
before. In this experiment, then, participants rated artistic images while the face images
remained irrelevant background distractors that participants were never asked about, to
see if the validity of the face would have an eect on an unrelated liking judgement.
4.3.1 Methods
Participants
In the 500ms SOA condition, there were 22 participants. Two of these participants' data
were not collected due to runtime errors, leaving 20 (all female, M age = 19.60, s.d. =
1.53). In the 1,000ms SOA condition there were 20 participants in total (all female,
M age = 20.25, s.d. = 2.39). As such, across the two conditions there were a total of 40
participants.
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 3.3 in that it included a face-matching
familiarisation task at the beginning of the experiment, followed by an initial
trustworthiness rating and ve blocks of gaze-cueing. Where Experiment 3.3 continued
with a video ller task, however, this experiment replaced this with an alternative
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measure of the attitudes to the faces, described below.
In this task, we intended to see whether attitudes about the faces could generalise to
simultaneously-presented objects. In order to explore this there were two
between-subjects conditions, which varied based on stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA).
Previous research with ERPs by Manssuer, Roberts and Tipper (2015) found a late
positive potential emerging around 1,000ms that appears to dierentiate between valid
and invalid faces, suggesting that it takes this long to access the stored representation of
trustworthiness associated with that face. However, to date such a delay has not been
shown behaviourally. As such, we included two levels of SOA between the face appearing
and the gaze shifting to look at where the target would appear: the gaze shift would
occur either 500ms (short SOA, too early to access the stored representation) or 1,000ms
(long SOA, long enough to access properties of trust).
Three types of image were used; non-directional arrows, Mandelbrot fractals and
Kandinsky- inspired abstract images (see Appendix D for examples). There were 16
examples of each type of image, and each face from the experiment appeared alongside
one example of each image. Image type was blocked and counterbalanced across
participants, such that where one participant might see arrows, fractals and then
Kandinsky images, another would see Kandinsky, arrows, and then fractals, etc. An
example trial is shown in Figure 4.7. Image position (left/right side of screen) alternated
predictably every trial, although participants were not explicitly told this.
We were interested in the rating that participants made of the image alongside the
face   whether those images associated with previously valid faces would be rated more
positively, even when all faces now gazed at the images.
At the end of the experiment, participants once again completed the normal
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Figure 4.7: Example of an image rating trial from Experiment 4.3, with timings for a. the short
and b. the long SOA conditions. In a trial, a face would appear in the centre of the screen and
shift its gaze either left or right after a. 500 (short) or b. 1,000ms (long). The image (either a
Mandelbrot fractal, a non-directional arrow, or a Kandinsky-inspired abstract image (pictured in
trial sequence); see Appendix D) would then appear for 500ms before the question and rating scale
appeared on the bottom of the screen. Participants reported how much they liked the image on a
scale of 1 to 9.
trustworthiness ratings of the faces.
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 4.1. Data were analysed in the
same way as described in Chapter 3, but with the addition of SOA (500ms/1,000ms) as a
xed factor, and models that examined the interaction of validity and SOA. This was
done for peace of mind to ensure that the between-subjects groups of participants were
processing the faces' gaze behaviour in a similar way during gaze cueing (e.g. if we did
not nd trust learning in the 500ms SOA condition as we expect, that this was not due
to those participants showing abnormal insensitivity to gaze cues). For RTs, the
maximum random structure would not converge until the validity j subject term was
removed, and so this was removed from this model and the validity-only and SOA-only
models to allow for direct comparison. The two-factor models converged with the
maximum random structure.
For accuracy rates, the validity-only, SOA-only, and interaction models would not
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converge with the maximum random structure until the SOA j identity term was
removed, so this was removed from all models to allow for direct comparison.
When modelling trustworthiness ratings no models would converge until the time j
subject term was removed. For image ratings, all models converged with the maximum
random structure   which in this instance included the image identity as a random
factor as well as face identity.
4.3.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 4.3 are shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9,
respectively. When analysing RTs, including validity as a xed factor signicantly
improved the t when applied to RTs, indicating a cueing eect ( = -52.10, SE = 7.76,
2(1) = 44.77, p <.001), and including SOA had a marginal eect ( = 59.07, SE =
32.76, 2(1) = 3.28, p = 0.070). This appears to be driven by faster RTs overall in the
long SOA condition than the other. However, given that the manipulation of SOA did
not aect the experiment until after gaze cueing had ended, this is likely noise driven by
slightly dierent populations of participants. There is no cause for concern that
dierences in gaze cueing may drive any dierences in learning, as there was no evidence
of an interaction of validity and SOA ( = 2.80, SE = 15.87, 2(1) = 0.03, p = 0.860).
Models of accuracy rates found no evidence to support an eect of validity ( =
0.01, SE = 0.01, 2(1) = 0.46, p = 0.499), or SOA ( = -0.01, SE = 0.03, 2(1) = 0.04,
p = 0.839), nor any interaction of the two ( = -0.01, SE = 0.03, 2(1) = 0.07, p =
0.791).
133
Chapter 4: Alternative measures of learned attitudes
500ms 1,000ms
RT
 (m
s)
60
0
70
0
80
0
90
0
10
00
11
00
Valid
Invalid
Figure 4.8: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds) in Experiment 4.3 in response to valid (light
grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials in the short (500ms; left plot) and long (1,000ms; right plot)
conditions. Despite dierent conditions, all experimental details up to the end of gaze-cueing were
identical across dierent conditions. Error bars show standard error.
Trustworthiness ratings
The changes in trustworthiness ratings for the faces in Experiment 4.3 are shown in
Figure 4.10. Adding time to the null model did not signicantly improve the t ( =
-0.21, SE = 1.65, 2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.899), nor did including SOA ( = 0.79, SE = 4.34,
2(1) = 0.03, p = 0.864). However, including validity did improve the t ( = -5.01, SE
= 1.52, 2(1) = 10.59, p = 0.001). The comparison of the two xed-factor models (time
+/* validity) revealed a signicant two-way interaction of time and validity ( = -7.56,
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Figure 4.9: Averaged accuracy rates (percent correct) in Experiment 4.3 in response to valid (light
grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials in the short (500ms; left plot) and long (1,000ms; right plot)
conditions. Error bars show standard error.
SE = 2.91, 2(1) = 6.75, p = 0.009), and including SOA to make a three-way
interaction marginally improved the t ( = -3.19, SE = 5.80, 2(3) = 7.12, p = 0.068).
To explore this three-way interaction further, analyses were performed on the short
and long SOA conditions separately. For the 1,000ms SOA condition, where the face
showed direct gaze for a full second during image ratings before shifting its gaze, we
examined a two-way interaction model of time and validity. The model converged after
the time j subject slope term was removed, and comparison of the two models found a
signicant interaction ( = 10.31, SE = 6.59, 2(1) = 4.84, p = 0.028). For the 500ms
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Figure 4.10: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over the experiment for valid (dotted) and
invalid (solid line) faces in short (500ms; left plot) and long (1,000ms; right plot) conditions in
Experiment 4.3. Error bars show standard error.
SOA condition, where the face showed direct gaze for only half a second during image
ratings before shifting its gaze, the models would not converge with the maximum
random structure and so both the time j identity and time j subject slope terms had to
be removed. This analysis found no signicant interaction ( = 11.94, SE = 6.45, 2(1)
= 2.14, p = 0.143) indicating that participants' learning of gaze cue contingencies had
been selectively disrupted in this condition. This was in line with our a priori hypotheses
that trust learning would be disrupted when the face shifted attention away before
participants had enough time to access their stored representation of its gaze behaviour.
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We also examined the change in trustworthiness for each condition of the faces
(short SOA vs. long SOA; valid vs. invalid). No models converged with any random
terms except for the long SOA valid models, which converged with time j identity
included only. These analyses found that including time in the model, which reects a
change over the course of the experiment, signicantly improved the t for valid faces in
the short SOA ( = 5.98, SE = 2.83, 2(1) = 4.46, p = 0.035), but not in the long SOA
condition ( = 1.16, SE = 3.21, 2(1) = 0.13, p = 0.715). However, for invalid faces
there was a signicant improvement of t in the long SOA ( = -7.99, SE = 2.67, 2(1)
= 8.84, p = 0.003), but not in the short ( = 0.02, SE = 2.85, 2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.995).
Image ratings
The results of the image rating tasks are shown in Figure 4.11 as standardised rating
values around the centre of the 1-9 Likert scale. Participants were generally conservative
with their image ratings, as all averages tended towards the centre of the scale. Adding
validity to the null model did not signicantly improve the t, suggesting that
participants did not base their image rating decisions on the cueing validity of the paired
face ( = -0.06, SE = 0.08, 2(1) = 0.55, p = 0.457). Including SOA similarly did not
improve the t ( = -0.38, SE = 0.31, 2(1) = 1.59, p = 0.208), but a two-way
interaction of validity and SOA approached signicance ( = 0.33, SE = 0.17, 2(1) =
3.70, p = 0.054).
However, closer examination of the two SOA conditions separately found that the
eect of validity approached signicance only in the short SOA condition ( = -0.21, SE
= 0.12, 2(1) = 3.24, p = 0.072), but not in the long SOA condition ( = 0.11, SE =
0.12, 2(1) = 0.80, p = 0.371). This did not t with our hypothesis that participants
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Figure 4.11: Averaged image ratings for images paired with valid faces (dotted) and images paired
with invalid faces (solid line) for short (500ms; left) and long SOAs (1,000ms; right). Values are
standardised as deviations from the midpoint of the response scale (5), such that negative values
denote ratings below 5 and positive values denote ratings above 5. Error bars show standard error.
would only be able to access the stored trustworthiness representations in the long SOA
condition, and not in the short.
4.4 Chapter Discussion
Experiment 4.1 asked whether the standard incidental trust learning could be accessed
through measuring distortions in participants' memory for the physical features of faces.
To do this, it used a morphing procedure in place of trustworthiness ratings; participants
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could morph the face to look more or less trustworthy to match what they remembered
from the gaze-cueing, with the expectation that if participants had updated their
memory of the faces to appear more or less trustworthy in line with their cueing
behaviour, this would cause them to morph the faces to physically match these stored
representations. No systematic bias towards one direction or another was found for
either valid or invalid faces. However, the paradigm used was quite complicated and
required participants to attempt to match a new image to a stored representation of a
face that they had been instructed to ignore.
This sort of morphing technique could prove to be a valid one, particularly in
paradigms that focus on memory for faces as this can be a dicult process to examine;
using a participant-controlled morphing application allows participants to feel more
control to get the image to match their memory or representation that is not available
when using recognition or 2AFC measures. Nonetheless, in this instance it appears that
the measure was somewhat complicated and challenging for participants, and as such
lacked sensitivity.
Experiment 4.2 attempted to simplify the morphing procedure of Experiment 4.1
and limited participants' choices to either a trustworthy or untrustworthy morphed
`twin'. It also included the pre-rating from Experiment 2.1, as one dierence between
Experiments 2.1 and 4.1 was that there was no initial consideration of the
trustworthiness of the face in Experiment 4.1, which may have led to more shallow
encoding of the faces (cf. Chapter 3). However, this experiment also found no evidence
of gaze behaviour impacting the low-level physical properties of participants' memories
of faces. This reinforces the conclusion that changes in trustworthiness elicited by gaze
cues do not result in systematic dierences in memory for the perceptual features of the
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face. These results show that as well as not aecting perception (Firestone & Scholl,
2015), top-down learning of trustworthiness also does not seem to aect memory for
perceptual features (although we must be careful to avoid over-interpreting null eects).
Both Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 also asked participants to rate how condent they felt
in their answers. The morphing task in Experiment 4.1 did not yield any systematic
dierences in condence, which is not surprising when the diculty of the task is taken
into account. The small changes in facial features and the diculty recalling ne details
of faces to match to the images mean that it was unlikely that participants felt
particularly condent about any of their decisions. In contrast, the simpler 2AFC task
used in Experiment 4.2 found that participants reported greater condence in decisions
made about invalid faces, which suggests that they may feel they remembered these faces
better. Although this did not result in a response bias towards the congruent image
(valid-trustworthy and invalid-untrustworthy), this does t with other ndings
throughout the literature and this thesis that individuals associated with deception are
privileged in memory (Bell, Buchner, Erdfelder et al., 2012; Buchner et al., 2009; Bayliss
& Tipper, 2006, and the fact that decreases for invalid faces are more stable than
changes for valid faces, particularly in Chapter 3).
Experiment 4.3 explored whether the trustworthiness of the faces could be accessed
without asking directly about the faces at all. To this end, faces were presented
alongside artistic images that participants were asked to rate, to see if the face's previous
validity had an eect on image ratings. No signicant eect of face validity on ratings of
the associated images was found in either the short or the long SOA condition. While
previous research has shown that facial attractiveness can manipulate desirability of
associated objects (Strick et al., 2008), these data suggest that the same is not true for
140
Chapter 4: Alternative measures of learned attitudes
incidentally learned trustworthiness.2 As Strick et al. used faces that varied in their
physical levels of attractiveness, it might be that such physical cues in the face are
necessary to aect non-social judgements, and as shown in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, this
incidental learning does not aect memory or perception of physical features.
A second aim of Experiment 4.3 was to investigate how the timing of the
intervening task might impact trust learning. Between learning (gaze cueing) and recall
(trustworthiness ratings), the representations of faces' cueing behaviour must be
maintained and consolidated. Experiment 3.4 has shown that this can occur during
naturalistic interference in the real world, and Experiment 3.5 showed that this learning
can survive reversed gaze cueing in a nal block. Experiment 4.3 aimed to explore this
further by making all faces now look towards a subsequent target   essentially removing
the gaze cueing component while retaining the visual experience of a gaze shift. The key
question was whether disrupting processing of the face by triggering an attentional shift
away from it (using a gaze shift) would disrupt the memory for individuals'
trustworthiness, and whether this might selectively impact valid or invalid faces.
In general, in support of the data obtained in Chapter 3 where memory for trust
could survive intervening tasks, Figure 4.10 shows similar patterns of trust learning. It is
noteworthy that the trust learning appears to be more robust when faces were viewed for
1000ms prior to gaze shifts in the previous art rating task. We might tentatively propose
at this time, that this longer viewing time enabled retrieval of prior trust/deception
associated with the faces (e.g., Manssuer, Roberts & Tipper, 2015), and this supported
the consolidation of trust during this intervening period. Certainly the current trust
2Note that Strick et al. (2008) also found that direct gaze was necessary to show this transfer. Although
they are not reported here, we also ran versions of Experiment 4.3 where the face maintained direct gaze
throughout the trial, but found no eects of face validity on image ratings in either short or long SOAs. This
is more in line with the ndings of Bayliss et al. (2007), who found that emotional information conveyed
by expression (which is more closely related to judgements of trustworthiness than are judgements of
attractiveness) requires that gaze be directed towards the object.
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rating data supports Experiment 3.5. That is, memory for incidentally learned trust can
even survive when the same faces are exposed again in a dierent task context, even
though there is no longer a speeded response component to the task, and no invalid cues
from any faces. Interestingly, it seems that this representation is maintained even when
faces demonstrate a non-informative gaze shift.
Although none of the approaches described here would serve as alternative measures
of incidentally learned trust, there are other options that may serve as a useful basis for
future research. For example, the economic trust games used by Rogers et al. (2014) can
be used to investigate dierent facets of this learning, and using dierent types of game
from the one-shot games used in that study (for example, seeing how participants then
adapt to particular investment behaviours from valid and invalid faces) could yield
important insights. Alternatively there are other measures that are starting to emerge
from technological advances with motion capture and virtual reality: Proxemic imaging
is a technique that has been used to measure approach and avoidance behaviours in
social interaction by measuring how participants position themselves in relation to their
partner (McCall & Singer, 2015). This has the advantage of providing a nuanced and
rich source of data without ever having to ask directly about participants' attitudes
towards the identities.
The main aim of this chapter was to explore alternative measures of incidental trust
learning, which it did in three ways over three separate experiments. However, none of
the avenues explored proved viable alternatives to directly asking about trustworthiness.
They did, however, reinforce some important points. Experiment 4.2 shows that
participants appear to feel more condent about their memories for invalid face than
valid faces, while Experiment 4.3 showed that an intervening task where the faces were
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re-exposed does not completely disrupt retrieval of prior incidental learning of trust,
similarly to results with non-face interference tasks reported in Chapter 3.
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incidental trust learning
The results of Chapters 2, 3, and 4 have brought to light some of the complexities and
intricacies of incidental learning of trust from gaze cues. However, one outstanding
question that remains to be addressed is the issue of how the identity of the cueing faces
might aect how we learn about them. In the real world, one hardly ever experiences a
face entirely in isolation   people also carry with them a wealth of social information
that we use to form predictions and evaluations of the person and their behaviour.
Humans are social creatures, and we rely on social groups in order to survive. These
social groups can range from a smaller personal scale (e.g. a close circle of friends) to a
much larger societal scale (our national identity, gender, race, etc.; Lickel, Hamilton &
Sherman, 2001). People prefer individuals who are members of their in-group over their
out-group, even when this group distinction is a new category that has been learned in
the laboratory (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971).
Given that people tend to trust in-group members over out-group members, there is
an expectation for in-group members to behave cooperatively and out-group members to
behave deceptively. According to a model of learning by Rescorla and Wagner (1972),
violations of such expectations should lead to increased learning as the cognitive system
responsible has to reconcile the error between what is expected and what occurs. In this
case, the expectation would be that in-group faces should co-operate and that out-group
faces should deceive. As such, in-group invalid faces that deceive will be judged more
punitively than out-group invalid faces due to violating their expectations. This relates
to social psychological research on the black sheep eect whereby in-group members who
act negatively are judged more harshly than out-group members who act negatively
(Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). As for out-group valid faces that facilitate
144
Chapter 5: Minimal group membership and trust
performance, they could lead to a greater increase in trust than their in-group
counterparts due to greater learning of expectancy-violating events.
There is an alternative hypothesis to this, however. Most previous research into
trust and group membership has focussed primarily on broad group-level dierences.
However, the current paradigm involves in-the-moment experiential learning of
individual behaviours, which are conceptually separate from group-level prejudices. As
in this paradigm an equal number of in-group members as out-group members deceive
the participant, it is possible that learning trustworthiness from gaze cues may override
the group representation   therefore, exposure to valuable information about an
individual's behaviour may be a way of reducing this classic in-group favouritism, as
people judge others on the basis of their behaviour rather than who they are.
Alternatively, and perhaps more pessimistically, group membership may supersede
individual learning, and so the presence of an out-group (particularly one that is
generated as a result of explicit experimental instructions) could drive participants to
default to a group-level representation without including information about that person's
individual history of behaviour. That is, once people are aware they are interacting with
two groups of individuals, both in- and out-group, learning from unique patterns of
individual behaviour no longer takes place as broader categorisation at the group level
dominates.
Over the course of two experiments, this chapter aims to explore this issue of how
knowledge of group membership may inuence incidental trust learning from gaze cues.
In Experiment 5.1, we assign participants to minimal groups and nd that this does
extinguish any changes in trust on the basis of individual behaviour. Experiment 5.2
serves as a control experiment and removes explicit references to these groups, to match
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previous versions of the paradigm and replicate the original incidental learning of trust
eect.
5.1 Experiment 5.1
Experiment 5.1 aims to explore whether incidental trust learning is aected by social
knowledge about others by using a minimal groups paradigm. Participants were assigned
to one of two minimal groups to see if identifying with half of the faces aected how they
learned about those and other faces' trustworthiness.
5.1.1 Methods
Participants
A mixture of undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of York
volunteered for this study in return for payment or course credit. There were 34
participants in total, but due to runtime errors data had to be removed from three of
these, and one further participant was removed after RT lters left less than 70% of the
original trials. As such, there were 30 participants included in the nal analysis (18
female, M age = 20.17, s.d. = 1.57).
Stimuli
All stimuli were the same for the gaze-cueing portion of the experiment as the smiling
faces used in Experiment 2.2, with the exception of the colour of the face images'
t-shirts. Shirt colours were edited in PhotoShop and 30% chromatic lters were applied
to the default grey. Examples of the stimuli used are shown in Figure 5.1. At the
beginning of the experiment participants were assigned to either the Overestimator
group or the Underestimator group, and were instructed at the beginning of the
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experiment that the faces had completed a similar classication task. For half of the
participants, blue shirts signalled an in-group member, yellow an out-group, while for the
other half this was reversed. Smiling faces were used because this has been shown to lead
to more robust learning and a bidirectional change in ratings of trustworthiness (cf.
Experiment 2.2), which would allow us to better track any eect of group membership.
Original Blue Yellow
Figure 5.1: Examples of the stimuli used in the group-membership experiment, along with the
original grey-shirt image (left). Participants were instructed that either the blue or yellow shirt
signied their in-group, and that the other signied their out-group.
The classication task undertaken at the beginning of the experiment involved
participants watching 12 arrays of moving dots. Participants were asked to estimate the
number of dots in each array. The number of dots was either 25, 50 or 70 white dots
moving incoherently at 1/500 units per frame on a grey background for 5 seconds.
Participants had a sliding scale to report the number of dots. After the total number of
trials, participants were then shown a screen that read, `Processing...' for one second to
give the impression of the machine making calculations, and then were shown a screen
that read as follows:
Your results show that you are an [overestimator/underestimator].
Research has shown that people who score like you on these tests tend to
perform well at tasks involving visual attention and memory, and also work
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well in team exercises.
The additional blurb did not vary depending on how participants were classied.
This blurb was added both to increase belief in the fact that this group classication
would be somehow related to the gaze-cueing portion of the experiment, and to make it
seem like they were expected to perform particularly well, which would lead to more
negative consequences for misleading gaze cues. This supposed calibration procedure was
coded using PsychoPy2 Experiment Builder (Peirce, 2007) and run as a standalone
Python le.
Design and Procedure
The gaze-cueing portion of the experiment was essentially similar to that in Experiment
2.2, where smiling faces appeared on the screen and cued either the correct or incorrect
location. The only dierence was the addition of shirt colour, which participants were
told signalled whether the person was `like them' (either an over- or underestimator) or
not like them.
In order to ensure that participants were familiar with which colour corresponded to
their group, participants consent forms were `led' in a clear plastic wallet with either a
blue or yellow sticker, corresponding to the colour associated with that group that was
left on the desk next to the participant, to serve as a reminder of which colour was their
own group. At the beginning of the experiment participants also performed a
categorisation task with the faces   a face would appear in the centre of the screen
wearing a blue or yellow t-shirt and participants (having been instructed that, for
example, blue t-shirts denoted that the person was an overestimator like them) judged
whether the person was `Like me' or `Not like me' using the keyboard keys Z and M.
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This encouraged participants to focus on the t-shirt colour early on and associate it with
either an in-group or out-group. Participants also saw refresher screens during every
break to make sure that they did not forget which faces were which.
There were 16 faces in total, 8 of which were in-group members and 8 out-group. Of
these, 4 provided valid gaze cues and 4 were invalid, meaning that each participant saw
four groups of faces, each composed of 4 identities, two male, two female: In-Group
Valid, In-Group Invalid, Out-Group Valid and Out-Group Invalid.
Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 2.1, and in this experiment one
participant had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials.
All data were analysed using linear mixed eects models as in previous chapters.
The inclusion of face identity as a factor meant that for RTs and accuracy rates we also
generated models that included group as a xed factor, and models that explored a
validity x group interaction to see if gaze cueing eects changed as a result of whether
the face was an in-group or out-group member. For RTs, no models would converge until
the validity j subject term was removed. No accuracy models would converge until the
validity j subject term was removed.
For trustworthiness ratings, the process was largely similar. We again generated a
maximum random structure then generated models for each xed factor individually
(time-only, validity-only and group-only models). To investigate interactions, we rst
compared a 2-factor interaction model (time x validity) with a model that included both
factors without an interaction (time + validity). We then explored whether a three-way
interaction model t the data better than a two-way interaction. To do this, we modelled
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the two-way interaction and included group as an additional xed factor (time x validity
+ group), which we compared with the three-way interaction (time x validity x group).
This was done to be sure that any improvement of model t was not simply due to the
inclusion of a third factor. All models included a group j subject error term as well.
All single-factor models except for the group-only model failed to converge until the
time j identity, validity j subject and group j subject error terms were removed. The
group-only model would not converge with any random slope terms dened, and so this
model alone was compared with a simplied null model that included the random
intercepts but no dened error slope terms. The two-factor models of time and validity
(time +/* validity) would not converge until the validity j subject and group j subject
terms were removed. The three-factor models (time +/* validity +/* group) would not
converge until the time j identity, time j subject, and validity j subject terms were all
removed.
However, we include an important caveat here. As in previous experiments, we
included a set of 16 individual faces for participants to learn. In experiments with only
validity as a single xed factor this allows for eight identities in each condition, but the
inclusion of minimal group as an orthogonal factor to validity reduces the number of
faces in each cell to four. As such, controlling for both stimulus and subject-level
variance could lead us vulnerable to a Type II error due to limited power. Indeed, this
may be why linear mixed models were reluctant to converge for trustworthiness ratings.
A way around this could be to use more stimuli, but the issue of set capacity in this
incidental learning has never been explored (see Chapter 8: General Discussion).
Instead, while we still present the results of linear mixed eects models, we also report
the results of factorial ANOVAs for trustworthiness ratings in the main text of this
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chapter, to allow converging statistical techniques to strengthen our interpretation.
5.1.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 5.2: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds) in Experiment 5.1 in response to valid (light
grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials and in- (left) and out-group (right) faces. Error bars show
standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 5.1 are shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3,
respectively. Including validity as a xed factor signicantly improved the t when
applied to RTs, indicating a cueing eect ( = -41.78, SE = 7.21, 2(1) = 33.34, p
<.001), but including group did not, which suggests that participants were not faster to
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respond on trials with faces of either their in- or out-group ( = -5.47, SE = 7.26, 2(1)
= 0.57, p = 0.451). As well as this, an interaction of these two factors (validity x race)
did not t the data signicantly better than did a model with both factors included
without an interaction ( = 6.22, SE = 14.45, 2(1) = 0.19, p = 0.667).
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Figure 5.3: Accuracy rates (percent correct) in Experiment 5.1 in response to valid (light grey)
and invalid (dark grey) trials and in- (left) and out-group (right) faces. Error bars show standard
error.
When modelling accuracy scores, including validity as a xed factor did not
signicantly improve the model t ( = 0.66, SE = 0.70, 2(1) = 0.88, p = 0.347), nor
did including group membership ( = -0.17, SE = 0.79, 2(1) = 0.05, p = 0.829), and
there was no evidence to support an interaction of the two ( = 1.52, SE = 1.40, 2(1)
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= 1.18, p = 0.278).
Trustworthiness ratings
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Figure 5.4: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over the course of Experiment 5.1 for valid
(dotted) and invalid (solid line) faces for both in-group (left) and out-group (right) members.
Error bars show standard error.
Linear mixed eects models. The results of Experiment 5.1 are shown in
Figure 5.4. We report the results of linear mixed eects models in the interests of
continuity with other experiments, but our condence in these statistics is weakened by
the small number of identities in each condition, as described above. Adding time to the
null model did not signicantly improve the t ( = -1.45, SE = 1.91, 2(1) = 0.58, p =
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0.447), nor did including validity ( = -2.37, SE = 1.82, 2(1) = 1.69, p = 0.194).
However, including group as a xed factor did signicantly improve the t ( = -9.38,
SE = 1.80, 2(1) = 26.67, p <.001)1. The comparison of the two xed-factor models
(time +/* validity) did not reveal a signicant two-way interaction ( = -0.98, SE =
2.69, 2(1) = 0.07, p = 0.798), and neither did the comparison of a three-way interaction
t better than a two-way interaction with group included (time * validity + group vs.
time * validity * group), indicating no three-way interaction ( = -4.22, SE = 3.26,
2(3) = 3.72, p = 0.293).
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
each condition (In-Group Valid; In-Group Invalid; Out-Group Valid; and Out-Group
Invalid) separately. These models found that time did not signicantly improve the
model t for In-Group invalid ( = -4.26, SE = 3.45, 2(1) = 1.53, p = 0.216),
Out-Group invalid ( = 0.49, SE = 3.24, 2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.879), In-Group valid ( =
-4.22, SE = 3.38, 2(1) = 1.56, p = 0.211), or Out-Group valid faces ( = 2.29, SE =
3.22, 2(1) = 0.51, p = 0.474).
ANOVAs. As well as mixed eects models we also report the results of a factorial
ANOVA, given that controlling for both subject and identity in linear mixed eects
models may unacceptably raise the risk of a Type II error. A 2x2x2 ANOVA looking at
time, validity and group membership found no main eect of time (F (1,29) = 0.57, p =
0.455, 2P = 0.02), or of validity (F (1,29) = 1.36, p = 0.253, 
2
P = 0.04), but a marginal
eect of group membership (F (1,29) = 3.95, p = 0.057, 2P = 0.12), which was driven by
the fact that in-group members were rated as more trustworthy than out-group
members. No signicant interactions emerged (all F s < 1.4).
1Note that this model was compared with a simplied null model with no random terms, to allow for
direct comparison
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Follow-up paired-samples t-tests between the beginning and end ratings for each
condition found that there was no signicant change in trustworthiness over the course of
the experiment for valid in-group (t(29) = 1.02, [95% CI -4.26 to 12.70], p = 0.318, d =
0.19), valid out-group (t(29) = -0.68, [95% CI -9.09 to 4.57], p = 0.504, d = 0.10),
invalid in-group (t(29) = 1.01, [95% CI -4.41 to 12.95], p = 0.323, d = 0.18), or invalid
out-group faces (t(29) = -0.15, [95% CI -6.30 to 5.42], p = 0.879, d = 0.02).
The results of Experiment 5.1 suggest that participants identied with their
in-group over their out-group, despite the fact that group membership was minimal at
best, and the cover story described an articial group distinction that does not emerge
often in the real world. What is particularly striking is that participants experience the
same gaze cueing paradigm as in previous studies and that gaze shifts in the in- and
out-group faces evoke the same orienting of attention, as the cueing eects are strikingly
similar. Nevertheless, when participants are asked to make trustworthiness judgements
in this experiment they do not appear to incorporate this information into their
judgements, and instead default to judging trustworthiness according to which group
individuals belong.
Of course, an alternative explanation is that the presence of blue and yellow t-shirts
during trustworthiness ratings was distracting and so participants simply forgot the
cueing behaviour of the faces. This explanation seems unlikely, but in order to rule it
out we replicated this experiment but removed all references to there being two groups.
Experiment 5.2 removed the instruction screen categorising participants as
over/underestimators in the calibration task, and removed the face categorisation task at
the beginning of the experiment. As such, this was more closely matched to Experiment
2.1, with the addition of a visual estimation task and the inclusion of blue and yellow
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shirts, which were not mentioned or highlighted at any point.
5.2 Experiment 5.2
This experiment replicated Experiment 5.1 but removed any reference to dichotomous
groups, to see if this addition had prompted participants to represent the trustworthiness
of faces on a group level as opposed to an identity level.
5.2.1 Methods
Participants
30 participants (22 female, M age = 19.79, s.d. = 2.20) volunteered for this study in
return for a mixture of course credit and payment. No participants were removed after
RT lters were applied.
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment was identical to Experiment 5.1 in every way except that participants
were not allocated to any groups   during the `calibration' task where participants were
asked to estimate the number of moving dots, they were not given any feedback as to
whether they had been classed as an overestimator or underestimator, and faces were
similarly not explicitly identied as belonging to either of these groups. Participants also
no longer completed any 2AFC task at the beginning of the experiment where they
identied the group membership of the faces on the basis of shirt colour. As such, in this
experiment shirt colour was an incidental background feature that was never explicitly
mentioned, as opposed to Experiment 5.1, where it was a salient cue to group
membership.
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Data analysis
RT lters were applied in the same way as in Experiment 5.1, and in this experiment no
participants had to be removed for retaining less than 70% of their original trials. In this
experiment, there was no in-group/out-group distinction and so these data were instead
analysed using shirt colour as an additional xed factor alongside validity for RT and
accuracy models, and using shirt colour, validity and time as xed factors in
trustworthiness models. We did not expect any eects of shirt colour, but include it in
the interests of consistency with Experiment 5.1.
All RT models converged with the maximum random structure dened. The
colour-only model of accuracy rates would not converge until the colour j subject term
was removed, so this was removed from this, the null, and the validity-only models. The
two-factor models of accuracy rates would not converge until the validity j subject term
was removed.
For trustworthiness models, all single-factor models except for the group-only model
failed to converge until the time j identity, validity j subject and shirt colour j subject
error terms were removed. The shirt colour-only model would not converge with any
random slope terms dened, and so this model alone was compared with a simplied null
model that included the random intercepts but no dened error slope terms. The
interaction model of time and validity (time * validity) would not converge until the time
j subject, time j identity, and shirt colour j subject terms were removed, so these were
removed from both two-factor models. The three-factor models (time +/* validity +/*
shirt colour) would not converge until the time j identity, time j subject, and validity j
subject terms were all removed.
Trustworthiness ratings were also analysed using factorial ANOVAs, which are
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reported in the main text as with Experiment 5.1.
5.2.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 5.5: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds) in Experiment 5.2 in response to valid (light
grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials and faces wearing blue (left) and yellow (right) shirts. Error
bars show standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 5.2 are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6,
respectively. Including validity as a xed factor signicantly improved the t when
applied to RTs, indicating a cueing eect ( = -42.85, SE = 9.02, 2(1) = 17.38, p
<.001), as did including shirt colour ( = 58.58, SE = 18.12, 2(1) = 4.28, p = 0.039).
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Fitting a two-way interaction model t the data signicantly better than a two-factor
model without an interaction ( = -57.15, SE = 15.70, 2(1) = 13.21, p <.001). This
appears to be driven by the fact that cueing was slightly stronger for faces in yellow
shirts than blue, but it is not clear why this happened and it is dicult to say what
impact, if any, this result may have on our interpretation.
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Figure 5.6: Accuracy rates (percent correct) in Experiment 5.2 in response to valid (light grey)
and invalid (dark grey) trials and faces wearing blue (left) and yellow (right) shirts. Error bars
show standard error.
When modelling accuracy scores, including validity as a xed factor did not
signicantly improve the model t ( = 0.55, SE = 0.66, 2(1) = 0.70, p = 0.404), nor
did including shirt colour ( = -0.32, SE = 0.66, 2(1) = 0.23, p = 0.631), and there
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was no evidence to support an interaction of the two ( = -0.26, SE = 1.34, 2(1) =
0.04, p = 0.846).
Trustworthiness ratings
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Figure 5.7: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over the course of Experiment 5.1 for valid
(dotted) and invalid (solid line) faces for and faces wearing blue (left) and yellow (right) shirts.
Error bars show standard error.
Linear mixed eects models. The results of Experiment 5.2 are shown in Figure 5.7.
We report the results of linear mixed eects models in the interests of continuity with
other experiments, but our condence in these statistics is weakened by the small number
of identities in each condition, as described above. Adding time to the null model did
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not signicantly improve the t ( = -1.73, SE = 1.66, 2(1) = 1.11, p = 0.291), nor did
including shirt colour ( = 1.12, SE = 1.61, 2(1) = 0.48, p = 0.488). Including validity
did marginally improve the model t ( = -2.92, SE = 1.61, 2(1) = 3.30, p = 0.069).
The comparison of the two xed-factor models (time +/* validity) revealed a
signicant two-way interaction ( = -8.74, SE = 3.18, 2(1) = 7.55, p = 0.006), but
including a three-way interaction did not signicantly improve the t over a two-way
interaction with shirt colour as an additional factor (time * validity + shirt colour vs.
time * validity * shirt colour), indicating that trust learning was not modulated by shirt
colour ( = 5.67, SE = 6.34, 2(3) = 1.44, p = 0.697).
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
each condition (Blue Valid; Blue Invalid; Yellow Valid; Yellow Invalid) separately.2
These models found that time did not signicantly improve the model t for Blue Valid
( = 2.81, SE = 3.19, 2(1) = 0.78, p = 0.378), or for Yellow Valid ( = 2.47, SE =
3.07, 2(1) = 0.65, p = 0.420), or Yellow Invalid faces ( = -3.44, SE = 3.19, 2(1) =
1.17, p = 0.278), but it did improve the t for Blue Invalid ( = -8.77, SE = 3.36, 2(1)
= 6.74, p = 0.009).
ANOVAs. As well as mixed eects models we also report the results of a factorial
ANOVA, given that controlling for both subject and identity in linear mixed eects
models may unacceptably raise the risk of a Type II error. A 2x2x2 ANOVA looking at
time, validity and shirt colour found no main eect of time (F (1,29) = 1.10, p = 0.304,
2P = 0.04), or of validity (F (1,29) = 1.05, p = 0.314, 
2
P = 0.04), or shirt colour
(F (1,29) = 0.28, p = 0.599, 2P = 0.01). The interaction of time and validity approached
signicance (F (1,29) = 3.83, p = 0.060, 2P = 0.12), but no other interactions did (all F s
2No models for blue faces would converge with any random terms dened, while models for yellow faces
converged after the time j subject term was removed.
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< 1.23).
Follow-up paired-samples t-tests between the beginning and end ratings for each
condition found that there was no signicant change in trustworthiness over the course of
the experiment for Blue Valid faces (t(29) = -0.82, [95% CI -9.78 to 4.17], p = 0.417, d
= 0.12), Yellow Valid faces (t(29) = -1.14, [95% CI -6.89 to 1.96], p = 0.264, d = 0.11),
Yellow Invalid faces (t(29) = 1.00, [95% CI -3.60 to 10.49], p = 0.326, d = 0.14), but
there was a signicant change for Blue Invalid faces (t(29) = 2.26, [95% CI 0.83 to
16.70], p = 0.031, d = 0.35).
In all, it seems that Experiment 5.2 has managed to overcome some of the extinction
of trust learning seen in Experiment 5.1, although it seems weaker than the learning seen
in previous experiments. While there were some dierences between learning for blue
and yellow faces, these were not so strong as to indicate a three-way interaction. This is
likely due to the fact that the presence of dierent shirt colours still serves as a cue to
discrete face categories, and although participants are not explicitly instructed to think
of these faces as dierent groups, enough of them may spontaneously default to this
representation that it weakens the classic prole of trust learning, which leaves them less
likely to use individuals' behaviour to inform trustworthiness judgements.
5.3 Chapter Discussion
This chapter investigated how the identity of the cueing faces may aect trust learning,
by assigning face identities to one of two minimal groups. Although we expected that this
manipulation may have some selective eects (i.e. enhancing or disrupting trust learning
for a particular type of face, depending on condition), Experiment 5.1 instead found no
learning of trust from gaze cues for any type of face. Instead, participants seem to use
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the group membership of the identities as a heuristic in their social decision making, as
group category appears to drive their decisions more than individual gaze behaviour.
Learning trust from gaze cues is demanding, and results of previous studies suggest
that it occurs automatically and outside of conscious awareness (c.f. Experiment 2.4).
However, the results of the current chapter suggest that in the presence of an alternative
source of information   explicitly instructed group membership   participants may
default to representing faces in terms of more easily accessible information that they can
use to inform trustworthiness judgements. It may be that learning on the basis of
experience with individuals is more cognitively demanding, and so the current paradigm
is insucient to override the salience of group membership.
Further research may look to explore the reasons for this. For example, it is not
clear from the current study whether participants still learn about trustworthiness from
gaze cues but do not use this information later in their social judgements, or whether it
is learning itself that is inhibited during gaze cueing. Similar cueing eects for both in-
and out-group members seem to indicate the former interpretation, but follow-up studies
could use alternative measures to interrogate this. Manssuer, Roberts and Tipper (2015)
found neural correlates of incidental trust learning during gaze cueing (that is, while
participants are learning about the cueing validity of the faces) using EEG, and so this
may be a way of exploring whether it is learning or retrieval that is aected by minimal
group membership. If these neural signals are preserved when groups are present, then
this suggests that learning may occur but group membership overrides it at retrieval. On
the other hand, if these neural correlates are disrupted by group membership then this
suggests that it is specically learning that is disrupted.
If the explanation behind these ndings is that trust learning is absent because
163
Chapter 5: Minimal group membership and trust
either forming or accessing these memories for individual behaviour is more cognitively
demanding, it could be interesting to see what happens when the typical gaze-cueing
paradigm used throughout this thesis is replicated under high cognitive load. If this
learning is more demanding (therefore higher in intrinsic cognitive load) then increasing
the demand on the cognitive system should extinguish trust learning in a non-social
context. However, if learning persists, this would suggest that this interference is due to
higher-order social interference from the minimal groups that is specic to this paradigm.
The results of Experiment 5.2 suggest that some participants at least are still
resorting to group-level representations. Clothing choices are, after all, a salient indicator
as to an individual's beliefs and opinions in the real world that reect an explicit and
conscious decision (sports team colours, for example). On the other hand, there are some
group distinctions that are independent of personal choice or preference, such as race,
and as these occur naturally in the real world it may be that these are subtle enough
manipulations that they do not trigger participants to represent them as explicit groups,
but rather treat them more implicitly. Chapter 6 explores this question in further detail.
In conclusion, this chapter reports the results of three experiments that show that
when participants are explicitly instructed that faces during gaze cueing belong to
dierent, albeit minimal, groups, they default to representing these identities on the
basis of their group-level characteristics rather than their individual history of gaze
behaviour. This suggests that although incidental trust learning from gaze cues is not
consciously driven, it may be superseded by concurrent information such as heuristics
about group membership.
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incidental trust learning
When using an experimental paradigm to explicitly change participants' expectations of
a face (e.g. through a minimal groups paradigm, where each identity is represented as a
trusted in-group member or a distrusted out-group member, see Chapter 5), this
group-level representation appears to override learning of individual identities, as
trustworthiness ratings reect group membership but not learned information about that
face's gaze behaviour.
This paradigm, however, relies on an explicit manipulation   that is, that faces are
labelled as part of a supercial in-group or out-group based on nothing more than shirt
colour. Although these group categories do exist in the real world (sports teams being an
example), there are also other ways in which our expectations and ideas about others
may vary in a more naturalistic way, such as the physical features of a face that reect
identity. Looking at a group membership category that occurs naturally and is driven by
face physical features would therefore allow us to investigate this without explicitly
telling participants about the manipulation.
One of the most studied and historically important social group categories, and one
that is driven primarily by facial features, is that of race. Aside from showing
preferential biases towards own-race over other-race faces (Dasgupta, Mcghee, Greenwald
& Banaji, 2000), people are also better at recognising the posed emotions of own-race
than other-race faces (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002b, 2002a), and remember own-race
faces better than other-race faces (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). There is also evidence
that these own-race biases are linked to decisions about trustworthiness in both explicit
ratings and economic games (Stanley, Sokol-Hessner, Banaji & Phelps, 2011).
In this chapter we include faces of dierent races in order to create more naturalistic
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group categories. There are competing predictions. One possibility is that learning
about other-race faces will be impaired. This would t with previous research suggesting
that we remember individuals of our own race better than those of other races (Meissner
& Brigham, 2001; Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Slone, Brigham & Meissner, 2000), and that
emotional learning about other-race faces is less exible than learning about own-race
faces (Dunsmoor, Kubota, Li, Coelho & Phelps, 2016). The trust learning task requires
that gaze patterns are associated with a specic face identity (see Chapter 3), and hence
if other-race identities are less well represented, learning will be impaired.
However, basing our behavioural decisions on physiognomy and race can be harmful,
leading to rigid responses that reinforce discrimination. In addition, it can render us
incapable of responding to the dynamics of behaviour and adjusting our behaviour
towards others in light of incoming information. Therefore we might expect learning not
to be less strong for other-race faces, but learning may instead be inuenced by those
events that oer opportunities for updating incorrect models or expectations.
Some studies suggest that people generally hold an expectation for own-race faces to
cooperate more than other-race faces (Stanley et al., 2011). As such, an alternative
hypothesis is that trust learning will follow a Rescorla and Wagner (1972) pattern of
learning, where learning is instead tailored to surprising events   in this case, invalid
same-race faces and valid other-race faces.
In Experiment 6.1 we explore whether trust learning is the same for individuals who
dier in terms of racial group membership in a behavioural paradigm. To this end, we
use images of White (in-group) and East Asian (out-group) faces in the cueing paradigm
and ask participants to rate them in terms of trust at the beginning and end of the
experiment. A critical contrast to the minimal group procedure of the previous chapter
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is that the two categories of faces are never explicitly mentioned in the current study.
6.1 Experiment 6.1
6.1.1 Methods
Participants
In Experiment 6.1a there were 30 participants in total. In Experiment 6.1b there were a
further 33 participants. One participant was excluded because Experiment 6.1b involved
EMG recordings of which participants needed to be nave to the purpose, and this
participant indicated at the end of the experiment that they had completed EMG
studies before. Another participant was excluded after applying lters (i.e. for having
pre-ratings that were exceptionally skewed towards the ends of the rating scale, which
would have created a ceiling or oor eect in trustworthiness ratings   more details are
given below). Finally, one participant was removed on the basis that their EMG
recordings were too noisy to extract meaningful data, so the nal number for analysis in
Experiment 6.1b was 30.
These two experiments were then collapsed together to give a total of 60
participants for analysis (all female, all Caucasian, M age = 20.14, s.d. = 1.59). All
participants provided written consent and the study was given ethical approval by the
Departmental Ethics Committee of the University of York Psychology Department.
Stimuli
Stimuli were taken from the MR2 face database, a multi-racial high-resolution database
of facial stimuli (Strohminger et al., 2015). This database comes with a set of ratings for
each face on a range of attributes, including trustworthiness on a scale of 1
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Figure 6.1: Examples of the four dierent conditions in which faces were presented in Experiment
6.1: out-group valid, out-group invalid, in-group valid and in-group invalid.
(untrustworthy) to 7 (trustworthy), and these are publicly available on the Open Science
Framework (OSF; https://osf.io/uwk4v/). 8 East Asian faces and 8 White faces were
selected on the basis of these ratings to be similar in terms of apparent trustworthiness
(East Asian faces: M = 4.13, s.d. = 0.14; White faces: M = 4.12, s.d. = 0.21).
Examples of each of the four conditions in which faces could appear are shown in Figure
6.1.
These images were then edited in Adobe Photoshop CS6 to remove the grey
background and edit the direction of eye gaze to create three versions of each face:
straight, left, and right gaze. These stimuli were used in the gaze-cueing procedure,
while faces with eyes unedited were used in the trustworthiness ratings and one-back
procedure.
Design and Procedure
The object categorisation task that participants were asked to complete was the same as
in previous experiments and chapters; a face appeared in the centre of the screen
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maintaining direct gaze for 1,500ms and would look either left or right for 500ms,
followed by the target object that participants had to identify as either a kitchen or
garage item, which would stay for 2,500ms, followed by a blank screen (500ms in
Experiment 6.1a; 2,000ms in Experiment 6.1b). The face would then return to direct
gaze for 1,000ms. As in previous experiments, participants received feedback in the form
of an error tone for incorrect trials. At the beginning and the end of the experiment,
participants completed trustworthiness ratings of each of the faces.
Experiment 3.3 has shown that trust learning is stronger when participants
complete a familiarisation task at the beginning of the experiment. In previous
experiments, this has involved recognising identity across changes in viewpoint and
expression. The MR2 database does not provide any such variation, and so in this
experiment we included a one-back recognition task, where faces were presented in
sequence and participants had to respond with the SPACE bar if they saw the same face
repeated twice in a row. This encourages participants to encode details of the faces and
store them in working memory, at least until the next face is shown, and with repeated
exposures this should allow participants to become familiar with the face identities.
Experiment 6.1a was an entirely behavioural experiment with the same timings as
previous chapters. Experiment 6.1b was identical to Experiment 6.1a with the exception
that electromyographic (EMG) recordings were taken from the corrugator supercilii and
zygomaticus major and the blank screen between trustworthiness rating trials was shown
for 2,000ms rather than 500ms, to allow the EMG signal to recover. These recordings
did not yield any signicant eects of race or validity during gaze cueing or
trustworthiness ratings, and so are not reported here (EMG parameters and results are
available in Appendix E). However, given that the two versions of the experiment were
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otherwise identical (and preliminary analysis found no signicant dierence between the
two versions), results were collapsed across the two versions of Experiment 6.1, yielding a
total of 60 participants.
Data analysis
As in previous experiments, before data were analysed participants' responses were
ltered to remove all error trials (where participants reported the incorrect answer) and
RT outliers   RTs below 250ms (too short to process the stimuli) and above 2,500ms
(indicating that participants had not given a response in the allotted time). The number
of remaining trials was then compared with the original number of trials to check that all
participants retained at least 70% of their total trials and had not scored below 70%
total correct on any one condition.
As well as RT lters, we also examined participants' pre-ratings. Participants'
ratings to in-group and out-group faces at the beginning of the experiment were
averaged and examined to ensure that the average for neither group exceeded 70 on the
100-point scale in either direction. This was done because an average to one-group that
exceeded 70 suggested that participants gave ratings to multiple faces that used the far
ends of the scale before any trustworthiness induction was performed, and in a paradigm
where there were two 8-member groups of faces at the beginning of the experiment (as
opposed to one 16-member group of faces as in previous experiments), we felt that this
may unduly aect our results if these participants were left in. One participant was
removed on this basis in Experiment 6.1b.
All data were analysed using linear mixed eects models as in previous chapters,
with the exception that experiment (EMG/no EMG) was included as a random factor.
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As in Experiment 5.1, the inclusion of face identity as a factor meant that for RTs and
accuracy rates we also generated models that included race as a xed factor, and models
that explored a validity x race interaction to see if gaze cueing eects changed as a result
of the cueing face's race. All RT models converged with the maximum random structure
except for the race-only model, which would not converge until the experiment j identity
term was removed, and so this was removed from all single-factor models to allow for
direct comparison.
For accuracy models, the validity-only would not converge with experiment j
identity as a term, so this was removed from all models for the purposes of comparison.
When this was removed, the null model would not converge until the validity j subject
term was also removed from this model only. The two-way interaction model would not
converge until both the experiment j identity and validity j subject terms were removed,
so these were removed from both two-factor models to allow for direct comparison.
Regarding analysis of trustworthiness ratings, we report the results of linear mixed
eects models in light of consistency with other chapters. We generate a maximum
random structure model that we compare with time-only, validity-only and race-only
models separately. As regards the interaction of these factors, we rst compared a
2-factor interaction model (time x validity) with a model that included both factors
without an interaction (time + validity). We then explored whether a three-way
interaction model t the data better than a two-way interaction. To do this, we
modelled the two-way interaction and included race as an additional xed factor (time x
validity + race), which we compared with the three-way interaction (time x validity x
race). This was done to be sure that any improvement of model t was not simply due
to the inclusion of a third factor.
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However, as in Experiment 5.1, we have a caveat about interpreting the results of
these models. In experiments with only validity as a single xed factor this allows for
eight identities in each condition, but the inclusion of race as an orthogonal factor to
validity reduces the number of faces in each cell to four. As such, controlling for both
stimulus and subject-level variance leaves us vulnerable to a Type II error. This is
somewhat evident by the fact that no model of trustworthiness rating would converge
until most of the maximum random structure slope terms were removed, leaving only
time j identity as a random term. As such, in this chapter we also report the results of
repeated measures ANOVAs for trustworthiness ratings.
6.1.2 Results and Discussion
Gaze-cueing
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 6.1 are shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3,
respectively. Including validity as a xed factor signicantly improved the t when
applied to RTs, indicating a cueing eect ( = -29.84, SE = 5.93, 2(1) = 24.58, p
<.001), but including race did not, which suggests that participants were not faster to
respond on trials with faces of a particular race ( = -6.07, SE = 5.90, 2(1) = 1.06, p
= 0.304). As well as this, an interaction of these two factors (validity x race) did not t
the data signicantly better than did a model with both factors included without an
interaction ( = 3.46, SE = 11.78, 2(1) = 0.09, p = 0.769).
When modelling accuracy scores, including validity as a xed factor did not
signicantly improve the model t ( = -0.72, SE = 0.53, 2(4) = 3.73, p = 0.444), nor
did including race ( = 0.03, SE = 0.67, 2(4) = 1.84, p = 0.766), and there was no
evidence to support an interaction of the two ( = -1.13, SE = 0.97, 2(1) = 1.36, p =
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Figure 6.2: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds) in Experiment 6.1 in response to valid (light
grey) and invalid (dark grey) trials and own (left) and other (right) faces. Error bars show standard
error.
0.244).
Trustworthiness ratings
Linear mixed eects models. We report the results of linear mixed eects models in
the interests of continuity with other experiments, but as in Chapter 5 our condence in
these statistics is weakened by the small number of identities in each condition. The
trustworthiness ratings in Experiment 6.1 are shown in Figure 6.4. Adding validity to
the model signicantly improved the t ( = 9.72, SE = 1.48, 2(1) = 42.82, p <.001),
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Figure 6.3: Accuracy rates (percent correct) in Experiment 6.1 in response to valid (light grey)
and invalid (dark grey) trials and own (left) and other (right) faces. Error bars show standard
error.
as did adding time ( = -4.47, SE = 1.77, 2(1) = 5.85, p = 0.016). The interaction
model of these factors (time x validity) t the data signicantly better than when both
factors were modelled but without an interaction ( = 19.95, SE = 2.92, 2(1) = 46.31,
p <.001).
Including race in the null model did not signicantly improve the t ( = 5.75, SE
= 4.55, 2(1) = 1.68, p = 0.195), and modelling a three-way interaction of time x
validity x race did not t signicantly better than modelling time x validity with race as
a separate factor ( = 9.54, SE = 5.83, 2(3) = 4.30, p = 0.231).
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Figure 6.4: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over the course of Experiment 6.1 for valid
(dotted) and invalid (solid line) faces for both in-group (left) and out-group (right) members.
Error bars show standard error.
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
each condition (Own Race Valid; Own Race Invalid; Other Race Valid; and Other Race
Invalid) separately. These models found that time signicantly improved the model t
for Own Race invalid ( = -16.58, SE = 3.14, 2(1) = 13.76, p <.001), Other Race
invalid faces ( = -12.30, SE = 2.77, 2(1) = 19.32, p <.001)1, and for Own Race valid
faces ( = 8.13, SE = 3.78, 2(1) = 4.04, p = 0.044)2, but the same was not seen for
1The null model of this comparison would not converge with any random terms included, so these were
removed from both.
2Models would only converge when time j identity was the only error term.
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Other Race valid ( = 2.87, SE = 2.90, 2(1) = 1.00, p = 0.316).
ANOVAs. As well as mixed eects models we also report the results of a factorial
ANOVA, given that controlling for both subject and identity in linear mixed eects
models may unacceptably raise the risk of a Type II error. Initial analysis included
experiment (Experiments 1a and 1b) as a between-subjects factor. Although there was
an interaction between experiment, time and race (F (1,58) = 9.83, p = 0.003, 2P =
0.14) where the dierence between own- and other-race trust judgments was larger at the
second rating in Experiment 6.1b than 6.1a, no interactions of experiment with the
critical variable of validity were detected.
Collapsing across experiment, a 2x2x2 ANOVA looking at time, validity and race
found a main eect of time (F (1,59) = 8.03, p = 0.006, 2P = 0.12), one of validity
(F (1,59) = 12.02, p = 0.010, 2P = 0.17), and a main eect of race (F (1,59) = 5.46, p =
0.023, 2P = 0.08). A signicant interaction of time and validity was found (F (1,59) =
17.43, p <.001, 2P = 0.23), indicating that there was signicant learning of trust over
time as a function of gaze cueing behaviour. Other two-way interactions were not
signicant (F s < 1.1). Importantly, this learning did interact with race, as a three-way
interaction was signicant (F (1,59) = 5.77, p = 0.019, 2P = 0.09).
To explore this interaction further we broke this down into separate analyses for
own- and other-race faces and looked primarily at the interaction of time and validity.
Analysis of time and validity in own-race faces found a signicant interaction of time and
validity (F (1,59) = 22.29, p <.001, 2P = 0.27). The same analysis in other-race faces
also found a signicant interaction, but this was weaker than in own-race faces, as
evidenced by the smaller F value and partial eta squared eect size statistic (F (1,59) =
8.81, p = 0.004, 2P = 0.13). Follow-up paired-samples t-tests between the beginning and
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end ratings for each condition found that invalid faces showed a similar decline in both
own- (t(59) = -4.21, [95% CI -24.47 to -8.70], p <.001, d = 0.66) and other-race faces
(t(59) = -3.47, [95% CI -19.39 to -5.21], p = 0.002, d = 0.57), but while own-race valid
faces showed a signicant increase in trustworthiness ratings (t(59) = 3.28, [95% CI 3.17
to 13.10], p = 0.002, d = 0.35), this was not the case for other-race valid faces (t(59) =
1.07, [95% CI -2.48 to 8.23], p = 0.287, d = 0.13).
6.2 Chapter Discussion
There are two key ndings from this chapter. First, gaze cueing where participants
follow the gaze direction of another person is unaected by whether the viewed face is a
racial in-group or out-group member, which suggests that gaze following is not sensitive
to the identity of the face (see also Frischen & Tipper, 2004). Second, and in sharp
contrast to attention cueing eects, incidental learning of trust from the predictive gaze
patterns of ignored faces was inuenced by race. That is, trust learning was larger and
more robust for own-race faces.
As noted above, there is a wealth of previous literature that suggests we might see a
dierence in incidental learning processes between faces of dierent races (Dasgupta
et al., 2000; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002b, 2002a; Meissner & Brigham, 2001), but the
underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We initially oered two potential mechanisms by
which dierences in learning between racial in-groups and out-groups may occur. The
rst point relates to expectations about cooperation   as we may expect out-group
members to deceive more than in-group members (Stanley et al., 2011), dierences in
trust could related to a Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model of learning where unexpected
information (i.e. in-group deceivers and out-group cooperators) is learned better than
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stereotypical information. However, we found no evidence of such asymmetries in trust
learning in this study   the magnitude of change in trust for other-race faces was
smaller than own-race faces in both valid and invalid conditions. This is not to say that
expectancy violation does not play a role in this learning, but we cannot draw this
conclusion from our current data.
An alternative explanation that ts the current data better is that of learning
eciency. There is extensive prior research demonstrating that other-race faces are
identied and remembered less eciently than own-race faces (see Meissner & Brigham,
2001, for a review). Hence, we predicted that learning of trust from gaze would be less
ecient in other-race faces. This was based on the idea that during the task where faces
are irrelevant and to-be-ignored, an association has to be learned between a specic face
identity and the pattern of eye-gaze it produces. It follows that the association between
identity and gaze behaviour will be more easily learned if there is a strong/specic
representation of the face identity. Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 conrmed this by
manipulating the strength of face identity representations, demonstrating that stronger
representations (greater familiarity with the faces) result in greater learning of trust from
gaze behaviour. These data appear to support this latter interpretation, but it is
important to note that this study aimed only to explore whether there was a dierence
between trust learning of own- and other-race faces, and was not designed to explore
what this dierence was. Follow-up studies would be needed to clarify the mechanisms
underlying these dierences.
There is also the possibility that this learning may be at least partly aected by
stereotype content   that is, that incidental trust learning is aected by participants'
preconceptions about the identities involved. For example, if one has a stereotype of an
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out-group as being particularly violent and aggressive, then it may be that invalid faces
would be particularly associated with negative trustworthiness ratings, while if one has a
stereotype of an out-group as inscrutable or dicult to read then it may accentuate
feelings of out-group homogeneity. With only one out-group in this experiment (East
Asian faces) it is dicult to tease these apart. Future research may wish to use
additional out-group categories (e.g. Black faces) or to explore the nature of
participants' preconceived and stereotypical views as a way of exploring how stereotype
content may aect learning.
The results of this chapter are particularly striking when compared with the results
of Chapter 5, where faces were also members of discrete social categories. In a minimal
groups paradigm, trust learning was extinguished and group-level representations were
used to inform trustworthiness judgements. On the other hand in the present experiment,
where race was the social category across which faces varied, trust learning was shown
for both in-group and out-group members, but was stronger for in-group members.
This intriguing contrast could be because of the nature of the group manipulation  
trust learning was extinguished when participants were explicitly assigned a personal
trait of over- or under-estimator and this personal property was then explicitly linked to
one group of people via shirt colour. In sharp contrast, in the current study no personal
property was highlighted and explicitly linked to a group of people. Rather, participants
simply passively viewed a range of faces while identifying peripheral targets in the gaze
cueing procedure.
Therefore it seems that explicitly priming participants to represent people in terms
of their group membership is able to supersede individual-level representations, but if
participants respond to real-world groups without explicit instruction, then these
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individual representations are maintained and inuenced by the wider social context.
One would therefore expect that individuals with stronger implicit beliefs or
expectations about dierent racial groups might show greater dierences in trust
learning, so an approach for future research may be to measure individual dierences in
implicit attitude biases (Dasgupta et al., 2000) to correlate with learning of trust.
In conclusion, this chapter reports the result that shows that incidental learning of
trust from gaze cues is aected by the race of the faces involved. While we see clear
patterns of trust learning across both in-group and out-group members, this learning is
stronger for in-group members, which could point to more ecient processing and more
stable representations of in-group identities than out-group. Contrasts between this
experiment and those in Chapter 5 indicate that this group distinction must be
implicitly driven or naturally occurring in order not to override the representations of
individual identities.
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incidental trust learning
A key feature of the previous research looking at incidental trust learning from gaze cues
is that trust was inuenced by eye-gaze behaviour of another person. Clearly looking
towards or away from relevant objects is a means of deceiving another person and
initiates joint attention, which recruits reward-related neurocircuitry (Gordon, Eilbott,
Feldman, Pelphrey & Vander Wyk, 2013; Schilbach et al., 2010). However, if this
rewarding sense of joint attention were the driving force behind this eect, then one
would expect learning to be driven by increases in trustworthiness to valid faces, rather
than the characteristic decrease in trust to invalid faces that has emerged throughout
this thesis. Invalid faces are associated with a lack of rewarding joint attention, but
beyond that they are also associated with disruptions to visuomotor uency during
responses (that is, there is a cost to RTs that is reliable when invalid faces appear that is
absent for valid faces).
It is possible that this decrease in trustworthiness for invalid faces occurs due to
them withholding the rewarding sense of joint attention, but it remains to be seen
whether this eect is wholly dependent on this joint attention feature or if similar eects
can be induced purely through selective disruptions of visuomotor uency in the absence
of any physical changes to the face. Previous research has shown that perceptual uency
(e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999) and motor uency (e.g., Hayes, Paul, Beuger & Tipper,
2008) can inuence emotional assessments of stimuli. Can impaired processing of a face
with no physical changes, such as eye-gaze shifts, also inuence trust judgements?
Therefore we investigate the incidental learning of trust in a task where enhanced
visuomotor uency is associated with some faces and impaired visuomotor uency is
associated with other faces in a similar way to gaze cueing studies. However, there are
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no face behaviours, such as gaze shifts, that might be associated with deception. To this
end we develop two new task-switching procedures in Experiments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. A
task-switching paradigm involves participants performing two judgements of a stimulus
on dierent trials. For example, two trials might require reporting the colour of a
stimulus, while the next two trials might require reporting the identity of a stimulus.
These paired trials and predictable switches between tasks continue throughout the
experiment. When the task changes, a visuomotor cost (slower RTs, greater probability
of errors) is associated with responses on that switch trial (e.g., Monsell, 2003; Wylie &
Allport, 2000; Yeung, 2006), even when the change sequence is predictable and therefore
switches can be anticipated (Kiesel et al., 2010; Rogers & Monsell, 1995).
If changing visuomotor uency is sucient to evoke aective reactions (see
Constable, Bayliss, Tipper & Kritikos, 2013; Hayes et al., 2008) then creating disuency
while processing a particular face identity will reduce trust ratings. That is, throughout
the experiment particular face identities are always presented on switch trials where RTs
are slowed and errors are more likely, while other face identities are always presented on
repeat trials where RTs are fast and accurate. In Experiment 7.1 we introduce a
procedure that closely matches the gaze cueing procedure used in previous chapters;
faces appear in the centre of the screen while objects appear on the left or right, and the
judgement that participants make about these objects changes every other trial.
In Experiments 7.2 and 7.3 we introduce a task-switching procedure where the faces
are now the targets of participants' decisions. In gaze cueing experiments, the sense of
disuency is contingent on the faces, which means there is some dynamic
attention-grabbing feature that is dicult to inhibit. However, in Experiment 7.1 the
identity of these faces may be easier to inhibit due to the lack of any dynamic changes
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and the fact that they have nothing to do with the participant's disuency (as opposed
to an invalid gaze cue, which is entirely driven by the face). As such, these experiments
change the task to focus on the faces, identifying either the colour (green or yellow) or
identity (male or female) of the faces. This means that the faces are now the targets of
the participants' judgements, which could facilitate trust learning as participants'
attention is wholly on the faces, or could disrupt it, as literature on distractor
devaluation suggests that to-be-ignored information often shows a devaluation that
to-be-attended information does not (see Raymond, 2009). It could be that we would
not see any learning of trust (particularly the characteristic decrease for invalid faces,
those associated with low uency, evident in gaze cueing experiments) in Experiments
7.2 and 7.3 because it is more dicult to devalue targets than distractors.
This two-trial task-switching procedure selectively disrupts visuomotor uency on
half of the trials that participants are exposed to. However, given the predictable nature
of the task-switching procedure, repeat trials   which result in high uency   are also
subject to anticipation of an imminent task-switch, which may confuse the learned
associations that are integral to this procedure. To get around this, Experiment 7.3
replicates Experiment 7.2 but includes a third trial in each sequence (a
switch-repeat-prepare paradigm as opposed to a switch-repeat paradigm) to disentangle
the eects of visuomotor uency and imminent switch anticipation.
The primary hypothesis of this chapter is that if visuomotor uency is the key
driver for the learning of trust, then eects should be detected in one or more of these
new tasks. On the other hand, if cues to deception such as eye-gaze are necessary, then
no learning of trust should be detected.
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7.1 Experiment 7.1
This experiment investigates whether the usual trust eect is contingent on gaze
behaviour or if a similar result can be elicited just by manipulating the visuomotor
uency associated with the face in the absence of any physical changes to the facial
features. As such, this experiment replaces the gaze-cueing procedure with a
task-switching paradigm.
7.1.1 Methods
Participants
28 participants volunteered for this study in return for a mixture of course credit and
payment. Four participants had to be removed after RT lters were applied, and so the
nal number available for analysis was 24 (17 female; M age = 18.95, s.d. = 1.38).
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
This experiment closely matched the gaze-cueing experiment used elsewhere, particularly
Experiment 4.1, but the faces no longer shifted their gaze. Instead, participants were
told that they would be making one of two possible judgements on a given trial; the rst
was object TYPE, where they would categorise the object as either a kitchen or garage
item (as in other experiments), while the second was object COLOUR, where they would
judge whether the object was blue or yellow.
Changes to the stimuli from previous experiments were the introduction of
yellow-coloured objects (the same objects as used in previous experiments but digitally
manipulated to appear yellow instead of blue) and the fact that when faces appeared in
the centre of the screen we used unaltered, original, neutral images rather than those
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digitally manipulated to shift their gaze. We also introduced a task cue before each trial,
to remind participants of whether they were supposed to judge the object's TYPE
(kitchen/garage) or COLOUR (blue/yellow).
The task that participants completed altered every other trial in a switch/repeat
task-switching procedure. As such, participants might start judging colour for the rst
two trials, then switch to type for the next two, and so on (order counterbalanced).
Rather than providing valid or invalid cues, in this experiment faces would either always
appear on a switch trial (the trial immediately following a change in task) or a repeat
trial (the trial immediately preceding the change). As such, each face appeared at a
point in the sequence that would associate it either with low (switch) or high (repeat)
levels of visuomotor uency (see Figure 7.1).
Data analysis
Before data were analysed, participants' responses were ltered to remove all error trials
(where participants reported the incorrect answer) and RT outliers, as in previous
gaze-cueing experiments   RTs below 250ms (too short to process the stimuli) and above
2,500ms (indicating that participants had not given a response in the allotted time). The
number of remaining trials was then compared with the original number of trials to check
that all participants retained at least 70% of their total trials and had not scored below
70% total correct on any one condition. Four participants were removed on this basis.
Data were analysed using linear mixed models as in previous chapters. When
analysing RTs, the null model would not converge with any random terms included and
so these were removed from both the null and trial-only models. For accuracy rates, all
models converged with the maximum random structure. For trustworthiness ratings, the
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Figure 7.1: Example trials used in the task-switching paradigm in Experiment 7.1. As in previous
gaze-cueing experiments, participants complete trustworthiness ratings at the beginning and the
end. During task-switching, participants responded with the prompted information that alternated
on a switch/repeat basis.
null and time-only models would not converge until the time j subject and trial j subject
error terms were removed, and so these were removed from these models and the
trial-only model for the sake of direct comparison. The two-factor models would not
converge until only the time j subject error term was removed.
As with Chapters 2, 3, and 4, see Appendix A for more conventional ANOVAs and
RT and accuracy rates broken down by experimental block.
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7.1.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 7.2: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 7.1 in response to switch (dark grey) and repeat (light grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 7.1 are shown in Figure 7.2. Fitting
trial type (switch/repeat) to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved
the t when explaining RTs ( = 93.09, SE = 14.24, 2(1) = 42.21, p <.001), as
responses were faster on repeat trials than switch. A similar eect was seen in accuracy
scores ( = -0.02, SE = 0.01, 2(1) = 8.65, p = 0.003), where accuracy rates were higher
on repeat trials than switch.
Trustworthiness Ratings
The changes in trustworthiness ratings for the faces in Experiment 7.1 are shown in
Figure 7.3. Adding time to the null model did not improve the t ( = 1.79, SE = 1.64,
2(1) = 1.19, p = 0.275), but including trial type did ( = -4.14, SE = 1.64, 2(1) =
6.36, p = 0.012). The interaction model (time x trial type) did not signicantly improve
the model t beyond the full model (time + trial type), where both factors were
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Figure 7.3: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 7.1 for switch (solid) and
repeat (dotted line) faces. Error bars show standard error.
modelled but without an interaction ( = 1.09, SE = 3.28, 2(1) = 0.11, p = 0.739).
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
switch and repeat faces separately. These models found that time did not signicantly
improve the model t for either switch faces ( = 2.34, SE = 2.36, 2(1) = 0.98, p =
0.322) or for repeat faces ( = 1.25, SE = 2.27, 2(1) = 0.30, p = 0.581).
Although the results of Experiment 7.1 do show a signicant eect of face position,
this appears to be due to chance dierences in the pre-ratings   there is no logical
reason to suppose that visuomotor uency could have an eect before participants
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encounter it, and so these dierences must be due to random chance. The fact that they
do not change over the course of the experiment, as evidenced by the lack of interaction
and the remarkably at prole of changes, is evidence that this incidental learning
cannot be explained in terms of visuomotor uency.
7.2 Experiment 7.2
This experiment replicates the task-switching procedure used in Experiment 7.1 but
alters it so that the face images are now targets rather than distractors.
7.2.1 Methods
Participants
32 participants volunteered for this study in return for a mixture of course credit and
payment. Eight participants had to be removed after RT lters were applied, and so the
nal number available for analysis was 24 (21 female; M age = 21.17, s.d. = 2.12).
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
Stimuli were generated from the same KDEF faces used in Experiment 7.1. Participants
completed the same trustworthiness ratings as in Experiment 7.1 before and after the
experiment, using full colour unaltered images. During the main portion of the
experiment, however, the paradigm was changed from gaze-cueing to task-switching, and
for this all face images were superimposed with a chromatic hue in Adobe Photoshop
CS6 to appear either green or yellow (see Figure 7.4 for examples).
Participants were told that they would be asked to make one of two judgements
about a face image that appeared on the screen; they would either be asked to judge the
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Figure 7.4: Examples of the coloured stimuli used in the task-switching experiment. (a) The
original uncoloured images were used during trustworthiness ratings, while the (b) green and (c)
yellow images were used in the task-switching portion. (d) Trial sequence. Participants reported
whether the face was coloured in green or yellow or if the face was male or female, depending on
a prompt before each trial.
colour of the image (Colour condition: green or yellow) or to judge the sex of the image
(Identity condition: male or female). Participants were told that the task they were to
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perform would be shown to them as a reminder before each trial, but that the task
would change every other trial such that they would perform two Colour trials, then two
Identity, and so on. As in Experiment 7.1, half of the identities only appeared
immediately after a task-switch, in the rst position of the sequence (switch trial) and
half appeared immediately before the switch in the second position (repeat trial).
Identity and trial position were counterbalanced across participants.
During the course of a trial, a condition cue (either `Colour' or `Identity' alternating
every two trials) would appear on the screen for 1,000ms to make participants aware of
the task they were performing, followed by a 500ms xation cross. The target image
would then appear on the screen for 500ms, followed by a blank screen for 1,000ms.
Participants could respond at any point in this 1,500ms window but anything after that
was classed as incorrect. Participant responses were the keyboard buttons Z and M, each
of which corresponded to a dierent answer in the two tasks (i.e. Z, male and green; M,
female and yellow   counterbalanced across participants).
Data analysis
The same RT lters were applied to the data as in Experiment 7.1, with the exception
that the upper time limit was reduced to 1,500ms in line with the new timings. Incorrect
responses and responses faster than 250ms were removed from the data and the
participants' accuracy and number of trials were considered to see if they retained more
than 70% of their original number of trials. In this experiment, eight participants in
total committed too many errors to be suitable for inclusion.
When analysing RTs and accuracy rates, no models would converge with any
random terms, so these were removed. For trustworthiness ratings, the null and
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time-only models would not converge until the time j identity and trial j subject random
slope terms were removed. The trial-only model, however, would not converge until all
random terms were removed. This does not allow for direct comparison with the null
model, and so we generated a simplied null that included no random slope terms and
compared the trial-only model with this, while the time-only model was compared with
the typical maximum random structure that would converge.
The two-way interaction model would not converge until the time j subject and trial
j subject terms were removed, and so these were removed from the two-factor and
interaction models.
7.2.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 7.5: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 7.2 in response to switch (dark grey) and repeat (light grey) trials. Error
bars show standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 7.2 are shown in Figure 7.5. Fitting
trial type to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when
explaining RTs ( = -62.02, SE = 6.43, 2(1) = 90.79, p <.001) as responses were faster
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on repeat trials than switch. A similar eect was seen in accuracy scores ( = 3.50, SE
= 1.03, 2(1) = 11.55, p <.001), where responses were more accurate on repeat trials
than switch.
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Figure 7.6: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over Experiment 7.2 for switch and repeat faces.
Error bars show standard error.
Trustworthiness Ratings
The changes in trustworthiness ratings for the faces in Experiment 7.2 are shown in
Figure 7.6. Adding time to the null model signicantly improved the t ( = 6.10, SE =
2.86, 2(1) = 4.33, p = 0.037), but including trial type did not ( = 1.18, SE = 1.66,
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2(1) = 0.79, p = 0.375), and the interaction model (time x trial type) did not
signicantly improve the model t beyond the full model (time + trial type) ( = -2.12,
SE = 2.62, 2(1) = 0.66, p = 0.418). Further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness
as a function of time for switch and repeat faces separately found that time signicantly
improved the model t for both switch faces ( = 5.04, SE = 1.81, 2(1) = 7.69, p =
0.006) and repeat faces ( = 7.16, SE = 1.83, 2(1) = 15.02, p <.001).
The nding of an eect of time in this experiment may reect the faces' status as
targets rather than distractors   as targets, they may be more susceptible to an eect of
mere exposure, where repeated exposure to stimuli results in more positive valuations
(Burgess & Sales, 1971), whereas such an eect was not observed in Experiment 7.1
because they are irrelevant distractors.
7.3 Experiment 7.3
Experiment 7.3 replicates Experiment 7.2 but adds a third trial to the task sequence to
dissociate eects of repetition from imminent switch preparation. The trial sequence now
progresses switch, repeat, prepare. We also included blocks of Pure trials (no switching)
with dierent faces to acclimatise participants to the responses and attempt to reduce
the number of excluded participants.
7.3.1 Methods
Participants
A further 27 undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of York
volunteered for this study in return for a mixture of course credit and payment. Three
participants were removed following the application of RT lters, and so the nal
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number available for analysis was 24 (21 female, age data not collected).
Stimuli, Design and Procedure
The methods were identical to Experiment 7.2 with some notable changes, the primary
change being that rather than changing every other trial, the task now changed every
three trials.To accommodate the increased complexity of the learning (three levels of
trial type rather than two) the number of stimuli was reduced to 12 to allow for four
(two male/ two female) in each group (switch/repeat/prepare). Faces were presented
eight times each over four experimental blocks, meaning that each face was presented 32
times over the course of the experiment. This gave participants much more opportunity
to learn the uency associations with the faces than in Experiment 7.2 and we felt this
might give more of an opportunity to learn associations of identity and uency if such an
eect were true.
As well as this, we also included a familiarisation procedure at the beginning of the
task switching, where participants completed blocks of `pure' trials (that is, a block
where they judged colour and a block where they judged identity, with no switching).
This procedure used six separate identities that did not appear in the main
task-switching procedure. These additional faces were included as ller in the
trustworthiness ratings at the beginning and the end of the experiment but are not
included in our analyses.
Data analysis
The same RT lters were applied to the data as in Experiment 7.2. In this experiment,
three participants had to be removed on the basis of RT lters. When analysing RTs and
accuracy rates, all models converged with the maximum random structure. For
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trustworthiness ratings, the null and single factor models would not converge with any
random slope terms dened. The two-factor and interaction models converged with only
the time j subject term removed.
7.3.2 Results and Discussion
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Figure 7.7: Averaged reaction times (milliseconds; left plot) and accuracy rates (percent correct;
right plot) in Experiment 7.3 in response to switch (dark grey), repeat (light grey) and prepare
(white) trials. Error bars show standard error.
The RT and accuracy results of Experiment 7.3 are shown in Figure 7.7. Fitting
trial type to the null linear mixed eects model signicantly improved the t when
explaining RTs ( = -60.29, SE = 10.31, 2(2) = 22.92, p <.001), as participants were
slower to switch trials than either repeat or prepare trials. This eect was not seen in
accuracy scores ( = 0.49, SE = 0.94, 2(2) = 1.29, p = 0.525).
Trustworthiness ratings
Changes in trust ratings for each position in the task-switching triads are shown in
Figure 7.8. Adding time to the null model signicantly improved the t ( = 4.85, SE =
196
Chapter 7: The contribution of visuomotor fluency
−20
−10
0
10
20
First Rating Second Rating
Tr
u
st
w
o
rth
in
es
s 
ra
tin
g
Switch
Repeat
Prepare
Figure 7.8: Time course of trustworthiness ratings over the course of Experiment 7.3 for switch
(solid), repeat (dotted) and prepare (dashed line) trials between rst and second ratings. Error
bars show standard error.
2.06, 2(1) = 5.52, p = 0.019), but including trial type did not ( = -1.71, SE = 2.53,
2(2) = 3.97, p = 0.138). In this experiment, the interaction model (time x trial type)
did t the data marginally better than the full model (time + trial type) ( = 0.20, SE
= 3.83, 2(2) = 4.72, p = 0.094).
We ran further analysis of the changes in trustworthiness as a function of time for
switch, repeat, and prepare faces separately. These models found that time did not
signicantly improve the model t for either switch faces ( = 0.35, SE = 3.34, 2(1) =
0.01, p = 0.916) or for repeat faces ( = 3.42, SE = 3.61, 2(1) = 0.90, p = 0.344), but
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did signicantly improve the t for prepare faces ( = 10.78, SE = 3.39, 2(1) = 9.91, p
= 0.002).
Linear mixed eects models suggested that there was a marginal interaction of trial
type (switch/ repeat/ prepare) and time, such that faces that appeared on prepare trials
were rated more trustworthy after the experiment than those that appeared on switch or
repeat trials. However, the fact that the model ts the data does not mean that this
result is interpretable: it is dicult to imagine why prepare faces should increase in
trustworthiness so much more than repeat faces when both types of face are associated
with greater visuomotor uency than are switch faces (as evidenced by the RT cost,
which is comparable to that seen in gaze cueing). It should also be noted that we
collected data from ve other task-switching studies (not reported here) and found
highly signicant task switching eects in RT and accuracy, but never observed any
consistent eect of this visuomotor uency on trust ratings of associated faces. For
example, one such experiment was identical to Experiment 7.3 but used a dierent set of
faces and failed to replicate the trust rating results reported here. As such, we feel
condent in rejecting task-switching as an alternative methodology to gaze cueing, as
over the course of eight experiments (the three here and the ve unreported ones) no
consistent patterns of results emerge.
7.4 Chapter Discussion
It is now well established that the eye movements of another person automatically shift
attention and whether they consistently look towards or away from objects aects
incidental learning of trust. The shifts of attention of another person certainly can be
used to deceive, and hence it might be predicted that if there are no such behaviours in a
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face, then learning of trust does not take place, even though particular face identities are
associated with dierent levels of visuomotor uency. Therefore this chapter examined
whether learning of trust could be generated in the absence of any physical changes to
the faces through a task-switching procedure. We found that in the absence of any
physical changes, disruptions to participants' sense of visuomotor uency were not
sucient to generate changes in trustworthiness, despite the RT costs associated with
task-switching being comparable to those associated with gaze-cueing. This nding also
held true regardless of whether the faces were distractors (Experiment 7.1) or targets
(Experiments 7.2 and 7.3), and whether repeat trials included anticipation of an
imminent switch (Experiment 7.2) or if this anticipation was removed (Experiment 7.3).
The results of Experiments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 indicate that the task-switching
procedure   one that approximates the gaze-cueing procedure without physical changes
to the face and retains only disruptions to visuomotor uency   is unable to elicit
reliable trust eects.It is also worth noting that this cannot be explained by the faces
being more resilient to devaluation in Experiments 7.2 and 7.3, as Experiment 7.1 used
the same faces as distractors that appear before the target object. While we must be
cautious when interpreting null eects, the fact that multiple experiments that use
dierent variations of the paradigm all fail to nd evidence for trust learning means that
the results of this chapter make a strong case against disruptions to visuomotor uency
being sucient for incidental learning of trust.
These ndings contrast with previous work that has shown that perceptual uency
does increase liking of objects (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Burgess & Sales, 1971).
There is also previous literature that does report that processing uency can aect
judgements of trust. For example, Winkielman and Olszanowski (2015) found that
199
Chapter 7: The contribution of visuomotor fluency
increasing the disuency associated with certain faces in a task requiring the
identication of face emotion led to decreased ratings of trust in later judgements, and
that the eect of this disuency was unrelated to face valence. However, it is important
to note that our experiments examined learning in the absence of explicit judgements of
physical cues to trustworthiness (such as changes in expression) and as such these results
are not necessarily inconsistent with this previous literature.
Learning of trust from patterns of eye-gaze is probably eective because joint
attention can be positively reinforcing (Schilbach et al., 2010) and because gaze direction
can be used by primates and humans to misdirect the attention of others (e.g., Klein,
Shepherd & Platt, 2009). Hence the invalid gaze-cue when the face looks away from the
highly salient target will be perceived as an act of deception. In contrast, the static faces
in the task-switching procedure presented here do not provide such socially relevant
information. Hence we can conclude that visuomotor uency is not sucient to produce
changes in trust, but leave the question for future research to address what other
mechanisms might exist for incidental social learning.
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The aim of this thesis has been to explore the mechanisms and properties of incidental
learning of trust from gaze cues. The original eect outlined by Bayliss and Tipper
(2006) showed that valid faces were selected as more trustworthy than invalid faces in a
2AFC measure, and that invalid faces were selected as having appeared more frequently
than their valid counterparts. The experiments in this thesis have replicated and
extended this original work using a dual scalar rating paradigm initially developed by
Manssuer, Roberts and Tipper (2015).
Chapter 2 replicated the original result and showed that participants adjusted their
ratings of trustworthiness in line with previous cueing behaviour. For faces expressing
neutral emotions, this was characterised by a decrease in trust for invalid faces, but when
they smiled this eect was bidirectional as it also showed an increase in trust for valid
faces. However, given some evidence from later experiments in the thesis (Experiment
3.1 in particular, which is identical to Experiment 2.1, but shows a dierent change
prole for valid faces), it is dicult to infer precisely what this dierence between
experiments might mean for valid faces. Across the thesis, and shown below in Figure
8.1, changes in trustworthiness to valid faces were much more varied than were changes
to invalid faces and appear to be sensitive to factors other than expression. This point is
discussed later in more detail.
We also explored some boundaries of this learning. Given that trustworthiness is a
broad social dimension that can be applied in many dierent ways (e.g. trustworthiness
as a proxy for warmth, in that trustworthy people are generally thought of as
approachable, vs. trustworthiness as a measure of statistical reliability), it was surprising
to see that this incidental learning from gaze cues appears to be quite specic, as it did
not generalise to judgements of likeability. As such, while trustworthiness can be
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considered a broad term, it appears that participants made their social judgements
according to a particular sub-dimension of trustworthiness, and this dimension did not
relate to how much participants liked the faces involved.
Another important boundary of the eect was that participants could not explicitly
report the cueing behaviour of the faces after they had learned about them. This was a
surprising result   the faces were clearly a salient feature, as evidenced by reliable
cueing in RTs, and face-cueing associations were 100% reliable (in that a valid face
would always be valid and never invalid), and yet the majority of participants (26 out of
30) performed at chance when asked to report which way the faces looked. This points
to the mechanisms that underlie this social learning being implicit in nature, supporting
previous observations of Bayliss and Tipper (2006) and Rogers et al. (2014). This ts
with some evidence that unconscious processes play an important role in social
information processing, from monitoring deception to making social evaluations of other
people's personalities (ten Brinke et al., 2016; Pawling, Kirkham, Tipper & Over, 2016).
In Chapter 3 we explored how durable this memory for faces was. Despite several
replications of the original eect, the question of how long this learning may last has
never been explored. We found that when a short interference task was introduced
between cueing and the nal trustworthiness ratings, incidental trust learning was
weakened, but not entirely eradicated. However, if participants were given the
opportunity to familiarise themselves with the faces beforehand then this learning was
much more stable, and could even be seen up to an hour later. Interestingly, the crucial
element of this interference appeared to be a change in the task that participants were
instructed to perform, as when we included an additional block of gaze cueing that
diered only in terms of the faces' cueing behaviour (reversed such that valid faces were
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now invalid and vice versa), memory for the original cueing behaviour was left relatively
intact. It may be that an avenue for future research would be to investigate how dierent
types of interference aect incidental social learning.
The nature of these stored representations of identities was explored in Chapter 4.
One way in which participants may remember the trustworthiness of faces could be to
update their memory for the physical appearance of the face to appear more or less
trustworthy, to facilitate access to stored trait information. However, over two
experiments   one where participants were asked to morph the faces and another where
they made a 2AFC between trustworthy and untrustworthy morphed exemplars   we
found that they did not seem to update these representations. This was further
supported by the fact that participants did not give more favourable aesthetic ratings to
images presented alongside previously valid faces than invalid faces: Evidence suggests
that people will adjust ratings of coincident objects when faces are more attractive
(Strick et al., 2008) or displaying a positive emotion (Bayliss et al., 2007), but this is
apparently not the case in the absence of visual cues in the face, which again suggests
that learned information does not interfere with how the physical properties of faces are
remembered or perceived. In hindsight this seems advantageous   when building a
representation of a person it is important to remember both static features (e.g. their
physical appearance) and more uid features (their behaviour or trustworthiness)
separately. If you were to update your memory for how a face looked every time that
person did something trustworthy, even if the changes were subtle, this could quickly
stack up to the point where the memory for that face's physical appearance was warped
beyond recognition, rendering it useless. Rather it is more sensible to keep these
representations of the physical properties of a face and the associated emotional
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responses or feelings largely independent of each other.
Chapters 5 and 6 looked at how higher order social information about a face aects
how we learn about them from observing their gaze behaviour. In Chapter 5 we assigned
participants to minimal groups, designated by a blue or yellow t-shirt, and completed the
typical gaze-cueing paradigm. Interestingly, participants did not seem to learn about the
cueing behaviour of individual faces anymore, and instead defaulted to making
group-level distinctions where they judged in-group members as more trustworthy than
out-group members (regardless of their cueing behaviour, or `actual' trustworthiness).
This extinction appears to be due to the explicit nature of the group manipulation, as in
Chapter 6 where we used the real-world social group of race without drawing attention
to the distinction participants again showed reliable learning of individual behaviours.
However, in this experiment, participants now showed better learning for in-group
(own-race) members than out-group (other-race) members, which seems to be driven by
poorer representations of other-race individuals (or out-group homogeneity; the
phenomenon whereby out-group members are considered more similar to each other, and
so less individually distinct, than are in-group members; Park & Rothbart, 1982). The
results of these chapters show that the inuence of social group categories on incidental
social learning is inuenced not only by explicit saliency of group categories but also
participants' own beliefs about the dierent groups.
The nal chapter of this thesis aimed to explore the role of visuomotor uency in
incidental social learning. During gaze cueing, participants experience a rewarding sense
of joint attention from valid faces as they look at the same targets as the face, where this
is not the case for invalid faces. However, throughout the thesis the key nding of
incidental trust learning has been that a decrease in trust to invalid faces is the more
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reliable change than an increase in trust for valid faces, which suggests that this eect
may not be driven by rewarding joint attention. Chapter 7 aimed to see if it could
instead be explained by disruptions to visuomotor uency; when an invalid face cues the
wrong location, it causes a cost to uent processing as participants need to reorient to
the correct location, resulting in longer reaction times. To explore this we developed
three task-switching procedures, where certain faces were consistently associated with
high (comparable to valid faces) or low (comparable to invalid) visuomotor uency.
However, we found no reliable eects of uency on trustworthiness ratings, and it seems
that this paradigm may not be sucient to elicit these changes in social judgements  
perhaps because without a physical change in the face, such as a gaze shift, participants
do not spontaneously anchor their sense of disuency to the identity.
Over the course of eighteen experiments this thesis has explored a variety of features
of this incidental trust learning from gaze cues. However, the number and variety of
results presented here belie the consensus of several dierent experiments on what has
proven to be a reliable and clear eect of incidental trust learning. When looking at the
results of the thesis as a whole, an interesting picture of this mechanism emerges. For
this reason, the next section reports a meta-analysis across all experiments in this thesis
where trustworthiness judgements were collected before and after gaze cueing, to outline
some of the recurring and important features of this eect.
8.1 Incidental learning across all experiments: a meta- analysis
It can be dicult when examining experiments and chapters individually to determine
how strong and reliable incidental trust learning from gaze cues actually is. While
several experiments in this thesis have replicated the eect reliably (Experiments 2.1,
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2.2, and 3.3, for example), others have been weaker or shown little evidence of any trust
learning (such as the minimal groups experiment in Chapter 5). In order to make
inferences about the true size of the eect, we report the results of a meta-analysis of all
experiments included in this thesis that can yield an eect size of incidental trust
learning from gaze cues.
8.1.1 Meta-analysis protocols
Not all experiments in this thesis were included in the meta-analysis. Experiments were
selected only if gaze cueing were the means by which social judgements were
manipulated (therefore the task-switching experiments of Chapter 7 were not included),
and only if trustworthiness judgements were collected at the beginning and at the end of
the experiment (therefore not only were experiments such as Experiments 2.4, 4.1 and
4.2 excluded for not including both ratings, but also Experiment 2.3, which asked about
liking rather than trust). Eleven experiments were included in this analysis, including
data from 357 participants.
In order to analyse these results in a meaningful way, we needed to reduce them to a
metric that was comparable across studies. Using the ANOVA tables listed in Appendix
A, we were able to calculate r values from the F -ratios and degrees of freedom (as
outlined in Field, 2007) for all time x validity interactions. While this meant that some
nuances were ignored   for example, where such two-way interactions were modulated
by a third factor, as in Experiment 6.1   this allows us to directly compare the eect
size for this interaction (as a measure of incidental trust learning) across all experiments.
These data were then analysed using the meta and MAc packages in the statistical
software R. We selected a random-eects meta-analysis model, as while all of our
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experiments were similar in how data were collected (they all used the same stimuli, were
tested on the same participant pool, and run by the same experimenter), several
experiments included manipulations designed a priori to weaken or enhance the eects,
which means that we could not justiably say that the true eect size for each study
would not vary.
8.1.2 Results of meta-analysis
The results of the meta-analysis are shown in Figure 8.1. Across all eleven studies, a
random-eects meta-analysis model found a moderate overall eect size (r = 0.38, 95%
CI [0.31 to 0.45], z = 10.39, p<.001). As is evident from the forest plot in Figure 8.1,
there was substantial variation across experiments, as certain manipulations were
eective at disrupting learning (e.g. introducing an interference task in Experiment 3.2,
or assigning participants to minimal groups in Experiment 5.1), while other
manipulations yielded apparently stronger learning (e.g. when faces smiled in
Experiment 2.2, or when participants were familiar with the faces in Experiment 3.3). A
few experiments where individual results were somewhat ambiguous to interpret (such as
Experiment 3.4, where participants left for an hour between cueing and rating, or
Experiment 5.2, where faces still wore coloured shirts but were not assigned to discrete
groups) now seem mostly in line with the overall eect size.
An important point to note when looking at the results of all experiments combined
is that the consistent element of trust learning across this thesis is a decrease in
trustworthiness in response to invalid faces. As evident in the bar plot (bottom) of
Figure 8.1, while the magnitude of this decrease may vary, it is much more stable than
any changes in valid faces across experiments. In fact it seems to be convincingly absent
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Experiment (N; n=11)
Random effects model
2.1: Neutral (24)
2.2: Smiling (24)
3.1: Baseline (30)
3.2: Interference (30)
3.3: Familiarisation (30)
3.4: Hour Break (30)
3.5: Reversed Cueing (30)
4.3: Image Rating (39)
5.1: Minimal Groups (30)
5.2: Coloured Shirts (30)
6.1: Racial Groups (60)
r
0.50
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0.20
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Figure 8.1: Results of all experiments included in a meta-analysis of all eleven results in the
thesis that explore an interaction of time and cueing validity on gaze cues. The top plot shows
a forest plot where the eect sizes (r, calculated from ANOVA outputs listed in Appendix A)
are plotted along with the weights assigned to each by the random eects meta-analysis. Error
bars show 95% condence intervals for eect sizes. Black bars show those experiments that are
underweighted in the analysis. The bottom plot shows the data from all experiments as change
in trustworthiness scores (second rating minus rst rating) for valid (light grey) and invalid (dark
grey) faces. Signicance markers denote signicance of the eect of time on ratings as calculated
with linear mixed eects models. Error bars show standard error. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05;
yp<.10.
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in only one experiment (Experiment 5.1, where participants were assigned to minimal
groups), but in all other cases either trends or signicantly changes in the predicted
direction. This provides strong evidence that this incidental trust learning is part of a
mechanism that is specialised for detecting invalid or deceptive faces. On the other hand,
learning of valid faces may be more susceptible to other factors, such as the emotion that
the face is posing or how familiar we are with the identities. It may also be that there
are confounds that are outside the control of the experimental design   for example, the
time in the academic year that data are collected could play a role, as participants who
sign up for studies early in the academic calendar are more motivated than those who
leave it until the end, particularly when they are volunteering for course credit (Nicholls,
Loveless, Thomas, Loetscher & Churches, 2014).
8.2 Implications for a model of incidental social learning
In Chapter 1, we introduced a tentative model of how incidental social learning from
gaze cues may be processed within the cognitive system. This model relies on there
being two streams of information about faces   one that processes invariant information
such as identity and is likely subserved by neural regions in the fusiform gyrus, and the
other that processes variant information such as eye gaze and is likely processed more
dorsally by regions in the superior temporal sulcus   that feed into a stable identity
representation for that face, which is likely stored in a region in the anterior temporal
lobe (Haxby et al., 2000). The model is shown again in Figure 8.2. We can now begin to
consider the components of this model in light of the evidence presented in this thesis.
We know that eye gaze information is encoded along the variant pathway (in blue)
and eventually feeds into the stored identity representation. The evaluative lter A.
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Figure 1.2: A model of incidental social learning from gaze cues. Visual information enters the
model from the left, through early face processing systems that identify the face-like configuration
and structure. Information is then processed by separate streams: an invariant stream, in red, which
processes information that is unlikely to change over the course of an interaction (e.g. identity), and
a variant stream, in blue, which processes information that is likely to change (e.g. gaze direction).
These streams then feed into a stored representation of the individual’s identity, which can be used
later to process incoming information. Some examples of feedback communications are shown: A.
person knowledge aﬀects processing of variant information such as eye gaze or emotion; B. person
knowledge aﬀects processing of invariant information such as gender or race; C. and D. processing of
variant (C.) and invariant (D.) information is not aﬀected by person knowledge, but the integration
of this information is aﬀected by what is already known about that identity; E. either variant or
invariant information is aﬀected by the content of the other.
experiment. This technique also has the advantage of being much easier to apply than
conventional economic games such as those used in Rogers, Bayliss et al. (2014).
1.1.2 A model of incidental social learning from gaze cues
The aim of the current body of work is to explore the mechanisms behind how people
can incidentally learn social information from task-irrelevant behaviours such as gaze cues.
Imagine a model of face processing similar to that posed by Bruce and Young (1986) or
Haxby, Hoﬀman and Gobbini (2000), where there are two streams of information processing
about faces. One stream is thought to process invariant aspects of faces such as their identity,
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Figure 8.2: A model of incidental social learning from gaze cues presented in Chapter 1. Visual
information enters the model from the left, through early face processing s stems that identify
the face-like conguration a d structure. Information is th n processed by separa e streams: an
invariant tream, in red, which processes informati n that is unlikely to change over the course
of an interac ion (e.g. identity), and a variant stream, in blue, which processes information that
is likely to change (e.g. gaze direction). Thes stre ms then f ed into a store representation of
the individual's identity, which can be used later to process incoming information. Some examples
of feedback communications are shown: A. nd B. pr cessing of vari nt (A.) nd invariant (B.)
information is not aected by perso knowledge, but the integr tion of this information is aected
by what is already known about that identity; C. person knowledge aects processing of variant
information such as eye gaze or emotion; D. person knowledge aects processing of invariant
information such as gender or race; E. either variant or invariant information is aected by the
content of the other.
evaluates incoming information based on how it ts with the stored identity
repres ation and ther sources of av ilable information. Evidence suggests that over
time, information from the stored identity representation could be used to lter this
information (that is, eye gaze information is processed and followed by parietal
attentional modules, but the social implications for this are then weighted according to
prior knowledge of that person). As faces become more familiar, the ltering criteria
may shift from monitoring for deception and untrustworthy individuals, to identifying
and remembering cooperative or helpful behaviour (c.f. Experiment 3.1 compared with
Experiment 3.3). Further research is needed to identify the features of this shift in rder
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to answer the question of why it would be easier to learn about prosocial behaviour for
familiar faces, but antisocial behaviour for unfamiliar faces.
We now know that evidence for valid or invalid behaviour appears to be acquired
cumulatively, as when faces change their cueing behaviour in the nal block this does
not override what participants have already learned about the face (c.f. Experiment 3.5).
Once this system has learned about cueing validity, then, it appears to be somewhat
resilient to contradictory information. In fact, it may be that continued exposure to eye
gaze information helps to sustain these representations   when participants experienced
an unrelated interference task in Experiment 3.2, they showed much weaker trust
learning, but when a similar interference task was used with the same faces shifting their
gaze (Experiment 4.3) or reversed gaze cueing (Experiment 3.5), the learning was much
stronger.
The other lter, pathway B., which lters information from the invariant stream, is
more dicult to identify from the current thesis. However, Experiment 5.1 suggest that
when alternative sources of social information are made salient   such as when
participants are explicitly assigned to minimal social groups   that this causes a shift in
the weights assigned to dierent inputs, as participants default to judging the face based
on who they are in the social group context, rather than considering their individual past
gaze behaviour. This could be due to the fact that this information is a more
straightforward heuristic tool for making their decision, rather than the computationally
more expensive process of learning from gaze shifts. This also means that this
experiment found no evidence to support pathway D. in the model, which suggests that
stored identity information (e.g. knowledge of an individual's behaviour) might aect
processing of invariant aspects of their identity (such as their social group).
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On the other hand, evidence from using more natural social groups such as race
gives some interesting insights into pathway E., which suggests communication between
the two streams where processing of one type of information is aected by the content of
the other. This was partly contradicted by the results of Experiment 6.1, which found
that while group membership did aect learning of trust from gaze cues (which suggests
that information from the invariant stream is aecting how gaze cues are integrated into
the stored identity representation) this did not aect actual cueing, as cueing costs were
similar for own- and other-race faces. As such, it seems that information about race is
more likely to aect pathway A. (the variant lter), rather than pathway E. (earlier
interference between the two streams).
Pathway C., which suggests that information from the stored identity representation
may be able to feed back to aect how eye gaze information is initially processed, is also
not supported. Although only Experiments 2.1 and 3.5 report cueing eects broken
down by block within the main text, Appendix A reports results from all experiments
broken down to see whether there is any evidence that cueing costs recover over time  
that is, as participants learn the cueing behaviour of faces more and more, if this results
in their being able to anticipate and compensate for invalid cues in the later blocks.
However, no reliable evidence to support this interpretation emerges, which suggests that
as participants are learning these cueing behaviours they are unable to inuence earlier
gaze processing. This is despite evidence that real world gaze cueing (e.g. feinting in
basketball) can be moderated by experience (Weigelt, Guldenpenning,
Steggemann-Weinrich, Alaboud & Kunde, 2016). There is also the point that cueing
times in Experiment 3.5, where the relationship between valid and invalid faces was
reversed in the sixth block, did not show an overall cost, which one might expect if
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participants had been implicitly learning the pattern to be able to compensate for it
(Knopman & Nissen, 1991; Reed & Johnson, 1994).
This model was generated as a tentative framework for describing how gaze
information might be incorporated into identity representations and used to inform later
judgements, and was intentionally oversimplied to give scope for expansion. The results
of this thesis clearly show that this process is much more complex than described here,
and likely more complex than can be easily summarised in a box-and-arrows gure, as
the social learning system not only weights its modules dierently according to the social
context, but how the memories are formed, stored, and accessed appear to be important
questions to which this thesis can provide only hints. There are several questions left
outstanding before a coherent model of incidental social learning can be generated.
For example, one question is the issue of set capacity. Experiments throughout this
thesis have used a set of 16 faces, as this is in line with previous ndings, but we do not
know if this accurately reects how many faces people can learn about in situ. Manssuer,
Roberts and Tipper (2015) reported ERP results that suggest that participants need ve
to six exposures to a face before the late positive potential (LPP) begins to discriminate
validity, and so we have an idea of how much exposure we need to learn about a face,
but no idea of how many faces we can learn about. Falvello et al. (2015) found that
participants were able to learn up to 400 items when asked to learn associations of faces
with explicit behaviour descriptions. However, this latter task required explicit active
learning; in contrast, it seems unlikely that the in-the-moment implicit learning in our
gaze-cueing studies, where faces are irrelevant and to-be-ignored, would have such a large
capacity.
Another outstanding question relates to the extinction of trust learning in
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Experiment 5.1. This seems to be driven by the explicit nature of the minimal groups
manipulation. We did in fact collect some additional data from a similar experiment
(not reported in this thesis) where we kept all references to separate groups of faces but
simply did not assign participants to be a part of them, thereby creating two `out-groups'
in the stimuli, and we found that this too resulted in extinction of trust learning. This
could suggest that making a group-level representation salient is enough to make
participants use it as a heuristic, even when it is not personally relevant. Given that trust
learning was observed when race was the key manipulation (and throughout the thesis
when faces of dierent sexes were used), a potentially interesting follow-up study could
be to replicate Experiment 6.1 but make the distinction of the two races experimentally
salient, to see if this is also capable of extinguishing individual trust learning.
An avenue for future research might be to investigate how incidental learning of
gaze cues might emerge in dierent populations, such as individuals with autism. Autism
is characterised by a set of symptoms relating to poor social and communicative skills, as
well as repetitive or obsessive behaviours or interests (Baron-Cohen, 2004). The
condition is also associated with gaze processing decits, that appear to be due to the
interpretation and use of gaze information to coordinate with others (Pelphrey, Morris &
McCarthy, 2005). It would be interesting to see how individuals who meet the clinical
criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) would behave in the context of this
gaze-cueing paradigm. There is evidence that individuals with ASD are sensitive to gaze
direction and do show cueing eects (Kuhn et al., 2010), but these are atypical compared
with controls (Freeth, Chapman, Ropar & Mitchell, 2010). As for incidental learning
from these gaze cues, it is dicult to predict. While Bayliss and Tipper (2006) did show
a negative correlation between incidental trust learning from gaze cues and autistic-like
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traits, there is other evidence that individuals with ASD can use other social cues such
as emotion to inform trustworthiness judgements (Cauleld, Ewing, Burton, Avard &
Rhodes, 2014), and can also use gaze direction to bias memory and preference
judgements for features of a scene in a similar way to controls (Freeth, Ropar, Chapman
& Mitchell, 2010). It would therefore be interesting to investigate this in a clinical
population, particularly using the more sensitive scalar ratings measures employed in the
current experiments.
8.3 Summary
This thesis investigated incidental learning of trust from gaze cues. Over the course of
six experimental chapters, eighteen experiments probed the limitations and features of
this eect and found several key and some surprising points. Firstly, this learning is
driven primarily by decreases in trustworthiness for invalid faces, and this is particularly
prevalent when using neutral faces, which suggests that this learning is geared towards
detecting cheaters and deceptive interaction partners. Learning is specic to trust, and
appears to happen outside of conscious awareness. Memory for trustworthiness is
surprisingly durable and is sensitive to the initial familiarity with the faces, but this
memory does not impact subsequent perception of or memory for the physical features of
faces. Learning is sensitive to the context of social groups   when faces belong to
naturally occurring in- and out-groups participants appear to be sensitive to this and
learn better about in-groups than out-groups, but if this distinction is part of an explicit
experimental manipulation as when participants are assigned to minimal groups then this
can override learning about individual behaviours. We also found that this phenomenon
cannot be explained purely by visuomotor uency, as learning did not emerge in a
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task-switching procedure where there were no physical changes to the faces. Finally,
even though trust learning is driven by patterns of eye-gaze, as trust learning develops
this does not feedback and aect the attentional orienting triggered by the eye-gaze.
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Appendices
A Results of conventional statistics
This appendix contains the tables of conventional ANOVAs, intended to supplement the
analysis used throughout the thesis and to help interpretation of effects. All ANOVAs
were run using the ez package in R. Partial eta squared (2P ) has been calculated by
hand using the output of this analysis. For those analyses where the results of ANOVAs
are included in the main text (i.e. trustworthiness ratings in Chapters 5 and 6), these
are not repeated.
All analyses performed here include block as a factor, and this is done to show that
although experiments may occasionally demonstrate an interaction of validity and block
that may suggest participants are learning to overcome invalid cues (c.f. Experiment
3.5), when looking at the larger picture this is clearly not the case. We also provide
figures of RTs and accuracy rates broken down across experimental blocks where these
figures have not been included in the main text, to aid clarity of communication.
Note that where corrections for the violation of sphericity assumptions have been
used (i.e. where degrees of freedom are not integers), the correction is
Greenhouse-Geisser.
Chapter 2
Table A.1: Experiment 2.1: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 144496394.70 4749159.60 699.79 0.00 * 0.97
Block 1.92 44.16 896491.10 958578.90 21.51 0.00 * 0.48
Validity 1 23 100831.70 48378.60 47.94 0.00 * 0.68
Block:Validity 4 92 10619.70 215111 1.14 0.34 0.05
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Table A.2: Experiment 2.1: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 1908167 16934.90 25915620483 0.00 * 0.99
Block 4 92 1527.34 10441.41 3.36 0.01 * 0.13
Validity 1 23 10.42 1575.52 0.15 0.70 0.01
Block:Validity 4 92 210.94 3320.31 1.46 0.22 0.06
Table A.3: Experiment 2.1: Results of a 2x2 (time x validity) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 185680.04 34248.96 124.69 0.00 * 0.84
Time 1 23 1134.38 4917.62 10.36 0.00 * 0.19
Validity 1 23 3725.04 8266.96 10.36 0.00 * 0.31
Time:Validity 1 23 1584.38 4792.62 7.60 0.01 * 0.25
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Figure A.1: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 2.2
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
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Table A.4: Experiment 2.2: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 166918011.09 3030587.30 1266.79 0.00 * 0.98
Block 1.86 42.72 1488731.71 1092908.38 31.33 0.00 * 0.58
Validity 1 23 100035.26 89951.03 25.58 0.00 * 0.53
Block:Validity 4 92 18072.67 339735.19 1.22 0.31 0.05
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Figure A.2: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
2.2 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.5: Experiment 2.2: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 2043107 6443.85 7292.45 0.00 * 1.00
Block 4 92 1076.82 11970.05 2.07 0.09 0.08
Validity 1 23 4.07 1062.34 0.09 0.77 0.00
Block:Validity 4 92 166.02 3005.86 1.27 0.29 0.05
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Table A.6: Experiment 2.2: Results of a 2x2 (time x validity) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 5835.96 20220.54 6.64 0.02 * 0.22
Time 1 23 7.18 10691.01 0.02 0.90 0.00
Validity 1 23 1542.01 6467.89 5.48 0.03 * 0.19
Time:Validity 1 23 2516.38 4791.83 12.08 0.00 * 0.34
Table A.7: Experiments 2.1 and 2.2: Results of a 2x2 mixed factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings across expression (smiling/neutral; between subjects) and validity (valid/invalid; within
subjects)
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 46 1228.19 25744.41 2.19 0.15 0.05
Expression 1 46 872.27 25744.41 1.56 0.22 0.03
Validity 1 46 7356.56 17863.54 18.94 0.00 * 0.29
Expression:Validity 1 46 321.29 17863.54 0.83 0.37 0.02
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Figure A.3: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 2.3
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
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Table A.8: Experiment 2.3: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 151217500 3158464.60 1101.17 0.00 * 0.98
Block 2.18 50.24 1355386 826177.10 37.73 0.00 * 0.62
Validity 1 23 68011.92 108231.10 14.45 0.00 * 0.39
Block:Validity 2.44 56.13 7913.63 334116.30 0.54 0.70 0.02
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Figure A.4: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
2.3 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.9: Experiment 2.3: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 2031590 7413.90 6302.56 0.00 1.00
Block 2.52 58.00 990.56 18579.75 1.23 0.31 0.05
Validity 1 23 58.76 1288.90 1.05 0.32 0.04
Block:Validity 4 92 318.03 3627.28 2.02 0.10 0.08
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Table A.10: Experiment 2.3: Results of a 2x2 (time x validity) factorial ANOVA on likeability
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 1345.32 5201.53 5.95 0.02 * 0.21
Time 1 23 13.59 1527 0.20 0.66 0.01
Validity 1 23 3.14 1671.84 0.04 0.84 0.00
Time:Validity 1 23 125.18 1276.56 2.26 0.15 0.09
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1 2 3 4 5
Block
RT
 (m
s)
Invalid
Valid
Figure A.5: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 2.4
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.11: Experiment 2.4: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 194028837.20 4605779.65 1221.69 0.00 * 0.98
Block 2.70 78.30 1532746.84 1423146.06 31.23 0.00 * 0.52
Validity 1 29 136805.24 177644.04 22.33 0.00 * 0.44
Block:Validity 4 116 28615.24 411962.29 2.01 0.10 0.06
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Figure A.6: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
2.4 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.12: Experiment 2.4: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 2530128.59 12347.50 5942.39 0.00 * 1.00
Block 4 116 1001.61 12793.80 2.27 0.07 0.07
Validity 1 29 2.71 922 0.09 0.77 0.00
Block:Validity 4 116 205.82 4845.69 1.23 0.30 0.04
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Figure A.7: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 3.1
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.13: Experiment 3.1: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 181702558.03 3066083.22 1718.60 0.00 * 0.98
Block 2.01 58.18 1187893.28 1541979.38 22.34 0.00 * 0.44
Validity 1 29 161094.12 124785.72 37.44 0.00 * 0.56
Block:Validity 4 116 39311.80 453493.56 2.51 0.05 * 0.08
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Figure A.8: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
3.1 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.14: Experiment 3.1: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 2565663.83 6281.76 11844.49 0.00 * 1.00
Block 4 116 952.72 11556.49 2.39 0.05 0.08
Validity 1 29 5.62 1109.83 0.15 0.70 0.01
Block:Validity 3.35 97.23 38.08 3491 0.32 0.83 0.01
Table A.15: Experiment 3.1: Results of a 2x2 (time x validity) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 556.31 36335.03 0.44 0.51 0.02
Time 1 29 115.79 3248.28 1.03 0.32 0.03
Validity 1 29 1429.16 7190.22 5.76 0.02 * 0.17
Time:Validity 1 29 1088.27 4893.39 6.45 0.02 * 0.18
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Figure A.9: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 3.2
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.16: Experiment 3.2: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 216425386.21 6905925.56 908.83 0.00 * 0.97
Block 2.66 77.23 2565372.43 1594537.15 46.66 0.00 * 0.62
Validity 1 29 50569.08 194808.87 7.53 0.01 * 0.21
Block:Validity 2.81 81.42 35177.11 671721.96 1.52 0.22 0.05
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Figure A.10: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
3.2 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.17: Experiment 3.2: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 2571865.82 7484.33 9965.37 0.00 * 1.00
Block 3.34 96.94 1153.84 10185.58 3.29 0.02 * 0.10
Validity 1 29 1.17 1438.28 0.02 0.88 0.00
Block:Validity 4 116 45.06 4245.98 0.31 0.87 0.01
Table A.18: Experiment 3.2: Results of a 2x2 (time x validity) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 266.26 62697.53 0.12 0.73 0.00
Time 1 29 402.42 5461.38 2.14 0.15 0.07
Validity 1 29 1038.41 6261.17 4.81 0.04 * 0.14
Time:Validity 1 29 280.60 6532.82 1.25 0.27 0.04
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Figure A.11: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 3.3
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.19: Experiment 3.3: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 193230210.02 4113244.89 1362.35 0.00 * 0.98
Block 2.50 72.52 1980669.40 1141249.64 50.33 0.00 * 0.63
Validity 1 29 142786.66 124887.58 33.16 0.00 * 0.53
Block:Validity 2.73 79.18 28178.58 673214.09 1.21 0.31 0.04
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Figure A.12: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
3.3 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.20: Experiment 3.3: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 2568031.38 3975.41 18733.37 0.00 * 1.00
Block 2.79 80.86 4520.88 14287.55 9.18 0.00 * 0.24
Validity 1 29 25.69 991.52 0.75 0.39 0.03
Block:Validity 4 116 32.27 3794.76 0.25 0.91 0.01
Table A.21: Experiment 3.3: Results of a 2x2 (time x validity) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 656.84 10802.60 1.76 0.19 0.06
Time 1 29 103.14 3135.11 0.95 0.34 0.03
Validity 1 29 1456.03 10567.39 4 0.06 0.12
Time:Validity 1 29 1445.60 4644.79 9.03 0.01 * 0.24
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Figure A.13: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 3.4
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.22: Experiment 3.4: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 201528160.75 5112404.03 1143.16 0.00 * 0.98
Block 4 116 1722498.23 1197859.08 41.70 0.00 * 0.59
Validity 1 29 63196.84 88401.25 20.73 0.00 * 0.42
Block:Validity 4 116 28268.28 469156.19 1.75 0.14 0.06
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Figure A.14: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
3.4 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.23: Experiment 3.4: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 2520778.77 6005.78 12172.03 0.00 * 1.00
Block 4 116 733.93 9169.22 2.32 0.06 0.07
Validity 1 29 8.84 1446.21 0.18 0.68 0.01
Block:Validity 4 116 42.01 4223.39 0.29 0.88 0.01
Table A.24: Experiment 3.4: Results of a 2x2 (time x validity) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 758.78 18637.01 1.18 0.29 0.04
Time 1 29 76 3781.65 0.58 0.45 0.02
Validity 1 29 245.82 7935.10 0.90 0.35 0.03
Time:Validity 1 29 343.41 3215.24 3.10 0.09 0.10
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Table A.25: Experiment 3.5: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times across all six blocks
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 236791305.16 6599722.71 1040.49 0.00 * 0.97
Block 2.57 74.53 1421389.09 2295398.17 17.96 0.00 * 0.38
Validity 1 29 133569.96 193472.64 20.02 0.00 * 0.41
Block:Validity 3.88 112.62 67146.71 554109.08 3.51 0.01 * 0.11
Table A.26: Experiment 3.5: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times over the final two blocks of gaze cueing, where cueing behaviour reversed
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 67869665.45 2021687.68 973.55 0.00 * 0.97
Block 1 29 11728.69 167398.36 2.03 0.16 0.07
Validity 1 29 4988.85 112268.57 1.29 0.27 0.04
Block:Validity 1 29 1034.73 73528.27 0.41 0.53 0.01
Table A.27: Experiment 3.5: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates across all six blocks
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 1238.83 3.12 11515.46 0.00 * 1.00
Block 5 145 0.54 5.79 2.70 0.02 * 0.09
Validity 1 29 0.02 0.56 0.88 0.36 0.03
Block:Validity 3.79 109.91 0.20 2 2.83 0.03 * 0.09
Table A.28: Experiment 3.5: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates over the final two blocks of gaze cueing, where cueing behaviour reversed
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 426.55 1.87 6602.13 0.00 * 1.00
Block 1 29 0.04 0.80 1.54 0.23 0.05
Validity 1 29 0.00 0.23 0.14 0.71 0.00
Block:Validity 1 29 0.04 0.64 1.62 0.21 0.05
Table A.29: Experiment 3.5: Results of a 2x2 (time x validity) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 1597.79 28862.52 1.61 0.22 0.05
Time 1 29 2.30 5325.24 0.01 0.91 0.00
Validity 1 29 262.92 4961.78 1.54 0.23 0.05
Time:Validity 1 29 1042.09 4217.09 7.17 0.01 * 0.20
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Figure A.15: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 4.1
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.30: Experiment 4.1: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 150908973.74 2709866.85 1280.84 0.00 * 0.98
Block 1.84 42.41 755947.70 976305.87 17.81 0.00 * 0.44
Validity 1 23 77245.22 97889.84 18.15 0.00 * 0.44
Block:Validity 4 92 5411.05 428946.77 0.29 0.88 0.01
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Figure A.16: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
4.1 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.31: Experiment 4.1: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 838.28 2.22 8671.39 0.00 * 1.00
Block 2.71 62.38 0.22 3.37 1.47 0.23 0.06
Validity 1 23 0.03 0.34 1.70 0.21 0.07
Block:Validity 4 92 0.04 1.23 0.70 0.59 0.03
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Figure A.17: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 4.2
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.32: Experiment 4.2: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction
times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 22 150813672.15 4954058.99 669.73 0.00 * 0.97
Block 2.57 56.58 1566289.61 965350.49 35.70 0.00 * 0.62
Validity 1 22 44151.50 129782.10 7.48 0.01 * 0.25
Block:Validity 2.09 46 5973.05 383126.35 0.34 0.72 0.02
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Figure A.18: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
4.2 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.33: Experiment 4.2: Results of a 2x5 (validity x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy
rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 22 781.46 1.82 9426.83 0.00 * 1.00
Block 4 88 0.67 3.17 4.64 0.00 * 0.17
Validity 1 22 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.84 0.00
Block:Validity 4 88 0.01 1.40 0.11 0.98 0.00
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Figure A.19: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 4.3
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials in the short SOA (500ms, left plot) and
long SOA conditions (1,000ms, right plot). Note that SOA as a factor only affected the paradigm
after cueing had ended, and so these conditions were identical at the point that these data were
collected. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.34: Experiment 4.3: Results of a 2x2x5 (SOA x validity x block) factorial ANOVA on
reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 38 2.74e+08 4121431.19 2529.72 0.00 * 0.99
SOA 1 38 349204.07 4121431.19 3.22 0.08 0.08
Block 2.29 86.88 2.24e+06 1953630.34 43.60 0.00 * 0.53
Validity 1 38 269136.86 227815.07 44.89 0.00 * 0.54
SOA:Block 2.29 86.88 66317.96 1953630.34 1.29 0.28 0.03
SOA:Validity 1 38 378.09 227815.07 0.06 0.80 0.00
Block:Validity 3.25 123.36 12725.64 677135.74 0.71 0.56 0.02
SOA:Block:Validity 3.25 123.36 33154.19 677135.74 1.86 0.14 0.05
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Figure A.20: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
4.3 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials in the short SOA (500ms, left plot)
and long SOA conditions (1,000ms, right plot). Note that SOA as a factor only affected the
paradigm after cueing had ended, and so these conditions were identical at the point that these
data were collected. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.35: Experiment 4.3: Results of a 2x2x5 (SOA x validity x block) factorial ANOVA on
accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 38 1331.21 3.68 13755.06 0.00 * 1.00
SOA 1 38 0.00 3.68 0.03 0.87 0.00
Block 4 152 1.08 6.48 6.33 0.00 * 0.14
Validity 1 38 0.01 0.53 0.73 0.40 0.02
SOA:Block 4 152 0.11 6.48 0.66 0.62 0.02
SOA:Validity 1 38 0.00 0.53 0.07 0.80 0.00
Block:Validity 4 152 0.02 2.70 0.25 0.91 0.01
SOA:Block:Validity 4 152 0.10 2.70 1.41 0.23 0.04
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Table A.36: Experiment 4.3: Results of a 2x2x2 (SOA x validity x time) factorial ANOVA on
trustworthiness ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 38 5428.90 26030.87 7.93 0.01 * 0.17
SOA 1 38 0.62 26030.87 0.00 0.98 0.00
Time 1 38 1.70 8815.69 0.01 0.93 0.00
Validity 1 38 1003.75 6262.50 6.09 0.02 * 0.14
SOA:Time 1 38 411.20 8815.69 1.77 0.19 0.04
SOA:Validity 1 38 174.83 6262.50 1.06 0.31 0.03
Time:Validity 1 38 570.97 4110.82 5.28 0.03 * 0.12
SOA:Time:Validity 1 38 25.40 4110.82 0.23 0.63 0.01
Table A.37: Experiment 4.3: Results of a 2x2 (SOA x validity) factorial ANOVA on image ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 38 1559.82 71.30 831.37 0.00 * 0.96
SOA 1 38 2.91 71.30 1.55 0.22 0.04
Validity 1 38 0.13 4.40 1.14 0.29 0.03
SOA:Validity 1 38 0.41 4.40 3.57 0.07 0.09
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Figure A.21: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 5.1
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials with in-group (left plot) and out-group
members (right plot) as the cueing faces. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.38: Experiment 5.1: Results of a 2x2x5 (group x validity x block) factorial ANOVA on
reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 3.55e+08 7.87e+06 1308.39 0.00 * 0.98
Block 2.65 76.79 2.78e+06 1.81e+06 44.50 0.00 * 0.61
Validity 1 29 256878.42 185140.81 40.24 0.00 * 0.58
Group 1 29 4600.28 137859.94 0.97 0.33 0.03
Block:Validity 2.76 80.05 36207.44 964282.39 1.09 0.36 0.04
Block:Group 2.93 84.99 10861.30 834019.30 0.38 0.76 0.01
Validity:Group 1 29 1274.22 145607.86 0.25 0.62 0.01
Block:Validity:Group 2.90 83.99 30575.44 1.22e+06 0.73 0.53 0.02
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Figure A.22: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
5.1 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials with in-group (left plot) and out-group
members (right plot) as the cueing faces. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.39: Experiment 5.1: Results of a 2x2x5 (group x validity x block) factorial ANOVA on
accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 5.14e+06 13315.86 11194 0.00 * 1.00
Block 4 116 1419.16 18653.76 2.21 0.07 0.07
Validity 1 29 56.02 2411 0.67 0.42 0.02
Group 1 29 4.17 4233.68 0.03 0.87 0.00
Block:Validity 4 116 428.07 6610.13 1.88 0.12 0.06
Block:Group 4 116 314.99 9223.21 0.99 0.42 0.03
Validity:Group 1 29 104.17 2276.04 1.33 0.26 0.04
Block:Validity:Group 4 116 135.71 7978.88 0.49 0.74 0.02
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Figure A.23: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 5.2
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials with faces wearing blue (left plot) and
yellow shirts (right plot) as the cueing faces. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.40: Experiment 5.2: Results of a 2x2x5 (shirt colour x validity x block) factorial ANOVA
on reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 4.02e+08 1.12e+07 1043.93 0.00 * 0.97
Block 2.26 65.50 3.10e+06 2.31e+06 38.91 0.00 * 0.57
Validity 1 29 269363.75 356110.60 21.94 0.00 * 0.43
Colour 1 29 60683.60 186645.20 9.43 0.00 * 0.25
Block:Validity 2.48 71.96 16215.89 1.29e+06 0.37 0.74 0.01
Block:Colour 4 116 113579.60 985068.90 3.34 0.01 * 0.10
Validity:Colour 1 29 117868.49 262405.70 13.03 0.00 * 0.31
Block:Validity:Colour 4 116 11771.29 835460.60 0.41 0.80 0.01
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Figure A.24: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
5.2 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials with faces wearing blue (left plot)
and yellow shirts (right plot) as the cueing faces. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.41: Experiment 5.2: Results of a 2x2x5 (shirt colour x validity x block) factorial ANOVA
on accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 29 5.23e+06 9718.63 15614.73 0.00 * 1.00
Block 3.01 87.27 4191.15 22253.30 5.46 0.00 * 0.16
Validity 1 29 46.30 1566.55 0.86 0.36 0.03
Colour 1 29 16.67 1891.32 0.26 0.62 0.01
Block:Validity 4 116 21.12 7020.54 0.09 0.99 0.00
Block:Colour 4 116 154.92 9213.14 0.49 0.74 0.02
Validity:Colour 1 29 4.17 2483.68 0.05 0.83 0.00
Block:Validity:Colour 4 116 338.14 7391.03 1.33 0.26 0.04
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Figure A.25: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 6.1
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials with own-race (left plot) and other-race
individuals (right plot) as the cueing faces. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.42: Experiment 6.1: Results of a 2x2x5 (race x validity x block) factorial ANOVA on
reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 59 8.66e+08 2.80e+08 1824.55 0.00 * 0.97
Block 2.80 165.13 6.00e+06 5.74e+06 61.59 0.00 * 0.51
Validity 1 59 285313.70 449543.20 37.45 0.00 * 0.39
Race 1 59 14212.36 613819.40 1.37 0.25 0.02
Block:Validity 4 236 8628.08 1.55e+06 0.33 0.86 0.01
Block:Race 3.08 181.80 16428.97 1721763 0.56 0.64 0.00
Validity:Race 1 59 3.91 528676.50 0.00 0.98 0.00
Block:Validity:Race 3.45 203.83 48620.95 2.25e+06 1.27 0.28 0.02
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Figure A.26: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
6.1 in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) trials with own-race (left plot) and
other-race individuals (right plot) as the cueing faces. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.43: Experiment 6.1: Results of a 2x2x5 (race x validity x block) factorial ANOVA on
accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 59 1.03e+07 32094.10 19011.48 0.00 * 1.00
Block 4 236 260.91 35091.52 0.44 0.78 0.01
Validity 1 59 194.68 4779.28 2.40 0.12 0.04
Race 1 59 0.93 3497.34 0.02 0.90 0.00
Block:Validity 4 236 205.93 16747.19 0.73 0.58 0.01
Block:Race 4 236 127.11 16409.35 0.46 0.77 0.01
Validity:Race 1 59 75 3693.40 1.23 0.27 0.02
Block:Validity:Race 3.30 194.90 346.441 16019.88 1.28 0.28 0.02
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Figure A.27: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 7.1
in response to switch (solid) and repeat (dotted line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.44: Experiment 7.1: Results of a 2x5 (trial x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 2.11e+08 4.09e+06 1186.49 0.00 * 0.98
Block 2.53 58.10 59014.34 2.65e+06 0.51 0.64 0.02
Trial 1 23 468567.03 284170 37.92 0.00 * 0.62
Block:Trial 2.90 66.77 8315.41 759859.50 0.25 0.85 0.01
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Figure A.28: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
7.1 in response to switch (solid) and repeat (dotted line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.45: Experiment 7.1: Results of a 2x5 (trial x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 2.16e+06 1648.27 30141.54 0.00 * 1.00
Block 4 92 518.55 3567.38 3.34 0.01 * 0.13
Trial 1 23 605.63 281.09 49.56 0.00 * 0.68
Block:Trial 4 92 80.40 2333.66 0.79 0.53 0.03
Table A.46: Experiment 7.1: Results of a 2x2 (time x trial) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 2512.54 25014.03 2.31 0.14 0.09
Time 1 23 77.27 2559.29 0.69 0.41 0.03
Trial 1 23 410.96 1645.65 5.74 0.03 * 0.20
Time:Trial 1 23 7.11 887.89 0.18 0.67 0.01
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Figure A.29: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all five blocks in Experiment 7.2
in response to switch (solid) and repeat (dotted line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.47: Experiment 7.2: Results of a 2x5 (trial x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 6.87e+07 2.94e+06 536.74 0.00 * 0.96
Block 2.69 61.79 202119.71 822782.90 5.65 0.00 * 0.20
Trial 1 23 215415.87 183275 27.03 0.00 * 0.54
Block:Trial 4 92 16099.07 212855.70 1.74 0.15 0.07
248
Appendix A
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5
Block
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
 co
rre
ct)
Switch
Repeat
Figure A.30: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all five blocks in Experiment
7.2 in response to switch (solid) and repeat (dotted line) trials. Error bars show standard error.
Table A.48: Experiment 7.2: Results of a 2x4 (trial x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 1.65e+06 11382.16 3330.06 0.00 * 0.99
Block 2.58 59.39 12188.48 30061.52 9.33 0.00 * 0.29
Trial 1 23 666.67 872.40 17.58 0.00 * 0.43
Block:Trial 4 92 119.47 1974.28 1.39 0.24 0.06
Table A.49: Experiment 7.2: Results of a 2x2 (time x trial) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 1210.37 25720.25 1.08 0.31 0.04
Time 1 23 891.97 4510.76 4.55 0.04 * 0.17
Trial 1 23 33.40 1679.03 0.46 0.51 0.02
Time:Trial 1 23 26.96 471.36 1.32 0.26 0.05
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Figure A.31: Timecourse of reaction times in milliseconds across all four blocks in Experiment 7.3
in response to switch (solid), repeat (dotted), and prepare (dashed line) trials. Error bars show
standard error.
Table A.50: Experiment 7.3: Results of a 3x4 (trial x block) factorial ANOVA on reaction times
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 8.82e+07 2.05e+06 989.37 0.00 * 0.98
Block 2.10 48.39 21048.52 767548.42 0.63 0.54 0.03
Trial 1.26 28.90 247142.71 175776.35 32.34 0.00 * 0.58
Block:Trial 4.34 99.78 16427.32 143166.86 2.64 0.03 * 0.10
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Figure A.32: Timecourse of accuracy rates as percentage correct across all four blocks in
Experiment 7.3 in response to switch (solid), repeat (dotted), and prepare (dashed line) trials.
Error bars show standard error.
Table A.51: Experiment 7.3: Results of a 3x4 (trial x block) factorial ANOVA on accuracy rates
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 23 1.45e+06 8121.09 4110.50 0.00 * 0.99
Block 2.22 50.98 14503.04 6402.17 52.10 0.00 * 0.69
Trial 2 46 54.82 107.68 11.71 0.00 * 0.34
Block:Trial 4.16 95.79 18.45 348.22 1.22 0.31 0.05
Table A.52: Experiment 7.3: Results of a 2x3 (time x trial) factorial ANOVA on trustworthiness
ratings
Effect DFn DFd SSn SSd F p * 2P
(Intercept) 1 26 619.32 56295.17 0.29 0.60 0.01
Time 1 26 952.18 5338.69 4.64 0.04 * 0.15
Trial 2 52 602.69 14410.54 1.09 0.34 0.04
Time:Trial 2 52 775.26 6905.47 2.92 0.06 0.10
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B Interference task used in Experiments 3.2 and 3.3
Figure A.33: Examples of object-directed actions in the allocentric (third person; top row) and
egocentric (first person; bottom row) perspectives. Each participant would only see either object
pairing 1 (with object 1 in the allocentric perspective and object 2 in the egocentric) or object
pairing 2 (vice versa), although the order of which perspective orientation was presented first was
counterbalanced across objects and participants.
Stimuli were videos of pairs of everyday household objects - see Appendix C for full list.
Each pair of objects was broadly matched to appear physically similar to the other object
as possible while still remaining visually distinct enough to differentiate between the
two. Videos showed the object sitting on a plain black surface before a hand appeared
from either the top (allocentric perspective, third person) or bottom (egocentric, first
person) of the screen, picked it up and brought it back off screen and out of sight. See
Figure A.33 for screen caps of the four different video conditions for one object pair.
Videos were captured using a GoPro Hero 3 Black Edition video camera mounted
on a tripod and capturing images with a resolution of 1080 and recording speed of 25fps.
The camera occupied the same position for all videos regardless of action orientation.
Each object was filmed once from the ego- and allocentric perspectives, resulting in 48
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videos in total. Each video was cropped and edited using Adobe Premiere Elements 12
such that each video began 3 seconds before the hand first appeared, and ended 3
seconds after the object had disappeared from view. They were also visually cropped
such that the table was all that could be seen and each video was visually the same size.
All audio recordings were removed from the recordings as well.
Due to a black border around the edges of the videos, these were presented on a
black background, a clearly distinct visual experience from the white-backed surrounding
tasks. Participants were told that they would see two objects that would be picked up
and moved off screen, and their task was simply to judge which of the two they
preferred. Before each video a white fixation cross appeared in the centre of the screen,
and then the video would play.
Participant response conditions
IIn the first condition, participants saw images of the objects (the first frame of the
video clips) presented side by side alongside key pairings. In this condition, the keys
were the numbers 1 and 2, which are located next to each other on a normal QWERTY
keyboard, meaning that participants' responses did not differ in terms of gross action
mapping between the two conditions. This is the Low action mapping condition.
In the second condition, participants saw the images side by side, but instead of
pressing 1 and 2, they pressed Z and M to identify whether their preferred image was
presented on the left or right side of the screen. As these keys are located at opposite
ends of a QWERTY keyboard, these two responses would be dissociable in terms of
response actions, as they would be mapped onto different sides of space. As such this is
the Medium action mapping condition.
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In the third condition, participants saw the images side by side, but instead of using
the keyboard they moved the mouse to the image that they preferred. In each trial,
participants had to click on a START location at the bottom of the screen, and then the
images would appear in the top two corners, meaning that participants had to simulate
a reaching motion with the mouse in order to click on the preferred object. The mouse
speed was slowed to encourage more motor movement, and after each trial participants
returned the mouse to the bottom of the screen to click on a NEXT button in order to
advance. This is the Moderate action mapping condition.
The final condition had no keyboard responses. Instead, participants were presented
with the images and they were instructed to point to their preferred image. The image
(left or right) was then registered by the experimenter and coded later. Participants
pointed at the object, and this action closely (although not exactly) mirrored the
grasping action in broad motor representations. This is the High action mapping
condition.
254
Appendix B
Results and Discussion
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Figure A.34: Stacked bar chart to show the average proportions of objects chosen as preferred when
grasped from an egocentric orientation (white) and those chosen when grasped from an allocentric
orientation (grey). The three bars show the results for the four different types of condition. Subject
ns are shown beneath the x-axis labels. Dashed line shows point of equal preference for ego- and
allo- videos (50%). ***p<1; yp<.10
The results of the four experiments are shown in Figure A.34. In the High condition
participants chose egocentrically grasped objects more than allocentrically grasped, but a
binomial test found this only approached conventional levels of significance (p = 0.062).
Participants chose the object grasped from the egocentric perspective on only 55.45% of
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trials.
There did not appear to be any bias in the Low (p = 0.272), or Medium (p = 0.295)
conditions. However, there was a significant bias towards selecting egocentrically
grasped images over allocentrically grasped images in the Moderate condition   where
participants responded using response keys that mapped onto the preferred image's
location in space (Z and M for left and right, respectively; p <.001). However, that this
bias emerges in this condition but only marginally in the High action mapping condition
(where participants have to actively reach out and point to their preferred object) is a
curious point, and one that might undermine our confidence in this finding.
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C List of objects used in filler task in Experiments 3.2 and
3.3
 Coloured wooden block
 Cafetiere
 Corkscrew
 Glass
 Hammer
 Computer mouse
 Mug
 Hole punch
 Scissors
 Screwdriver
 Tape measure
 Torch
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D Images used in Experiment 4.3
Arrows
Figure A.35: 16 images used as `arrow' stimuli in Experiment 4.3. These were described as
decorated images of the letter H during the experiment.
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Fractals
Figure A.36: 16 images of Mandelbrot fractal images used as stimuli in Experiment 4.3.
259
Appendix D
Kandinsky
Figure A.37: 16 images of Processing-generated Kandinsky-style artwork used as stimuli in
Experiment 4.3.
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E Results of EMG recording in Experiment 6.1
Experiment 6.1b was a replication and extension of Experiment 6.1a where in addition
to behavioural analysis we record electromyographic (EMG) activity. EMG is an
electrophysiological technique that measures electrical signals in muscles when they
contract. Facial EMG can be used to measure small contractions in muscles associated
with particular emotional expressions such as the corrugator supercilii (which runs
across the brow and is associated with frowning) and the zygomaticus major (which runs
from the corner of the mouth up the cheek towards the temple and is associated with
smiling). Studies have associated activity in these muscles with emotional responses to
stimuli   both muscles show heightened activity during observations of particular
emotional expressions (corrugator when frowning, zygomaticus when smiling; Dimberg,
Thunberg & Elmehed, 2000), but this emotional mimicry is influenced by the social
context of incoming visual information such that mimicry of smiles is inhibited when
they are perceived to be gloating (Kirkham, Hayes & Tipper, 2015). This points to facial
EMG signals as a measurement not of automatic motor imitation but of participants
embodied emotional states as they experience them.
To date, only one study has investigated EMG activity in incidentally learned trust
from gaze cues. Manssuer, Pawling et al. (2015) recorded from the corrugator and
zygomaticus, and found that signals in the corrugator increased when a participant
experienced invalid gaze cues. This points to an embodied emotional response to
deception, as the contraction of this muscle is an action coding unit for anger in the
Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978). Crucially, this embodied
response only emerged in participants who subsequently rated invalid faces as less
trustworthy than valid faces   in a selection of those participants who did not show this
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learning, there was no embodied emotional response.
In Experiment 6.1b, we record from these same facial muscles (corrugator and
zygomaticus) and measure activity in response to all four stimulus conditions (White
Valid; White Invalid; Chinese Valid; and Chinese Invalid), to see not only if invalid cues
lead to greater corrugator response, but also to investigate whether this response is
moderated by race. If the prediction regarding expectancy violation   that learning will
be stronger for events that are more surprising   it may be that this is reflected in the
EMG signal. Alternatively, the use of this electrophysiological technique may find such
a coding that behavioural measures are not sensitive to.
EMG Parameters and Preprocessing
Two pairs of 4mm Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with conductive electrolyte gel were secured
upon the left-hand side of the face of each participant using adhesive discs. The
electrodes were sited according to the guidance of van Boxtel (2010). A ground electrode
was also placed upon the forehead. Prior to the application of the electrodes, each site
was prepared by cleaning and exfoliating the skin, before wiping with an alcohol swab.
EMG activity was obtained at 2000Hz using a combination of BioPac systems (MP150
and EMG100C), and recorded using AcqKnowledge software.
Following the completion of each recording, the raw signal from each muscle was
filtered using a bandpass filter (20Hz - 500Hz) and a notch filter of 50Hz, before being
rectified and smoothed with an integration window of 50ms (100 samples).
EMG amplitude was then normalised across all trials around the average of the
activity during the final 500ms of the fixation screen, and then binned into 250ms
windows, and these are used to show signal timecourses. For the purposes of analysis,
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these data were then averaged across all bins and trials for each epoch and compared
across participants.
Corrugator Supercilii
Results of EMG recording from the corrugator are broken down by different periods of
the experiment. For the analysis of the gaze-cueing portion of the experiment, trials were
broken down into separate events: trial event 1 was where the face appeared showing
direct gaze for the first time for 1,500ms; trial event 2 was where the face shifted its gaze
for 500ms; trial event 3 was where the target appeared and participants made their
response, which lasted 2,500ms; and trial event 4 was where the face returned to direct
gaze for a further 1,000ms. These are examined separately and are shown in Figure A.38.
Trial event 1: Direct gaze
Adding validity to the null model did not explain significantly more of the variance than
did the null model ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.55, p = 0.458), nor did including
race ( = -0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.77, p = 0.380), and comparison of the
two-fixed-factor models found that an interaction term fit the data only marginally
better than when the two factors were modelled without an interaction ( = -0.00, SE =
0.00, 2(1) = 3.07, p = 0.080).
Trial events 2 and 3: Target appears
As trial event 2, where the face shifted its gaze, was the shortest of all trial events and
only yielded two data points per participant per condition (due to the data being binned
into 250ms chunks), trial events 2 and 3 (where the target appeared) were collapsed
together for analysis. Adding validity to the null model did not explain significantly
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Figure A.38: Timecourse of EMG signal recording in Experiment 6.1 in the corrugator supercilii
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) British (top plot) and Chinese faces (bottom
plot) during gaze cueing.
more of the variance than did the null model ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.58, p =
0.445), nor did including race ( = -0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.953), and there
was no evidence of any interaction between these two factors ( = -0.00, SE = 0.00,
2(1) = 2.16, p = 0.141).
Trial event 4: Return to direct gaze
For trial event 4, where the face returned to direct gaze after the participants' response
had been made, adding validity to the null model did not explain significantly more of
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Figure A.39: Timecourse of EMG signal recording in Experiment 6.1 in the corrugator supercilii
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) British (top plot) and Chinese faces (bottom
plot) during pre-experiment trustworthiness ratings.
the variance than did the null model ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.27, p = 0.600),
nor did including race ( = -0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.06, p = 0.803), and there was no
evidence of any interaction between these two factors ( = -0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) =
0.19, p = 0.664).
Trustworthiness ratings
For analysis of the trustworthiness ratings, EMG signal to all four conditions of faces in
the pre-experiment rating (see Figure A.39) and post-experiment rating (see Figure
A.40) were analysed together and time included in the modelling as a fixed factor.
Adding time to the null model did not explain significantly more of the variance
than did the null model ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.27, p = 0.605), nor did
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Figure A.40: Timecourse of EMG signal recording in Experiment 6.1 in the corrugator supercilii
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) British (top plot) and Chinese faces (bottom
plot) during post-experiment trustworthiness ratings.
including race ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.15, p = 0.697), but adding validity did
marginally improve the fit ( = -0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 2.93, p = 0.087). However,
comparing time and validity in both a two-factor and interaction model found no
evidence of an interaction ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.946), and nor did a
three-factor comparison of models with time, validity and race ( = -0, SE = 0.00, 2(4)
= 5.89, p = 0.207).
Zygomaticus Major
Results of EMG recordings from the zygomaticus major are examined separately and
shown in Figure A.41.
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Figure A.41: Timecourse of EMG signal recording in Experiment 6.1 in the zygomaticus major
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) British (top plot) and Chinese faces (bottom
plot) during gaze cueing.
Trial events 1 and 2: Direct gaze
Adding validity to the null model did not explain significantly more of the variance than
did the null model ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 1.70, p = 0.192), nor did including
race ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.25, p = 0.618), and there was no evidence of any
interaction between these two factors ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 2.62, p = 0.105).
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Figure A.42: Timecourse of EMG signal recording in Experiment 6.1 in the zygomaticus major
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) British (top plot) and Chinese faces (bottom
plot) during pre-experiment trustworthiness ratings.
Trial events 2 and 3: Target appears
For trial events 2 and 3, where the face shifted its gaze and the target object appeared in
either the cued or uncued location, adding validity to the null model did not explain
significantly more of the variance than did the null model ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) =
1.23, p = 0.268), nor did including race ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.40, p = 0.529),
and there was no evidence of any interaction between these two factors ( = 0.00, SE =
0.00, 2(1) = 2.04, p = 0.153).
Trial event 4: Return to direct gaze
For trial event 4, where the face returned to direct gaze after the participants' response
had been made, adding validity to the null model did not explain significantly more of
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Figure A.43: Timecourse of EMG signal recording in Experiment 6.1 in the zygomaticus major
in response to valid (dotted) and invalid (solid line) British (top plot) and Chinese faces (bottom
plot) during post-experiment trustworthiness ratings.
the variance than did the null model ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 1.99, p = 0.159),
nor did including race ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.33, p = 0.564), and there was no
evidence of any interaction between these two factors ( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) =
0.47, p = 0.494).
Trustworthiness ratings
For analysis of the trustworthiness ratings, EMG signal to all four conditions of faces in
the pre-experiment rating (see Figure A.42) and post-experiment rating (see Figure
A.43) were analysed together and time included in the modelling as a fixed factor.
Adding time to the null model explained significantly more of the variance than did
the null model ( = -0, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.05, p = 0.824), but including race did not
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( = 0.00, SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 0.00, p = 0.948), and nor did including validity ( = -0,
SE = 0.00, 2(1) = 1.04, p = 0.309). Similarly, comparing time and validity in both a
two-factor and interaction model found no evidence of an interaction ( = -0, SE =
0.00, 2(1) = 1.44, p = 0.230), and nor did a three-factor comparison of models with
time, validity and race ( = -0, SE = 0.00, 2(4) = 3.63, p = 0.459).
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